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Abstract
This thesis examines countermeasures to digital replay attacks using existing consumer smart de-
vice technology. The current literature shows virtually no significant research on practical solutions
to these attacks, which limits the ability to leverage such smart devices as biometric readers. Enhanc-
ing existing password-based authentication with biometrics has many positive benefits to users. The
ultimate goal is that, one day, accessing online accounts will be as simple as looking at your phone.
Current password-based authentication is complex, prone to error, and users find it difficult. Re-
placing passwords with hardware devices removes some of the complexity, but results in an accumu-
lation of more devices (or tokens). Both of these forms of authentication have the same weakness:
they only authenticate knowledge of the password, or possession of the token; they do not authenti-
cate the actual person. Anyone with possession of your ATM card and PIN can withdraw money from
your account, even though they are not you.
Biometric systems promise to provide usable authentication that identifies you as a person. You
benefit from additional security, and service providers benefit from being able to show who requested
the service.
Unfortunately, biometric systems have not experienced wide adoption, partly due to the expense
of deploying biometric sensors. The widespread deployment of consumer smart devices now offers
the opportunity to place biometric sensor devices in every user’s hands with little or no additional
expense. For example, the camera interface can capture face images of the user for authentication
purposes.
However, these devices cannot be fully trusted. Like many systems, they are many points within
the system that attackers may attack to their advantage. Users often know of presentation or spoofing
attacks due to their portrayal in popular movies. Nevertheless, defeating a face verification system
by using a photograph, video, or mask in front of the camera is becoming much more difficult due to
significant recent research efforts into anti-spoofing techniques. These techniques aim to distinguish
live people from facsimile copies.
Instead, if the attacker replaces the digital representation of the user’s face with that of a different
(but equally real) user’s face, the anti-spoofing and liveness testing will all conclude that the digital
signal is that of a real person. Thus, anti-spoofing technology completely fails to detect the forgery.
These attacks are termed digital replay attacks as they replace the valid digital signal by replaying
a previously obtained signal. Digital replay attacks are easy to implement, and may be widely auto-
mated using malicious software, such as viruses and trojan horses. Such attack automation uses the
smart device to capture valid images of the victim for use elsewhere at a later time. This is in contrast
to the spoofing attack, in which the attacker must carefully customise each attack for each intended
victim.
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Currently, little practical research determines countermeasures to defeat these digital replay at-
tacks. Some researchers have suggested solutions such as challenge-response to intelligent interface
devices, or encrypting all communication channels within the system. Most of these proposed solu-
tions are unproven.
The research in this thesis deliberately restricts solutions to those that are inexpensive, usable,
and secure. Solutions requiring new hardware or significant user cooperation are not viable in a
competitive marketplace that needs eager user cooperation and acceptance for success.
Based upon these constraints, no practical countermeasures to digital replay attacks exist today.
The lack of suitable countermeasures severely hampers the widespread deployment of biometrics
using consumer smart devices.
This thesis argues that deploying face verification systems on consumer smart devices improves
current online authentication. The thesis widely examines the current literature and forms a baseline
of current knowledge to address digital replay attacks. One practical countermeasure to defeat digital
replay attacks, proposed here, is to watermark the face verification video with a challenge-response
signal using structured illumination. Finally, the research examines a number of constraints within
the system that either are rectified, or require additional research.
Digital replay attacks must be defeated. They are a significant barrier to the dream that, one day,
instead of remembering a myriad of confusing passwords, secure authentication to online services
will be as simple as looking at your phone.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Today you are you!
That is truer than true!
There is no one alive. . .
. . . who is you-er than you!
Dr. Seuss,
Happy Birthday to You! 1959
Chapter Summary: Current user authentication based upon passwords suffers from many
deficiencies. Usable authentication systems may be available in the future, where the user
simply needs to look at their phone to access a variety of online services. Digital replay
attacks will impede the wide deployment of face verification systems on consumer smart
devices.
Users hate passwords [2]! The ever-bewildering password complexity rules make passwords dif-
ficult to remember. The seemingly never-ending accumulation of more passwords ultimately results
in users eventually forgetting one or more passwords [48, 66]. Replacing complex passwords with
hardware devices (tokens) has been expensive, inconsistent, and resulted in merely replacing an un-
manageable number of passwords with an unmanageable number of different devices. Just look at the
number of keys on your key ring to see an example.
Replacing passwords with another complex and unusable system will never succeed [22, 86, 190].
Authentication systems must be usable or users will attempt to circumvent them [81, 244].
Apart from usability problems, current authentication systems also suffer from another deficiency:
they only authenticate the possession of objects or knowledge. Ideally, authenticating to our online
accounts should relate to us as a person, and not just on what we possess or know. Biometric systems
provide authentication that identifies people based upon physical or behavioural characteristics of the
individual [100].
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One reason that biometric systems have not been widely deployed is due to the expense of in-
stalling biometric devices in all required locations. However, that is all about to change.
Today’s smart phones (and other devices such as tablets) have an array of interfaces that can
provide biometric data for authenticating to online systems. Cameras, microphones, accelerometers,
and more recently, fingerprint scanners, are already commonplace on these devices. As well, these
smart devices are also highly connected to the Internet.
Imagine being able to log into your bank account, your government benefits account, or many
other online services, simply by looking at your phone. For a service provider, there is a strong
incentive to be able to prove who completed a transaction if there is a dispute. Computers can now
provide face verification authentication. Face recognition is the natural way that humans recognise
each other.
Unfortunately, like any other system, there are multiple points where biometric systems may be
attacked [179]. Recent research addresses a number of these attack scenarios [6, 14, 41, 102, 133,
164, 182, 189].
Therefore, it is vital to address feasible attacks before deploying new authentication systems.
This thesis provides novel research on one such attack — the digital replay attack. To date,
virtually no research addresses digital replay attacks (shown in Section 3.5). Such attacks are easy to
perform, devastatingly successful, and represent a significant barrier to the widespread deployment of
authentication systems that use consumer smart devices. Chapter 3 describes digital replay attacks in
more detail.
Readers should not confuse digital replay attacks with spoofing attacks (sometimes called pre-
sentation attacks). Spoofing attacks occur by presenting a fake representation of the person, such
as a mask, to the biometric system. Recently, it took only a few days to defeat the recently added
fingerprint scanners on the Apple iPhone 5s [37] and Samsung Galaxy S5 phone [215] using fake
fingerprints.
Face verification systems, on the other hand, are becoming much more robust against simple
spoofing attacks such as photographs [14, 41, 52, 102, 133, 164]. Such anti-spoofing mechanisms
aim to distinguish between a fake representation of a person and a real person, by exploiting the
possibility that the spoof image is inferior to the real image in some measurable sense.
The challenge for anti-spoofing protection is that the replayed digital biometric signal is bit-for-bit
an exact replica of a legitimate biometric signal. Attempting to distinguish a real person from a fake
in the contents of the digital signal is simply not possible, since the biometric signal is of a real living
person. The underlying problem in a compromised system is that the authentication system has no
idea from where the digital biometric signal came from, or when!
Addressing digital replay attacks will significantly reduce their effectiveness and bring us a step
closer to simply looking at our phone or computer to gain access to our online accounts, hopefully to
banish confusing passwords into history forever.
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1.1 Goals and Challenges
The primary goal of this thesis is to provide a usable countermeasure against digital
replay attacks for face verification systems. The challenge is to do this without requiring
imposition or expense to the user, by leveraging unmodified consumer smart devices.
The original goal of this research was to investigate improving online authentication by using con-
sumer smart devices (such as desktop computers, laptops, tablets, and phones) as biometric readers.
Such devices are widely deployed, but are often untrusted. Chapter 2 describes why authentication
needs to be improved, and why face verification using a smart device as a biometric reader is a good
choice.
The benefits of using biometrics include a decreased reliance on stronger passwords, making it
easier for users to authenticate to online services. Rather than relying on dozens of complex pass-
words, the user would be able to use a common PIN, their smart device, and their face image to
authenticate. The use of a face image biometric to recognise users provides service providers with a
stronger audit trail for transactions, and enables convenient continuous authentication throughout the
entire transaction and not just at the start of it.
However, during the early stages of this research, it became clear that if such a system were
developed and deployed, it could be easily defeated through the application of the digital replay
attack. For a face verification system, the injection of a video of the victim user inside the client
system can completely bypass other security checks, such as liveness and anti-spoofing.
Existing proposals address digital replay attacks either by operating the system in a controlled
environment [21] or by deploying specialised hardware such as sensors that contain specific pro-
cessor chips [179]. Both techniques are expensive, limiting the widespread adoption of biometrics.
Consumer smart devices typically operate in uncontrolled environments with no specialised security
hardware.
Without a suitable solution, digital replay attacks will severely hamper the widespread deployment
of biometrics on consumer smart devices.
Consequently, the research questions in this thesis focus on the following:
Q1: What improvements will enhance the usability of current password authentication?
Q2: Which biometric modality is appropriate when deploying biometric systems that use consumer
smart devices?
Q3: Are there any obvious attacks to such a biometric system, and how could countermeasures
combat these attacks without requiring any enhancement to existing deployed hardware?
There are significant challenges in answering these research questions.
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Firstly, any proposed solutions must not decrease the usability of the system. Ideally, security
countermeasures would operate without any active involvement from the user.
Secondly, security countermeasures must be implemented using existing deployed hardware, and
not require the inclusion of specialised or non-standard devices or peripherals.
Most importantly, the system should not be expensive to implement, and should require little or
no cost to the end-user.
Whilst these limitations are self-imposed, they are fundamental to the creation of practical and
usable systems using today’s technology. Imposing even a small cost increase per device could result
in a multi-billion dollar expense to implement.
1.2 Contributions
This research work provides the first practical countermeasure against digital replay at-
tacks for face verification systems that use consumer smart devices. In addition, empirical
testing identifies and addresses several issues.
The research work documented in this thesis provides a number of significant contributions. Most
importantly, although this research builds on the work of others, it is the first practical solution for
face verification systems on consumer smart devices to combat digital replay attacks. In summary,
the contributions include:
• Proposing mechanisms to improve authentication above current password systems (in Chap-
ter 2);
• Examining usable biometric modalities on consumer smart devices (in Chapter 2);
• Illustrating the difference between the two main client-side biometric system attacks (in Chap-
ter 3);
• Providing a literature baseline on digital replay attacks (in Chapter 3);
• Validating the effectiveness of digital replay attacks on consumer smart devices (in Chapter 3);
• Construction of a reflection model suitable to analyse the components in the proposed reflection
systems (in Chapter 4);
• Proposing and evaluating in-band challenge-response watermarking countermeasures that use
structured illumination reflections to combat digital replay attacks (in Chapters 5, 6, and 9);
• Further examining limitations in the proposed countermeasures, and evaluating mechanisms to
overcome those limitations (in Chapters 7, 8, and 10);
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• Analysing the security of the proposed countermeasure to digital replay attacks, and proposing
additional countermeasures to combat new attacks (in Chapter 11).
A detailed review of the current literature (in Section 3.5) concludes that, although digital replay
attacks have been identified as an issue by others, no practical countermeasures to digital replay
attacks currently exist. Therefore, the proposed structured illumination reflection technique is one of
the first evaluated attempts to combat digital replay attacks for face verification systems that leverage
consumer smart devices as biometric readers.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis consists of 12 chapters and one appendix.
This section provides an outline of the entire thesis. Throughout this thesis, each chapter and
section provides a short summary. These summaries provide an outline of that part of the thesis.
Collectively, they form an outline of the entire thesis. The collection of summaries is located on
Page xxiv.
The remainder of this thesis consists of the next 11 chapters. Figure 1.1 is a diagram of the chapter
structure that links the different topics together.
1. Introduction 2. Authentication 3. Digital Replay Attacks
4. Reflection Model
5. Colour Eye 
Reflections
6. Colour Face 
Reflections 8. Frame Capture 
Delays
7. Colour Perception
9. Monochrome Face 
Reflections
10. Communications 
System 11. Security Analysis 12. Conclusion
Figure 1.1: Flow chart illustrating the connection between the chapters in this thesis.
Chapter 2 provides background material describing why authentication is so important, some
current computer-based authentication techniques (especially, passwords), and existing problems with
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authentication. Biometric systems, using physical characteristics to authenticate people, are one way
to resolve current authentication issues. Next, this chapter describes how a consumer smart device
can act as a biometric sensor by using the webcam for face verification. Continuous authentication
then becomes possible to use conveniently. A discussion on biometric system attacks, especially
related to smart device malware, closes this chapter. Readers familiar with computer and network
authentication, two-factor authentication, and biometrics may choose to skip this chapter.
Chapter 3 specifically focuses on comparing digital replay attacks with spoofing attacks, as some
readers might confuse these two attack types. As this thesis aims at addressing digital replay attacks,
it is important to understand these attacks completely. This chapter includes the literature review that
leads to the use of face verification on smart devices as a replacement for passwords, describes current
work address spoofing attacks, and searches for previous works that address digital replay attacks. A
simple demonstration highlights the effectiveness of digital replay attacks.
Chapter 4 extends a defined light reflection model to include the components that contribute to
the subsequent light reflection systems. These components interact, requiring techniques to isolate
one component from the others. The early light reflection systems in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 use the
proposed pixel subtraction technique to perform this isolation function.
Chapter 5 details the first attempt at addressing digital replay attacks, by observing reflected colour
light from the user’s eyes. Empirical analysis uncovers significant limitations that challenge the suc-
cess of such a system.
Chapter 6 expands on Chapter 5 by using the entire face to reflect the colours instead of just the
eyes. The face provides a significantly larger area of reflection, but introduces several other problems.
Smart devices also possess significant limitations discovered while researching this solution. Exper-
iments show some limited success under ideal conditions. A dataset of collected videos provides a
useful input to further studies.
From here, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 discuss two additional issues, before using knowledge gained
from these two chapters to propose the next system in Chapter 9.
Chapter 7 provides a deeper analysis of the way that webcams perceive colour. Several experi-
ments fail to identify a suitable mechanism that provides a robust classification of observed colour
reflections. This failure prompts a shift away from coloured illumination to monochrome illumination
in Chapter 9.
Chapter 8 examines the phenomenon of captured frames exhibiting illumination reflections that
contain more than one state. These semi-illuminated frames create classification errors in the systems
described in Chapter 6 and Chapter 9. The analysis identifies the primary cause for semi-illuminated
frames, and proposes a workaround solution.
Chapter 9 extends the work from Chapter 6 by replacing the colour illumination with monochrome
illumination. This modified system provides increased entropy, as well as successfully operating in
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a significantly wider variety of ambient environments. The system still failed in some of the more
challenging environments, such as outdoor daylight illumination.
Chapter 10 examines the limitations imposed by consumer smart device illumination operating
in several ambient environments. A detailed study identifies the limitations imposed on the system
usage, which will provide significant insight for similar systems in the future.
Chapter 11 then provides a security analysis of the proposed countermeasures to digital replay
attacks. Several new attacks against the countermeasure from Chapter 9 show that, like any security
system, new attacks are constantly developing over time. This requires new countermeasures on an
ongoing basis.
Chapter 12 concludes this thesis with a list of the main contributions of the research, and outlines
future directions for extension of the work.
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Chapter 2
Introduction to Authentication
Those who cannot remember the past
are condemned to repeat it.
George Santayana,
Reason in Common Sense, Vol 1, Ch XII. 1905
Chapter Summary: Face Verification that uses consumer smart devices to interact with
the user is desirable as a replacement for traditional password authentication.
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides information on authentication, biometrics, and biometric system
attacks. Readers familiar with computer and network authentication, two-factor authen-
tication, and biometrics may choose to skip this chapter.
For most of us, it is inconceivable to revert to life before the Internet. Although the information
age has only existed for just over half a century, the online information age, where users access online
services via the Internet, is barely 20 years old. Yet, this revolution has fundamentally changed the
way our lives are lived.
Computer-based authentication validates the identity of clients, which other security systems then
build upon to perform their tasks. Despite this enormous responsibility, computer-based authentica-
tion is fundamentally the same as it was 50 years ago! The authentication method still most widely
used today is the password. Passwords are difficult to remember, but they are cheap to deploy. With
the ever-increasing number and complexity of passwords, the need for improvements to authentica-
tion is increasing.
Basing authentication on physical characteristics of the person, such as their face, offers a promis-
ing alternative. However, such systems have traditionally been expensive.
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The smart device revolution may soon offer a cheaper alternative. It is now possible to use smart
devices as biometric sensors. However, systems designed this way are subject to a number of attacks.
Chapter 3 addresses specific biometric system attacks (spoofing attack and digital replay attack) in
further detail.
This chapter provides necessary background information on authentication, biometrics, and bio-
metric system attacks.
2.2 What is Authentication?
Authentication is the mechanism of proving the purported identity of a person.
The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary defines authenticate as “1. Establish the truth or gen-
uineness of. 2. Validate”. The dictionary further states the origin as “medieval Latin authenticare,
from late Latin authenticus” [144].
Authentication has been the cornerstone of security in computers and computer networks for
over 40 years [76]. In the early days of mainframe computers, users often authenticated to use the
computer by possession of the computer room key. Although it is possible to copy a key, recognition
of authorised computer users by other staff meant that it was difficult to gain unauthorised access.
Instead of issuing lots of keys, application programmers would generally be required to hand over
their programs to the computer operations staff for processing, rather than accessing the computer
directly [142].
Since those early days, the requirements for computer authentication have changed dramatically.
Primary drivers for change include decentralisation of computers and increased sophistication of at-
tacks against existing authentication schemes [7]. The requirement for additional security services
(such as access control, auditing, and non-repudiation) also increased, and authentication became the
foundation upon which other security services were built. For example, the Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria [231] required that trusted computer systems include identification and authenti-
cation, discretionary access control, and audit services (among other services) to achieve a Class C2
Rating. Since then, further security frameworks such as ITSEC [46], Common Criteria [147], and the
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) [170] have also specified the requirement
for authentication.
Authentication is related to, but separate from, identification [173]. Olsen [160] states, “Identifi-
cation is the process whereby a network element recognizes a valid user’s identity. Authentication is
the process of verifying the claimed identity of a user.” Without authentication, users may pretend to
be any asserted identity.
By viewing identification and authentication as separate entities, it is possible to assert an anony-
mous identification when engaging in the act of authentication. An example of this is using a key to
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access a locked Common Room. The key authenticates that user to the room, but does not provide
details of which specific user gained the access. Such situations are useful when the service requires
that clients are authorised to use the service, but do not need (or want) to know the identity of the
individual user (e.g., electronic voting [149]).
However, in many situations, the service will want to verify the purported identity of the client.
This might be to provide a specific service, to initiate a contract, authorise requested changes, grant
access to private information, and a variety of other similar activities.
2.3 Why is Authentication Important?
Authentication is the foundation upon which all other computer security services depend,
resulting in it being the target of many attacks.
As discussed in the previous section, service providers need to verify the identity of their clients.
Unfortunately, clients may often purport any identity, so it is important to perform robust authentica-
tion.
In Australia alone, during 2013–14, the “digital economy contributed $79 billion (or 5.1%) to
GDP”. If modelled as an industry, this would be larger than agriculture, transport, or retail indus-
tries [200]. In any large industry, there is a level of crime as well. Attacks against online authentica-
tion have led to financial losses, identity theft, and widespread privacy breaches.
It is difficult to determine an accurate figure for losses occurring from cybercrime, or the rate
that these crimes are occurring. The RSA 2012 Cybercrime Trends Report [187] states, “Cybercrime
continues to show no signs of slowing down.” Their conclusion was that, “Every minute, 232 com-
puters are infected by malware. The lightning speed at which cybercriminals develop attacks and new
malware code is making it harder for global organizations to manage fraud risk.”
The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) reported in their 2013 Internet Crime Report [96] that,
for the reports that they received, “In 2013, the IC3 received 262,813 consumer complaints with an
adjusted dollar loss of $781,841,611, which is a 48.8 percent increase in reported losses since 2012
($581,441,110).” Towards the other end of the spectrum, the 2005 FBI Computer Crime Survey [232]
estimated the financial losses as “$67.2 billion per year”, while Juniper Research recently claimed
that “the rapid digitisation of consumers’ lives and enterprise records will increase the cost of data
breaches to $2.1 trillion globally by 2019” [143].
Unfortunately, obtaining accurate global figures of losses from cybercrime is nearly impossible.
Floreˆncio and Herley identified in their recent study that unverified self-reporting in surveys of cy-
bercrime losses leads to sampling issues, biases in unverified data, and the loss of the signal into the
background noise due to refusal rates and small sample sizes [67].
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However, guided by this discussion, for the purposes of establishing the relative impact of the
cybercrime problem, it is reasonable to conjecture that:
• The cybercrime problem is already large;
• Cybercrime is continuing to grow in sophistication;
• Cybercrime will grow further if security solutions continue to use current defence methods.
2.4 Existing Computer Based Authentication
Computer authentication generally uses one or more of three authentication factors. Each
of these factors has advantages and disadvantages with deployment and use. The most
common authentication technique in use today is the password.
The Internet has revolutionised society in less than 20 years. Business transactions are increas-
ingly moving online, with connections to these services provided through the Internet. The require-
ment to authenticate individuals for the purposes of performing these transactions is also increasing.
In 1972, Browne noted that there are three basic approaches to authentication [28]. Thomas and
Courtney described these approaches (commonly known as factors) as [224] (emphasis added):
• “Something you have, such as a badge or a credit card”;
• “Something you know, such as a password”;
• “Something you are, such as a voice print or finger print”.
Yet, the process of authentication has been in use for centuries, long before the invention of
computers. These three authentication factors also feature prominently throughout history.
People have used Physical Objects for authentication for thousands of years. It is claimed that
somewhere between the 7th [214] and 3rd [106] centuries B.C., the Spartans used a tool called a
Skytale (or Scytale) to keep their messages from being intercepted by unauthorised clients [106]. The
Skytale was a cylinder of wood around with a strip of leather tightly wound with no gaps. The sender
writes the message vertically down the Skytale, so that each letter appears on a different part of the
winding. After removing the leather strip from the Skytale, the letters appeared to be scrambled, and
impossible to read. Only a person that possessed a Skytale with the same dimensions would be able to
reconstruct the message [201]. Although the primary use of the Skytale was to obscure the message,
the Skytale also provided a basic form of authentication since only someone with a similar Skytale
could have produced the original message. Kahn claims that this was the earliest form of military
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cryptography [106]. However, several authors have questioned the Spartans’ use of the Skytale for
protecting military secrets [109, 243].
For more than two thousand years, the second way that people have authenticated each other, es-
pecially in the realm of spies and the military, is by using Shared Secrets. During the 2nd century B.C.,
Polybius describes the use of watchwords by the Roman military in the following extract [translated
by Paton] [174]:
“The way in which they secure the passing round of the watchword for the night is as
follows: from the tenth maniple of each class of infantry and cavalry, the maniple which
is encamped at the lower end of the street, a man is chosen who is relieved from guard
duty, and he attends every day at sunset at the tent of the tribune, and receiving from him
the watchword — that is a wooden tablet with the word inscribed on it — [. . . ]”
Eaton claims that this is the earliest description of how the Romans distributed watchwords [59].
A third way that people have recognised and authenticated each other is by using Physical Char-
acteristics. This form of recognition has been in use since the first humans. For example, human
babies learn to recognise their mother’s voice in-utero [126]. After birth, they then learn to recognise
faces quickly, and respond to them [30, 168].
Each of these three authentication factors has advantages and disadvantages when used for user
authentication. O’Gorman provides an excellent comparison of different computer-based authentica-
tion techniques, including an analysis of their advantages and drawbacks, as well as potential attacks
and typical defences [158]. However, Herley et al. argue that, despite significant problems, passwords
remain the most widely used authentication scheme on the Internet [86].
2.4.1 Passwords
The most common form of computer-based authentication is a shared secret known as a password
(or sometimes, passphrase). Passwords were a logical choice for early computers due to text-only
computer interfaces. Since then, cost and usability drivers have maintained the widespread adop-
tion of passwords as the authentication mechanism of choice, due to them being easy and cheap to
implement [22].
Since their inception, passwords have been relatively easy to attack. This led to early studies
by Morris and Thompson [145], and Klein [115], to determine the extent of the password problem
and propose mechanisms designed to strengthen passwords. These protection mechanisms include
encrypted password databases, salting the encrypted passwords (adding randomness to defeat pre-
computed hash tables), and protecting password databases from general read access (also known as
shadow passwords).
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Despite these protection mechanisms in password systems, users continue to contribute to the
password problem. Users tend to pick poor passwords, and will continue to do so unless forced to do
otherwise [66]. This has resulted in the general implementation of rules designed to strengthen the
password by enforcing minimum standards. These rules included:
• Preventing the use of dictionary-based words;
• Enforcing minimum password lengths;
• Enforcing password complexity rules;
• Forcing regular changes to the password;
• Preventing the reuse of passwords;
• Providing instant feedback to users on password strength;
• Using passphrases.
Users tried to work around early rules, forcing the implementation of stronger rules. As com-
puter power increased, brute force attacks of six, then seven, then eight character passwords became
feasible [80], so the minimum length of passwords was increased even further.
Regardless of the size and complexity passwords, they may still be compromised through other
means and subsequently reused by an intruder. Some common attacks are:
• Brute-force guessing of passwords;
• Sniffing from the network due to the lack of encryption in transit;
• Keystroke loggers on compromised client systems;
• Users writing passwords down and leaving them open to discovery;
• Using the same password on multiple computer systems, especially where these systems apply
different levels of diligence in securing passwords.
At the same time, users are accruing accounts and passwords, seemingly without end. Floreˆncio
and Herley [66] discovered in 2007 that users averaged more than 20 different accounts, typed eight
passwords a day, and maintained 6.5 different passwords. Each of those passwords is often required
to conform to different, and sometimes conflicting, sets of complexity rules.
The accumulation of so many passwords coupled with the conflicting password complexity rules
leads to users constantly forgetting their passwords, requiring help from support personnel to reset the
password. The increased cost of support then led to systems where users could reset the passwords
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themselves by answering a set of “personal questions” to provide a secondary form of authentication.
However, studies have shown that the use of these questions generally reduces the security of the
system [176, 191].
When there is a lack of mutual authentication, it is easier to compromise shared secrets such
as passwords. Usually, an entity proves that they are in possession of the shared secret by uttering
it. When a service requests the shared secret from a client, there is no proof that the service is in
possession of the shared secret initially. After the client reveals the shared secret, the service will
also be in possession of it whether they are authorised to know the secret or not (e.g., when fraudsters
pretend to be from the bank and contact unsuspecting customers to request account details [114]).
One significant problem with passwords is that, once compromised, it is possible to reuse them
repeatedly without detection. That is, they can be replayed [48]. Coskun and Herley [48] also con-
clude that passwords must now be so complex to avoid brute force attacks that they have become too
complex to remember. Users will reduce the complexity if they can, making passwords much easier
to guess.
2.4.2 Token-based Authentication
One solution to the complexity problem has been to move some of that password complexity away
from the user and place it into a device, or token. These tokens can perform complex cryptographic
computations, or provide a sequence of passwords for single use only, in an effort to circumvent
replay attacks against multi-use passwords. However, if a token is lost or stolen, then anyone that
possesses it may easily use it to authenticate to the system. This has led to combining tokens with
knowledge-based protection, discussed in the next section.
2.4.3 Combining Authentication Factors — Two-Factor Authentication
To prevent the simple unauthorised use of the token, a secret of some form (either a password or
PIN) is often required in combination. This combination is Two-Factor Authentication (2FA). A
classic example of this technique is the use of the ATM card to withdraw cash — both the card and
its corresponding PIN must be used to authenticate successfully (imagine the problem if anyone that
found your lost wallet could withdraw cash from your account just by using your ATM card alone).
Since 2FA now moves some of the complexity into a token, usability demands often dictate a
reduction in the complexity of the secret knowledge component [211]. Currently, banks generally
only require the use of four digits for the PIN, whereas passwords are often a minimum of eight
characters and are required to consist of combinations of upper and lower case letters, digits, and
punctuation.
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Hardware tokens for user accounts do not enjoy widespread use due to the increased cost of
deployment [86]. Replacing 20 or more user accounts with 20 or more tokens becomes expensive
and inconvenient (e.g., look at how many keys you possess on your key rings). Additionally, if the
token is not available at the time its use is required, then authentication cannot take place (consider
the inconvenient situation when you arrive at your office on a weekend only to discover that you have
left your office keys at home).
Ideally, different tokens would be harmonised to just a small number of multi-use devices. An
early example of this was the work performed at Sun Microsystems where the identification badge
performed the following functions:
• Photographic identification;
• Physical access to buildings and rooms using either magnetic stripe, or NFC (Near Field Com-
munication) [148];
• Digital authentication using X.509 certificates [95] and PKCS11 [188] interface;
• Small cashless transactions using MIFARE [155].
However, these multi-function cards still required a variety of card readers to be available any-
where the card would be used, increasing the cost of deployment.
Passwords and tokens can also suffer from an attack known as the Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
attack [162]. If an active attacker can masquerade as the service provider (such as an online bank-
ing website), they can capture the authentication sequence presented by the user, and then use this
sequence themselves to access the account.
Many banks now leverage user smart devices, such as the smart phone, to provide a form of
2FA. For higher risk transactions, a one-time code (often called an mTAN — mobile Transaction
Authentication Number) is sent to the registered user’s smart phone via SMS [186]. To authorise the
transaction, the user must enter this code. One problem with this system is that it relies on the phone
companies to have authenticated the user of the phone service. In Australia, phone companies are
required to allow the transfer from one service provider to another to be a relatively easy process,
thus preventing vendor lock-in. However, this also allows criminals with a basic amount of personal
information to transfer the phone service away from the legitimate user, and then receive all of the
authentication SMS codes.
In 2007, Tung quoted a General Manager in security of a major bank as stating that “SMS-
delivered two-factor authentication will be dead in three years” [228]. The provided reason was
the convergence of smart phone banking applications with SMS delivery of authentication codes, re-
sulting in a single platform for intruders to attack. The device receiving the SMS code was no longer
separate from the device used for the transaction.
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Increased costs, usability issues, and security concerns with 2FA, are now driving the need for
better authentication technology.
2.4.4 Problems with Existing Authentication Techniques
Current computer authentication techniques, such as passwords and tokens, suffer from a number of
deficiencies. Users forget passwords, choose poor passwords, and lose their tokens [104, 115, 145,
158].
Whilst current research has improved the authentication mechanism, there are still significant
problems.
Current authentication schemes generally authenticate objects or knowledge, not people. These
schemes validate that the user knows a secret, or possesses an object, but they do not authenticate the
actual person. Any user with that object or knowledge can masquerade as someone else.
Simple examples of this in action are:
• If someone finds your office or home keys, they can easily use them to gain physical access;
• If you give your ATM card and PIN to your partner, they can successfully withdraw cash from
your bank account;
• If an intruder compromises your password, then they can login to your online account.
This lack of ability to authenticate the actual person makes it harder to prosecute computer crimes
successfully. Although it is possible to trace a connection back to an individual computer, it is more
difficult to prove that a particular person was typing those commands on the keyboard.
The same problem exists for business transactions. When receiving an order, a supplier wants to
be able to prove that the customer sent the order before investing in resources to build the items. If
delivery of the item is time critical, the buyer desires to be able to prove that the supplier received the
order at a certain time. Once payment takes place, the customer wants to be able to prove that the
supplier has received the payment, and the supplier wants to be able to prove that the customer has
received the items.
All of these concepts draw on the same principle, called non-repudiation. One text defines non-
repudiation as “The action of preventing the data recipient later denying receipt of the data or the
sender denying transmission” [32].
Businesses not only want to prove that a transaction occurred, but also who authorised that trans-
action. This is where biometrics can be of assistance.
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2.4.5 Three-Factor Authentication — Adding Biometrics
Biometrics (Something You Are) promises to improve authentication by using features that are unique
to individuals. This authenticates the actual person and not merely the possession of objects or knowl-
edge [100]. These biometric traits form a physical part of our identity, and are carried with us daily.
Therefore, it is not easy for users to forget, lose, or misplace their biometric traits. However, biometric
sensors have tended to be expensive so usage has been largely limited to border control applications
and other large government-based services [113].
Section 2.5 provides a more detailed discussion on biometrics.
2.5 Introduction to Biometrics
Biometric systems authenticate people based upon measurable personal characteristics,
thus linking the purported identity to an actual person.
Biometric systems read physical characteristics of people, with the aim of distinguishing them
uniquely. One definition for biometrics is, “The automated use of physiological or behavioral char-
acteristics to determine or verify identity” [93]. Biometrics form part of the “something you are”
authentication factor (see Section 2.4) and been studied for over 100 years [17]. Jain et al. [97] pro-
vide a deeper discussion on biometrics for readers that are seeking more detail. Figure 2.1 shows an
example list of different biometric modalities.
BiometrickModalities
Fingerprints
FacekVerification
VoicekVerification
IriskScanning
RetinakScanning
HandkGeometry
EarkPatterns
VeinkPatterns
GaitkVerification
WrittenkSignature
KeystrokekDynamics
DNA
Figure 2.1: Examples of different biometric modalities.
Immigration and border protection services are among the early adopters of automated biometric
systems. The USA originally used hand geometry in their INSPASS program, and then moved to face
and fingerprint verification in their upgraded US-VISIT program. This current system is manually
driven, and labour intensive. Australia and New Zealand use face verification in their SmartGate
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system to couple passengers to their biometric enabled passport. This system uses automated booths,
but there is still significant staff oversight to prevent security breaches and to facilitate passenger
movement. Figure 2.2 shows examples of each of these biometric border protection systems.
©U2013,UWilliamUBaron/WikimediaU
Commons/CC-BY-SA-3.0/GFDL
©U2013,UUnitedUStatesUDepartmentUofUHomelandUSecurity/
WikimediaUCommons/PublicUDomain
©U2013,UAustralianUCustomsUandUBorderU
ProtectionUService/PublicUDomain
Figure 2.2: Example border protection biometric systems — INSPASS, US-VISIT, SmartGate
Other uses for biometrics are personal identification of persons of interest (iris scanning), build-
ing/restricted space access control (face, voice, fingerprint), and crime scene investigation (DNA).
More recently, biometrics have started to appear in laptop and desktop computers (face, fingerprint),
but these are primarily used for local access to that computer system only.
Outside of such deployments, biometric systems are not widely used by the public. One of the
primary challenges to widespread adoption is that the biometric sensor technology must be readily
available in the location it will be used. Practical systems can only support a small subset of above
biometric modalities. Otherwise, the number of different sensors would continue to grow.
Biometric systems authenticate real people and, as such, promise to improve authentication dra-
matically. Biometrics are difficult to forget as they are measured from human characteristics that are
permanently present, which means that biometrics require the actual person to be present to complete
the authentication.
However, there exist significant disadvantages to biometrics as well. They are not really “secrets”
as they are either displayed publicly (e.g., face, photos), or traces of them are left everywhere people
go (e.g., fingerprints, DNA). It is difficult to revoke and replace a compromised biometric (e.g., people
usually only have ten fingers and one face) [180].
Even worse, biometric matching is not exact, as opposed to the way that traditional authentication
mechanisms operate. Two pictures of a person’s face can vary widely, including changes in lighting,
pose, expression, make-up, glasses, hair, and ageing. These variations require the system to perform
a fuzzy match, with a variable degree of tolerance [256].
As a result, the biometric system may incorrectly match two different people (Type I error), or
incorrectly fail to match two biometric samples taken from the same person (Type II error). These
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two errors often require careful balancing (e.g., making a system matcher stricter to prevent incorrect
matches may increase the number of failed legitimate matches).
According to Jain et al. [98] a suitable biometric should have the following characteristics:
• Universality — all users should possess the biometric;
• Distinctiveness — it should be possible to use the biometric to distinguish between any two
different people;
• Permanence — the biometric should not change significantly over time;
• Collect-ability — it should be relatively easy to collect the biometric signal quantitatively;
• Acceptability — Users need to accept the biometric system (e.g., shining a laser into people’s
eyes makes some people hesitant).
Each of the biometric modalities above supports these characteristics to varying degrees. So, if it
is possible to use only one biometric modality, which one should it be? They each have their strengths
and weaknesses. The answer lies, not so much in their characteristics, but which modality allows for
the most cost-effective deployment of sensors for a given use case. Like all security systems, cost is
usually the primary driver for the choice of technology, with acceptability/usability next, followed by
security [86].
User acceptance has a number of components. Requiring users to perform unnatural acts in public
(e.g., making specific face gestures, being subjected to intensive personal inspection, speaking certain
words) will be far less accepted than if the user can interact with the biometric system in a natural
way (looking at a screen, typing on a keyboard).
In particular, the Universality characteristic significantly impacts the usability of the biometric
system. For example, some users may have lost fingers or hands, they may have eye cataracts, may
be unable to speak or walk, or even have unusable fingerprints. However, they usually have a face,
and can aim it in the general direction of a device screen, even if they are blind.
Speed of operation is also a factor. Systems that take many seconds to make a decision can act as
a bottleneck. A state-of-the-art iris-in-motion border protection system uses specialised processors,
sensors, and infrared panels that operate at multiple wavelengths to increase processing speed. This
system can recognise up to 50 persons per minute, allowing the user to walk simply through a gate at
normal speed [62]. However, such a system is also quite expensive, limiting broad adoption.
Alternatively, examining DNA is presently an extremely slow process requiring specialist pathol-
ogy techniques. As a result, it is not currently suitable to act as a real-time authentication technique
(e.g., as portrayed in the 1997 science fiction movie, “Gattaca”; see Section 3.2).
One of the most widely deployed biometric sensing devices is the CCTV camera. Cities around the
world have deployed thousands of these cameras. However, the resolution of these cameras is often so
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poor as to be considered legally blind [121]. The limitations of resolution from these cameras restricts
the biometric choice to large surface areas such as the face — often via human-driven face verification
since automated face matching is problematic on low resolution images of non-cooperative subjects.
Recognising people via CCTV is certainly unobtrusive for the user — all they need do is simply walk
past the camera. However, what is the benefit to the user other than nebulous and disputed claims of
increased safety? This lack of perceived benefit to the biometric user often encourages complaints
regarding invasion of privacy.
Section 2.6 discusses how mobile devices may have a significant impact on choosing face veri-
fication as the primary biometric modality. Biometric technology is a useful solution waiting for an
important problem to solve. Identifying a universally useful application and addressing user concerns
will significantly increase user acceptance of biometrics.
It turns out that there is a significant use case for biometrics already. Section 2.4 introduces the
topic of users logging into their online accounts, and the significant problems that surround this action.
Biometric systems authenticate real people, not things or knowledge, promising to improve authen-
tication dramatically. Biometrics are difficult for users to forget or lose as they are measured from
human characteristics that are permanently present, which means that biometric systems (should)
require the actual person to be present to complete the authentication.
The pairing of reliable face verification with consumer smart devices has the potential to offer an
alternative solution to online authentication for banking and other activities. The choice of face verifi-
cation is natural, based upon how users generally interact with their smart devices (see Section 2.6 for
discussion). Authenticating using face verification also has the added benefit that humans can later
verify the matches in a natural way. This provides a powerful mechanism for auditing who performed
the transaction.
2.6 Smart Devices as Biometric Sensors
Smart devices such as laptops, tablets, and smart phones that possess several peripheral
input devices are widely deployed. It is possible to leverage these devices to read biomet-
ric signals from the user, and use those signals in a variety of system configurations.
The last decade has seen an explosion in smart device usage. Mobile phones are no longer just a
phone, but a complete online client system that is capable of executing sophisticated applications.
Coupled with the improvements in smart devices, mobile networks have kept pace, with the de-
ployment of GPRS, then 3G, and now 4G networks. Today’s device users are now highly mobile and
always connected.
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The Australian Communications and Media Authority reported in 2013 that nearly half of adult
Australians now possess a smart phone [1]. The Pew Research Center’s Internet & American Life
Project also report similar numbers for the United States of America [203].
Consumer smart devices (smart phones, tablets, laptops) are becoming the required tools for living
daily life. The functionality they now provide is sufficiently mature that many organisations use them
as client devices. These organisations often allow users to bring their own smart devices for use at
work (Bring Your Own Device, or BYOD). In addition, these smart devices are now small enough to
be carried everywhere, and the widespread network access allows them to remain connected for the
majority of the time. This creates a highly mobile and always connected user base, with each user
provisioned with a personally owned (or allocated) smart device.
It may now be possible for the public to leverage the wide deployment of smart mobile phones,
tablets, laptops, and desktops as biometric sensors with little or no additional hardware cost. These
devices are often equipped with microphones and video cameras to enable video and audio commu-
nications. Therefore, such sensors could serve as biometric readers to capture audio and video data
from users.
To gain a competitive edge, smart device vendors are constantly improving their products. Fig-
ure 2.3 shows how the basic features of mobile phones have improved over time.
Therefore, it is a logical choice to examine these consumer smart devices to determine if they
possess the capabilities for use as a universal biometric sensor.
Consumer smart devices come armed with a wide array of inbuilt sensors and output interfaces.
Figure 2.4 shows examples of the interfaces now found on many smart devices.
To provide a biometric capability, it will be necessary to leverage common existing device inter-
faces. However, until recently, smart devices did not have a single, ubiquitously deployed biometric
sensor.
GPS location data, compass data, ambient light readings, sounds from the speaker, and displayed
images provide no measure of user characteristics. Therefore, they are not suitable for use as biomet-
ric information.
It may be possible to use the keyboard or keypad to perform keystroke analysis [45]. However,
users sometimes consider small hardware keyboards too clumsy to use to be able to get an effective
measure. In addition, the on-screen keyboards performing error correction may skew the results to
introduce additional verification errors.
Studies on gait recognition using accelerometers (e.g., [122]) have shown some promising results,
but these require that the smart device be in a certain position on the body (such as in a pocket). To
use this system requires the user to carry the device on their body while they walk or run. Operating a
device while walking around is not safe, and this reduces acceptability. In addition, gait recognition is
simply not possible once the user stops walking. Thus, the system must remember the user identity for
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Figure 2.3: Improvement in features of Apple iPhones and Samsung Galaxy phones over time (in-
cluding their release dates). There is no scale provided, since a comparison between the models is not
the intention.
a period of time, which could allow an imposter to take the device and impersonate the authenticated
user.
Voice verification, in ideal conditions, can be suitably robust. However, in noisy environments
(e.g., railway stations, airports, and public spaces) performance will decrease. Although work to im-
prove performance in noisy environments has been undertaken, the results are often poor [125]. It
may not be possible for the user to conveniently address noise problems in many situations, espe-
cially public places. Voice systems suffer when people read or pronounce words differently to those
requested or intended (e.g., reading “one-two” instead of “twelve”) [101]. In addition, using mobile
phones for voice communication in public places negatively intrudes on other’s personal space. For
example, some train service providers designate quiet carriages where travellers should “refrain from
having loud conversations, using mobile phones and noisy musical devices” [175].
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Figure 2.4: Peripheral interfaces available on many consumer smart devices.
Many laptops and phones also now possess a fingerprint reader. The primary use of these readers
is to authenticate the user to the device, not to online accounts. Most of the readers in these devices
remain vulnerable to spoofing attacks [11, 37, 140, 215, 234]. Many forums report that the usability
of some of these fingerprint readers is variable, and a source of frustration to users [16, 39, 57].
However, recently released readers appear to have addressed many of the usability issues.
This essentially leaves the video camera as the likely biometric sensor. There are numerous pos-
sibilities for using the on-board camera, including:
• Retina scanning;
• Iris scanning;
• Fingerprint scanning;
• Ear pattern recognition;
• Face verification.
Retina and iris scans generally require specialised devices (e.g., near-infrared light sources and
capture equipment in close proximity to the eye). Current smart device cameras tend not to have suf-
ficient resolution or the necessary illumination sources to perform such scans successfully. However,
researchers are performing some work in this area (e.g., [43, 103, 167]).
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Using a camera to scan a fingerprint may require a specialised interface or significant user coop-
eration.
Although ear recognition is possible, the requirement for someone to hold the smart device to
video their ear, or moving their head blindly into a suitable position, reduces the acceptability of this
biometric for users.
Therefore, the practical conclusion is to use the video camera on the consumer smart device for
face verification, shown in Figure 2.5. A solution based upon the camera would offer the widest
opportunity to leverage existing hardware. The camera could be a standard webcam connected to a
desktop or laptop computer, or the front-facing camera found on most smart devices today. Using the
camera in this way requires little cooperation from, or interaction with, the user other than to have
them continue looking at the screen during the authentication process. This non-cooperative solution
addresses many of the usability concerns raised by Bonneau et al. [22].
2.6.1 Smart Device Malicious Software (Malware)
Using a smart device as a biometric reader is not as simple as it may first appear. These devices, rich
in functionality, have also become a target for intruders. Malicious software (commonly referred to
as malware) exists for many smart devices [187]. The software on all of the major smart phones,
including Android [92, 120, 210, 257] and Apple iOS [26, 74, 92, 253], suffers from a wide variety
of compromise techniques. Some of this malware can use the camera to take photos and upload them
without user knowledge [258].
Chebyshev and Unucheck reported in a Kaspersky Security Bulletin that they detected approxi-
mately 6,000,000 unique malicious installation packages in 2012 alone [38].
More recently, Mosquera et al. [146] stated that, “Of the 6.3 million apps analyzed in 2014, one
million of these were classified as malware, while 2.3 million were classified as grayware.”
The online banking sector is a primary target. The recent CERT-UK Annual Report states that
“Malware is the biggest cyber threat to the UK”, with the most common infections coming from
malware that targets online banking credentials [77].
Even more recently, reports indicate that more than 600 million Samsung Android phones have
pre-installed keyboard software containing a security vulnerability [241]. Welton reports that vulner-
ability allows attackers to:
• “Access sensors and resources like GPS, camera and microphone”;
• “Secretly install malicious app(s) without the user knowing”;
• “Tamper with how other apps work or how the phone works”;
• “Eavesdrop on incoming/outgoing messages or voice calls”;
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Figure 2.5: Smart device as a biometric sensor. Impracticalities, poor performance, or poor security,
exclude different biometric modalities and device peripherals. Face verification remains as a good
choice of biometric modality using consumer smart devices.
• “Attempt to access sensitive personal data like pictures and text messages”.
Sophisticated security attacks will continue to improve as the widespread use of these devices
only makes them a bigger target. Any future improvements in online access will need to account for
smart device access, and be secure against a wide range of known, and currently unknown, attacks.
2.6.2 Biometric Authentication Use Cases
If the choice is to use a smart device as a biometric sensor, then the next decision is how applications
will use that biometric most effectively and be of benefit to the greatest number of users. A number
of options exist from a standalone system, to one where the device is simply a biometric reader with
the processing of the biometric data performed on another system.
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Standalone Application
The first case is using a biometric in a standalone application on a smart device. It is often easier to
provide a fully self-contained application rather than to integrate more deeply with the device. One
example of a standalone application is the EyeContact face recognition app for iPhone, shown in
Figure 2.6 [131]. EyeContact uses photos associated with the iPhone contact list as the face gallery.
The user then looks up a contact based on their face image rather than their name. The app could
potentially use the phone camera to scan a crowded room to identify faces stored within the iPhone
contact list.
Apps such as EyeContact may even be useful as an aide-me´moire when in the common, but
nonetheless embarrassing, situation of forgetting a colleague’s name. Simply unobtrusively capture
their face from a distance to look up their details on the phone. An alternative is to use the app instead
of nametags at business meetings. A more conventional security example would be security officers
identifying persons of interest from a self-contained watch list of faces.
Figure 2.6: Example interface from the EyeContact application.
Searching databases of faces and performing near-real time matching has not been possible in the
past without significant computing power. However, the newer smart devices contain faster processors
and more memory (see Figure 2.3 for some examples). Some recent devices even contain GPUs
accessible through tools such as OpenCL [112].
Local Authentication
The second case is to use the biometric to authenticate the user to the actual smart device. This could
be to unlock the device, login to privileged functionality, or to access restricted data. The possible
choices of biometric to use here are somewhat broader, and could include face verification, fingerprint,
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voice, gait, iris, keystroke, or even hand writing. This would restrict the device to only a small set
of authorised users. As each different user authenticates, their profile sets up the device according to
personal preferences.
A minor expansion of this scenario is that the smart device performs all of the biometric process-
ing, and communicates its authentication decision to a remote service. However, compromise of the
unsupervised and uncontrolled consumer smart device would result in security decisions that can no
longer be trusted.
Remote Authentication
The third and emerging case is to use the smart device as the biometric sensor, providing the biometric
data to a remote system or service to process and authenticate the user. This requires an active network
connection for the smart device at the time of authentication.
This type of system reduces the trust requirement for the smart device. Provided the back-end
system is confident that it is receiving a valid biometric signal, it can then do all of the security
checking itself rather than relying on a decision by an unknown device.
Continuous Authentication
One interesting challenge for authentication systems is that the authentication process typically occurs
at a single point in time, often at the beginning of a transaction. However, there is a desperate need
to prove that the authenticated user is the same one that actually completes the transaction. For this
reason, some online banking systems implement a form of continuous authentication by requiring the
user to re-enter their PIN just prior to completing the transaction.
Most current authentication schemes authenticate objects, not the person. Since a strong connec-
tion between the authenticated session and the actual user is not available, it is possible to replace the
user with another user during the transaction and the service will not be aware of this switch.
Consider the following scenario in a bricks and mortar bank. The customer walks up to the bank
counter to withdraw cash from their account. The bank teller requests a suitable level of identifi-
cation (such as the ATM card and/or PIN) before authorising the transaction. In the meantime, the
customer leaves the bank counter and someone else replaces them to receive the cash at the end of the
transaction.
In a physically based transaction such as the one just outlined, it is difficult to achieve this attack
as the bank teller would probably not complete the transaction under those circumstances. However,
when the user is remote, how can the service provider know that the attacker has taken over the session
by hijacking it?
Security systems must not only successfully complete the authentication, but must then manage
the entire session until the transaction has completed to ensure that the user is still the same authenti-
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cated user. This is not as easy as it might seem when using remote uncontrolled client systems over
the Internet (such as a web browser).
In 2010, Butler demonstrated an attack against session management cookies. The tool, called
firesheep, obtained access to unprotected session cookies after the user had authenticated. This al-
lowed the attacker to hijack the session and continue the transaction under their control [31].
Ideally, the service provider not only authenticates the client device, but also the actual user. After
authenticating the user, the system should render it difficult to replace the user with a different user
during the transaction. One way to achieve this is requiring the user to authenticate to the system on
a continual basis throughout the lifetime of the entire transaction. In the physical case, this is easy as
the user’s physical presence maintains a continual contact with the service provider.
In a remote online situation, asking that the user continually prove who they are could be ex-
tremely annoying. Imagine a system that insists that you type in your password, or swipe your finger
for a fingerprint scan, every second throughout the lifetime of the transaction. Even continually
speaking words for voice recognition would quickly become onerous.
Yet with forward facing cameras on smart devices (and desktop webcams), continuous authen-
tication could be more easily achieved without annoying the users. By continually obtaining a face
image and performing face verification, the remote service system can gain a level of assurance that
the user is the same user that authenticated at the beginning of the transaction. If the user walks away
out of range from the camera, the system can detect this and abort the transaction.
Continuous authentication has the potential to increase the security of online transactions signifi-
cantly, which would hamper a wide variety of online attacks.
2.7 Biometric System Attacks
Biometric systems can be vulnerable to attack at many locations.
Despite their advantages, biometric systems are not a “silver bullet” [69] that can magically solve
all of the problems with authentication. Biometric systems are also subject to a number of serious
attacks.
Biometric systems that take advantage of consumer smart devices have technical limitations im-
posed upon them. Cameras and microphones only report what they see and hear. There is no authen-
tication or time stamping of the received signal, and no protection against unauthorised copying or
modification.
Therefore, careful use of biometric systems is required or they open a new range of attacks. This
section discusses attacks against biometric systems, along with typical ways to remediate some of
these attacks.
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2.7.1 Biometric Attack Points
Biometric systems (like all other systems) have a number of attack points. Ratha et al. [179] described
eight vulnerable points in a generic biometric system, as shown in Figure 2.7.
Sensor Feature5Extraction Matcher
Stored5
Templates
Application5
Device
1
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2 4
3
85
6
Figure 2.7: Possible attack points in a generic biometrics-based system [179].
The attack points are characterised as follows:
1. The user presents fake biometric credentials to the sensor (e.g., printed photo, fake finger).
Section 3.2 discusses these spoofing attacks in more detail;
2. An attacker replaces the digital biometric signal with a previously captured signal. Section 3.3
discusses these digital replay attacks in more detail;
3–8. Attack points after the digital capture of the biometric data include compromise of the fea-
ture extraction, matching, or decision processes, insecure communications within the biometric
system, and insecure storage of biometric data.
For open and uncontrolled systems (in this case, a smart device), attack points 3–8 are a real threat.
This reduces the effectiveness of many of the use cases outlined in Section 2.6.2.
However, in the use case where the smart device is acting only as a biometric sensor before
providing the biometric signal to a back-end system for further processing, then attack points 3–8 are
located within the secure back-end system, where mitigation can be more effective.
Attack Point 3: Compromised Feature Extraction
After capture of the biometric signal and conversion into a digital form, further processing extracts its
identifying features. A compromise at attack point 3 affects the feature extraction process, so that the
resulting extracted features do not accurately represent the supplied biometric signal.
Combating this attack could involve techniques such as system integrity checks, closed system
designs, and code control.
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Attack Point 4: False Template Provided to the Matcher
At attack point 4, if the communications channel between the feature extractor and the matcher is not
secure, then an attacker could supply a false feature set for matching. This is similar to the digital
replay attack, except that the communications path is located deeper within the service, possibly
further away from the attacker.
As discussed for attack point 3, providing false templates will be much more difficult to achieve
in systems that have a closed back-end component, rather than a fully open system.
Attack Point 5: Compromised Matcher
The correct operation of the biometric system requires the correct operation of each of its components.
At attack point 5, if the attacker modifies the matcher to bias its decision, or overrides the decision,
then the overall system will fail. Again, a closed system design will make this attack much harder to
achieve.
Attack Point 6: Compromised Stored Templates
The next two attack points relate to the enrolment components, rather than the authentication or
matching components. To use a biometric system for authenticating users, each user is required
be enrolled into the system. The enrolment process must validate the user’s identity through some
external mechanism (such as requiring a number of different items of identification) before capturing
their biometric, processing it to extract the features to create the user’s template, and storing that
template in the biometric system.
If the attacker can change this template to one of their own before or during storage, then it may
allow false matching in later authentication attempts. The first part of this attack is more a failure in
the enrolment process rather than a failure in the system, and is no different for any other system that
fails to adequately verifying the identity of its users during the enrolment process.
A secondary attack consists of an attacker compromising the database of stored templates, and
copying or modifying the biometric data. A suitably secure enrolment and storage system, which
includes the appropriate use of transmission and storage encryption, can help prevent this attack.
Additionally, the attacker could use a captured template to recreate a facsimile of the original
biometric [3]. This ends up being similar to the spoofing attack at attack point 1.
A number of studies focus on protecting template information, either to preserve the privacy of
the information, or to protect the template against unauthorised modification [18, 27, 34, 61, 63, 87,
150, 182, 189, 213, 230].
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Attack Point 7: False Stored Template Provided to the Matcher
Whether the stored template is incorrect, or the connection to the matcher is insecure, if an attacker
can provide a false template for matching against a purported identity, then it may be possible that the
matcher will erroneously confirm the match by using the wrong template for that user.
Attack points 6 and 7 show that the enrolment system and template storage must also be protected
against compromise if the biometric system is to operate correctly.
Attack Point 8: Compromised Decision from the Matcher
At attack point 8, the attacker either compromises the integrity of the matching process, or alters the
final decision that is output from the matcher before the requesting entity can observe the original
decision.
As for attack point 3, a closed system is harder to compromise than a fully open system.
2.7.2 Attack Points for Different Use Cases
For the different use cases from Section 2.6.2, different attack points are easier to access than others
are. If the biometric is used to authenticate the user to the local device (e.g., to unlock the screen or
decrypt some data) then this system would not be secure if the application is modified.
In the use case where the face verification is contained within a self-contained application that
operates entirely on the smart device, all eight attack points are possible. Therefore, in an uncon-
trolled and open system, malicious software such as viruses and trojan horses can be effective at
compromising the biometric system, making it untrusted.
If the application is to perform a biometric match on the device such as fingerprint, voice, or
face matching, and then supply a yes/no answer to an authentication system, then the security of the
system places significant trust in the correct operation of the device and application. Unauthorised
modifications to the application to provide an incorrect answer would compromise the security of the
whole system.
For systems where the smart device acts as a biometric sensor only, and the captured biomet-
ric signal is then transmitted to an online authentication service for further authentication analysis,
then attack points 3–8 are moved away from the consumer smart device and located in a back-end
system. Provided the back-end system is suitably secure (e.g., by providing a range of information
security mechanisms including self-integrity checking, closed system design, reduced attack surfaces,
encrypted and authenticated communications, privacy-preserving data storage, and cancellable bio-
metrics [18, 34, 61, 87, 150, 180, 182, 189, 213, 220]), then these attack points are much harder to
compromise by the intruder.
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Enrolment services and processes must also be robust, as for any other online system. The ca-
sual enrolment of users without suitable identity checking will always undermine any authentication
system. Points 6 and 7 in Figure 2.7 show these attack locations.
For remote authentication systems, attack points 3–8 are remote from the attacker, so are out of
the scope of this research. This leaves attack points 1 (spoofing) and 2 (replay) still located within the
open, uncontrolled, smart device. Chapter 3 examines these two attacks in further detail.
2.7.3 Privacy Issues
One of the biggest objections by users to using biometric systems is their concern about privacy, and
that using their biometric data will lead to unauthorised access to systems and services. Exacerbating
this problem is that biometric data are not secrets, often displayed in full view for anyone to capture.
The threat is not so much the capture of the biometric data, but its ability to be reused in the
system. If the system can perform suitable liveness testing, as well as verifying the timeliness of the
biometric signal, then this will significantly reduce the threat of reuse of biometric data.
Rendering old biometric data invalid for reuse will remove a significant obstacle to the widespread
use of biometrics in online transactions as well as helping to allay the concerns of users about reuse
of their biometric information.
2.8 The Future for Online Authentication?
Authentication to online services may ultimately be as simple as looking at your smart
phone, enabling additional security capabilities such as continuous authentication and
non-repudiation.
Face verification is simple to use for most people, non-intrusive to others around the user, is easy to
adopt on most phones, tablets, and computers by using a cheap web camera, and aligns well with how
humans naturally recognise each other. Using the camera on the computer while the user authenticates
requires little user cooperation other than continually looking at the screen. Several studies highlight
the requirement that security systems be usable if they are to succeed [22, 75, 86, 193, 244]. System
design must motivate users and reduce friction to encourage a positive user experience [226].
Biometrics offers the potential to address a number of usability concerns experienced by exist-
ing authentication systems. Such authentication systems also open the option to enable additional
security facilities without decreasing the usability. One is continuous authentication, where the sys-
tem continually authenticates the user throughout the lifetime of the transaction, not just at the start
of the transaction. The second is non-repudiation, where the user will find it more difficult to deny
participating in a transaction since their actual image will be associated with the transaction.
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However, users remain concerned over privacy [23] and the difficulty in revoking compromised
biometric data [180]. A user’s face image is always on public display. Therefore, it is extremely
easy to compromise it for use in a face verification system. Privacy concerns of face recognition
in surveillance systems are beyond the scope of these studies. However, problems of compromised
face biometrics for authentication are definitely within scope. It may be possible to use compromised
biometrics to gain fraudulent access to biometric-protected systems [192].
If the biometric authentication system performs adequate liveness testing, spoofing attacks be-
come infeasible [6]. If the system also validates the source, integrity, and timeliness of the captured
biometric signal, replaying a compromised digital representation of the face biometric also becomes
infeasible.
Until such tests are available, the widespread deployment of biometric systems on smart devices
will have limited success. Solving such problems brings us one small step closer to the vision of
simple-to-use authentication, which only requires looking at the phone to gain access securely to
online services.
2.9 Summary
Password based authentication needs to be replaced. Face verification using consumer
smart devices could be the next solution. However, until research identifies solutions to
digital replay attacks, the ability to use uncontrolled smart devices as biometric sensors
will be limited.
Current computer-based authentication relies heavily upon passwords. Authentication is a primary
target of attacks since all other security services depend on it. Numerous attempts at strengthening
password authentication have resulted in complex and almost unusable systems. With the wide pro-
liferation and increased complexity of passwords, users are overwhelmed.
Biometrics offers an alternative that looks attractive. However, biometrics has traditionally been
expensive to deploy. The smart phone revolution offers the opportunity to leverage these devices as
biometric readers. Usability concerns lead to a choice of face verification using the webcam available
on most devices. However, malicious software and other attacks threaten the integrity of the biometric
signal.
Chapter 3 provides a more detailed discussion on spoofing attacks and digital replay attacks.
Significant research has created a number of different methods of detecting attempts to use spoofing
attacks to fool biometric systems. However, there is little research available to combat digital replay
attacks. These attacks remain a significant barrier to the widespread deployment of face verification
systems that leverage the wide deployment of consumer smart devices.
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You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks,
if you only attack places which are undefended.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War. ca. 5th Century B.C.
Chapter Summary: Spoofing attacks and digital replay attacks are different from each
other. The current literature identifies significant progress in solving spoofing attacks, but
almost no progress in solving digital replay attacks. A simple demonstration of a digital
replay attack shows its effectiveness.
3.1 Introduction
Some people might confuse spoofing attacks and digital replay attacks, driving this spe-
cific discussion to contrast the two attacks.
Chapter 2 identified that biometrics could provide improvements to current computer-based au-
thentication. It is possible to leverage the widespread deployment of consumer smart devices as
biometric sensors with little or no additional hardware cost. Usability issues drive the decision to
adopt face verification as the biometric modality of choice.
As identified in Section 2.7, there are multiple points to attack biometric systems.
This chapter now focuses specifically on describing two of those attack points, spoofing attacks
and digital replay attacks. These two attacks are completely different from each other. The reason for
this specific focus is the continuing confusion by many people between these two attacks.
With the wide deployment of consumer devices such as smart phones, tablets, laptops, and desk-
top computers, this provides the opportunity to leverage cameras for biometric purposes with little
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additional hardware cost. However, these devices do not possess specialised hardware and usually do
not operate in a controlled environment, which are two typical countermeasures to some attacks.
Face verification using smart device webcams to capture the face may potentially suffer from
spoofing attacks, but definitely suffer from digital replay attacks. A simple demonstration against a
face verification system that detects spoofing attempts highlights the effectiveness of using a digital
replay attack.
A review of the literature describes the current state of research to defeat spoofing attacks. The
review also outlines the lack of any practical solutions to digital replay attacks.
This chapter concludes that digital replay attacks remain a weakness to the widespread use of
biometrics.
Chapter 2 describes why current computer-based authentication systems are inadequate. Sec-
tion 2.6 specifically discusses how the widespread deployment of consumer smart device provides a
useful platform to implement face verification authentication for remote authentication. In this design,
the smart device uses a generic webcam to capture the face biometric signal to provide to a backend
server for further authentication. Spoofing attacks (attack point 1) and digital replay attacks (attack
point 2) in Figure 2.7 cover this device. The next two sections discuss these attack points further.
3.2 Spoofing Attacks
Spoofing attacks occur by presenting a biometric facsimile such as a photo, video, voice
recording, or fake fingerprint to the biometric sensor instead of the real person.
Spoofing attacks occur by presenting a fake biometric to the sensor prior to the biometric being
read and converted into its digital representation. Attack point 1 in Figure 2.7 shows the position
where an attacker can use a spoofing attack.
The public is generally aware of spoofing attacks due to their portrayal in popular movies. For
example, in James Bond “Never Say Never Again” (1983), the attacker used a specially created iris
to fool the authentication system. In “Sneakers” (1992), the attackers created a voice response by
stitching together different words that had previously been captured. In “Gattaca” (1997), the main
character adopts a new identity by using various DNA samples from another person.
Such attacks are not just the realm of movies. In 2009, a woman paid $15,000 to have surgery to
alter her fingerprints [15]. In 2011, a man used a silicone mask to fool immigration officials [223].
The specific spoofing technique will vary, depending on the modality of the chosen biometric
system. Spoofing attacks are expensive to create due to the need to construct the attack specifically
for each target victim.
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For voice recognition systems, the attacker may have previously recorded the victim’s conversa-
tion and either reconstructed the voice characteristics or pasted together select words to construct a
specific phrase [237] (as in, “Sneakers”, above).
Current smart phones now possess fingerprint readers. These systems have been successfully
attacked [11, 37, 215]. The attacker may attempt to use a fake fingerprint obtained from somewhere
else [234]. Other fingerprint spoofing attacks involve spraying the sensor with some special material
to activate a previous fingerprint [140], using the finger from a deceased person [58], iteratively
constructing fake fingerprints to maximise matching scores using a Hill-climbing Attack [229], or
generally reconstructing fingerprints from their templates [185].
Attackers have previously defeated face recognition systems by using photographs, videos, or
3D facemasks of the victim [9, 60]. Researchers have undertaken significant research to detect these
forgeries (e.g., [6, 8, 14, 35, 41, 52, 60, 73, 102, 119, 133, 164, 171, 218, 242, 250]). Figure 3.1 shows
an example of attempting to spoof the face recognition system using a photograph of a face.
Figure 3.1: Unsuccessful spoofing attempt using a printed photograph.
One generic solution to defeating spoofing attacks is to ensure that fake biometrics are not pre-
sented to the sensor [140], for example, by supervising the user as they use the system to ensure
that they are not trying to present artificial biometric features. Operating the biometric system in a
supervised mode can deter users from attempting to use fake biometrics. However, supervised opera-
tion can also be expensive and intrusive. When using smart devices as biometric sensors, supervised
operation is not a feasible solution.
The literature review (see Section 3.5) highlights other liveness techniques developed to overcome
spoofing attacks.
37
Chapter 3. Understanding Digital Replay Attacks
3.3 Digital Replay Attacks
Digital replay attacks occur when the attacker replaces the digital biometric signal nor-
mally captured by the smart device with a fraudulent digital signal of the target victim.
Digital replay attacks operate at attack point 2 in Figure 2.7, and are distinct from spoofing attacks
(described in Section 3.2).
Instead of attacking the system in front of the biometric capture device (e.g., the webcam on a
smart device), the digital replay attack operates by copying a digital representation of a real biomet-
ric signal, and then injecting it into the system at some later date and/or different location. Since
the copied signal is from a live person, the anti-spoofing mechanisms are unable to detect that it is
fraudulent.
Digital replay attacks succeed if the system does not protect the digital information captured by
the biometric sensor. That protection must ensure obtaining the digital biometric signal live from the
actual biometric device, and providing that signal to the decision process intact. Compromise initially
may involve copying the biometric data. During the attack, the attacker fraudulently replaces the
biometric data with false data. The attacker obtains this false data by either carefully constructing it
or using previously captured data (perhaps from a different device). Even if the attack does not target
the original (or derived) biometric signal, the extracted feature template may also be subject to digital
replay attacks.
For spoofing attacks, the attacker must construct a customised attack for each individual victim.
However, digital replay attacks can be highly automated, especially by using the victim’s own com-
puter against them to steal a copy of their digital biometric signal. Automating the attack could
compromise many victims in a short space of time. Attackers can launch a cheaply created attack
worldwide in the form of malicious software such as Trojan Horses or viruses [247, 257].
In 2014, the FBI announced the takedown of the Blackshades Remote Access Tool that “allows
criminals to steal passwords and banking credentials; hack into social media accounts; access docu-
ments, photos, and other computer files; record all keystrokes; activate webcams;” [233]. An attack
of this nature could completely undermine public trust in biometric systems.
Even if the attacker does not use the victim’s computer to capture biometric data, they may still
collect data fraudulently. Although biometric data authenticates people, such data are not secrets [192]
(unlike a password). In daily living, people leave traces of their biometrics behind them, such as
the public display of their faces, leaving fingerprints and DNA on objects that they touch, spoken
words overheard and recorded, or their digital footprint. Once the compromise of the biometric has
occurred, it is difficult to revoke, unlike a password that is easy to change. As stated in Section 2.5,
users generally only have one face, two eyes, and ten fingers [180]. Therefore, biometric revocation
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is not a solution. The issue concerns whether biometric systems can detect the injection of fraudulent
biometric data into the authentication decision, rather than focusing on the capture of the data.
In Section 2.6, usability and deployment costs led to the conclusion that face verification on con-
sumer smart devices would be a logical choice to enhance online authentication. However, digital
replay attacks are a significant threat to such systems as consumer smart devices are often uncon-
trolled. There is generally no supervision when using these devices to collect biometric data, and the
devices themselves are subject to malware problems [247, 257].
To use biometric signals captured by these uncontrolled smart devices successfully in an authen-
tication system, the system must validate the source of that signal and preserve the integrity of any
data. This also includes information that defines when a biometric signal was sampled [6]. This vali-
dation of authentication information must occur within part of the biometric system that is not under
the control of the attacker. Without this validation, any liveness testing of the presented biometric to
defeat spoofing attacks is completely ineffective. The supplied digital signal is of a real person (in
this case, the victim), so will pass any anti-spoofing tests. Section 3.6 demonstrates the effectiveness
of digital replay attacks defeating anti-spoofing protections.
In consumer smart devices (including tablets, laptops, and desktop computers), the communica-
tion path from the camera to the rest of the device is generally not protected, allowing the original
video stream to be intercepted or modified prior to any additional security (such as authentication
meta-data) being added. When adding security data to the video, the system must complete this prior
to an intruder gaining access to the video data.
Time stamping biometric data is not a total solution since there is no trust in the time source. The
attacker may have full control over the computer’s concept of time.
Although the current literature discusses digital replay attacks as being of concern, there appears
to be little empirical research to address the problem. Suggested countermeasures to digital replay
attacks are to operate in a controlled environment [21], deploy specialised intelligent sensor hardware
with specialised processor chips that can perform complex encryption or challenge-response opera-
tions [21, 111, 124, 179, 208], or involve the user in cooperative actions [68, 107, 164], but these
techniques have not been extensively tested. All of these techniques are expensive or influence the
usability of the system, limiting the widespread adoption of biometrics.
In the scenario of using a webcam on a smart device, the webcam does not currently possess any
intelligent capabilities to defeat replay attacks. All it can provide is the vision observed in its field
of view. To use smart devices for face verification, additional security features are critical to combat
digital replay attacks. The smart device cannot provide these security features alone, as the attacker
could easily defeat them.
Requiring the users to engage in cooperative actions such as directed head movements [68], ran-
dom head movements [52], eye blinking [164], or eye movement [107] takes time to complete and
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reduces the usability of the system as users are not motivated to engage in security processes before
performing transactions [86, 244].
Therefore, this research focuses on the problem of digital replay attacks in a non-cooperative or
non-invasive framework where the user does not actively assist in the authentication process.
Without solutions to digital replay attacks, the widespread deployment of biometrics on uncon-
trolled smart devices cannot be trusted, impeding further progress in authentication improvements.
Figure 3.2 shows an example image of what the system retrieves from the camera driver during a
digital replay attack. A video file of the person shown replaces the actual image captured by the real
webcam (whoever it originally was).
Fake Video captured Jan 2013
Figure 3.2: Successful digital replay attack using images provided by a virtual webcam from a previ-
ously recorded video.
3.4 Comparing Digital Replay Attacks against Spoofing Attacks
Liveness testing examines liveness characteristics for anti-spoofing, but does not address
digital replay attacks since the replaced digital signal is still of a real person.
When discussing the issue of digital replay attacks with people, including biometric researchers,
there is still a tendency to confuse digital replay attacks with spoofing attacks. One question often
asked is, “Won’t liveness testing solve the problem?”
Liveness testing applies particularly to anti-spoofing. Liveness testing aims to distinguish between
a live person and a facsimile object.
However, liveness testing does not apply to digital replay attacks, since the digital signal used by
the attacker is from a live subject. In this scenario, all liveness tests are ineffective.
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the concept. These graphs are adapted from Chingovska et al. [42].
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Figure 3.3: Performance graphs of a biometric system, illustrating zero-effort imposter attempts,
spoofing attacks, and digital replay attacks. Adapted from Chingovska et al. [42].
The first graph illustrates the desired performance of the anti-spoofing detection system. Zero-
effort imposters consist of simple failures in the system to distinguish between people (e.g., failure of
the automated biometric system to detect that a husband and wife had accidentally swapped biometric
passports [79]). The biometric system should be able to distinguish between the legitimate user and
a different person. The second graph illustrates an attacker that attempts to spoof the system by
presenting a facsimile copy of the victim’s biometric. For example, this copy may be a photograph,
fake fingerprint, or recorded voice, of the target victim. As a result, note that the spoofing attempts
overlap with the genuine access attempts. The anti-spoofing, or liveness, detection system should
be able to distinguish between the spoof attempt and the live subject. The third graph illustrates the
system performance when subjected to a digital replay attack. In this graph, the biometric signal
from the attacker is an exact copy of a live signal from a genuine access attempt. Therefore, there is
no ability for the anti-spoofing mechanisms to discriminate between the digital replay and a genuine
access attempt.
To address this vulnerability, what is required is a data integrity and timeliness test. The digital
data must be tested to confirm that the capture occurred at the time the authentication system expected
it to be (i.e., now), that it came from the expected device, and that it has not been tampered with. Anti-
spoofing testing is only one part of the solution.
To highlight the difference between the location of these two attacks, Figure 3.4 illustrates the
difference between spoofing attacks and digital replay attacks in an example face recognition system.
3.5 Literature Review
Current solution proposals to address digital replay attacks are inadequate for use on
uncontrolled consumer smart devices. None of the current literature provides a verified
practical method of addressing digital replay attacks using smart devices for face verifi-
cation.
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Spoofing Attack
- Fake Photograph
Digital Replay Attack
- Pre-recorded Digital 
Signal of a Real Person
Figure 3.4: Spoofing Attacks vs. Digital Replay Attacks in a face recognition system. Note that in
the spoofing attack, the attacker uses a fake physical representation of the victim (such as a photo),
but in the digital replay attack they use a digital representation of the victim.
Research into digital replay attacks brings together the Computer Security and the Biometrics
communities. Whilst traditionally each community focuses on its area of expertise, the issue of digital
replay attacks bridges between the two communities, not belonging solely in one or the other.
As a result, literature from both communities contributed to this review.
3.5.1 Current Authentication Problems
The original goal of this research was to examine how to improve online authentication beyond simple
passwords, by incorporating the third authentication factor (biometrics). In particular, the envisaged
solution was that of a system using face recognition on smart devices.
The design of any new authentication system must take into account the users, including their
abilities, and their motivation. Whitten and Tygar [244] identified the “unmotivated user property” in
which users want to complete their desired tasks, and not be delayed by complex security measures.
That is, users are not motivated to be part of the security solution. Wimberly and Liebrock [246] also
show that users will choose weaker passwords if they think that there are other security mechanisms
in place. Garfinkel commented in his study that security specialists often ignore usability when de-
signing computer security systems [75]. Jøsang et al. also identified that usability issues increase
security risks [105].
Bonneau et al. [22] produced one of the most comprehensive studies on authentication to date.
Their conclusion is that any replacement authentication scheme must be at least as, if not more, usable
and acceptable to users as current passwords.
However, many studies on existing password schemes continue to highlight their deficiencies [20,
22, 66, 80, 86, 115, 145, 259].
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3.5.2 Using Smart Devices as a Biometric Sensor
As discussed in Section 2.6, smart devices are now becoming commonplace. A number of papers
have studied the concept of using mobile phones for authentication (e.g., [5, 135, 178, 183, 219, 236]).
Many of these provide a One-Time Password mechanism, and/or use SMS (Short-Message Service)
for out-of-band communications. One problem with these architectures is that SMS communications
are not secure [108].
Fang and Zhan [64] proposed a different model, which not only used client-side SSL certificates,
but also included the use of the TPM chip (Trusted Platform Module) to manage the cryptographic
keys [227]. Unfortunately, TPM chips are currently not widely deployed on mobile phones.
Architectures such as these continue to authenticate devices and knowledge only, not people. To
authenticate real people, a form of biometric is required. The idea of using mobile phones as biometric
readers has been in existence since at least 2005 [44]. However, many smart device authentication
schemes only authenticate the user to the device [45]. Furnell et al. [70] go on to argue that there is a
need to tie users to services.
Derawi [55] and Kwapisz et al. [122] discuss deploying gait recognition systems on mobile de-
vices. Wang and Liu [239] engage in a wider discussion on various options for biometric authentica-
tion for mobile phone clients. However, Derawi concludes that biometric sensors provided by the user
may not be suitable unless the device is registered and verified it is unaltered. For a mobile phone,
this is difficult due to the existence of malicious software (malware) [257]. Wang and Liu note that
phones can be lost, and the PIN level of protection is insufficient to protect sensitive data.
The research problem investigated by this current research uses the smart device as a biometric
sensor for generic face verification. The network service processes all authentication decisions at a
location remote to the user. This architecture would tie the user to the end service, as identified by
Furnell et al. [70]. However, examining the attack points proposed by Ratha et al. [179] in Figure 2.7,
attack points 1 and 2 are still of primary concern as these will be uncontrolled.
3.5.3 Addressing Spoofing Attacks
Anjos et al. [8] provide a comprehensive background to spoofing attacks and anti-spoofing detection
systems.
Completion of significant research addresses the issue of spoofing attacks in biometric systems,
in particular in face verification systems. A number of techniques to detect “liveness” in face verifi-
cation systems have been proposed, including distorting images [220], observing eye movement and
eye blinks [102, 107, 164], head pose estimation [68], face movement detection based upon optical
flows [14, 117] and 3D geometry [52], analysis of high frequency Fourier spectra [127], image qual-
ity [73], micro-texture analysis [12], multi-spectral illumination [250], and user gestures [68, 153].
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Hanna and Hoyos propose an eye reflection technique in their patent [84] that uses computer
screens to reflect images from a person’s eye where “there is a need to detect the presence of a live,
human eye in the imagery”. They aim their technique primarily at iris recognition systems. In a
patent application, Galambos proposes using controlled lighting to detect if a face is real or fake [71],
to detect spoofing attempts.
Akhtar et al. [4] used a fusion of biometric modes and classification algorithms to determine
liveness.
Kose and Dugelay [119], and Erdogmus and Marcel [60], have recently taken on the task of
distinguishing between live faces and 3D masks.
Arguably, the best systems currently for detecting live faces use Local Binary Patterns (LBP) his-
tograms [133, 159], and LBP in Three Orthogonal Planes (LBP-TOP) [118, 171, 255] which includes
a temporal component. LBP forms the basis for KeyLemon [110], a commercially available face
verification system that incorporates spoofing detection. KeyLemon is the base system used for the
demonstration in Section 3.6.
Many face recognition systems still suffer from spoofing attacks, where they can be easily defeated
using a printed photograph or a video sequence [165].
However, all of these systems, including KeyLemon [110], remain susceptible to digital replay
attacks. These systems are trying to solve the issues at attack point 1 in Figure 2.7. Digital replay
attacks use attack point 2, and none of the current liveness testing systems are secure as a result.
3.5.4 Addressing Digital Replay Attacks
Although several researchers have suggested methods to address digital replay attacks, they have not
always followed through with implementations.
The publications included in the next series of tables identify works that specifically target digital
replay attacks. Note that publications that propose liveness testing generally address spoofing attacks,
so are not included in the tables below. There are several different solutions proposed that specifically
mention addressing digital replay attacks.
Table 3.1 shows the papers that propose to address digital replay attacks by modifying the biomet-
ric data after the system has captured it. This modification process transforms the biometric data from
each capture to make it unique. The modification process may alter the data in a defined manner, or
add a form of unique watermark. The problem with these proposals is that, for untrusted devices like a
consumer smart device, the attacker may insert the fraudulent biometric data prior to the modification
process. At this point, the digital replay attack has already succeeded.
Table 3.2 next lists the papers that aim to authenticate the biometric data by adding additional
meta-data, such as a timestamp or nonce (a random number used once). The system may transmit
the meta-data separately, or the meta-data may be bound to the biometric data using techniques such
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Table 3.1: Publications proposing modification of the template after capture, or inserting a watermark.
Author(s) Year Proposed Solutions to Digital Replay Attacks
Ratha et al. [179] 2001 Add extra information (watermark) to fingerprint image (p6).
Ratha et al. [180] 2001 Add one-time verification string to fingerprint image (p10).
Daugman [51] 2003 Permute byte order for iris codes (p12).
Maltoni et al. [134] 2003 Digitally watermark the fingerprint images (p14).
Ratha et al. [181] 2003 Add extra information (watermark) to fingerprint image (p7).
Ambalakat [6] 2005 Steganographic/Watermarking techniques (p4).
Roberts [184] 2007 Watermarks, steganography, time-stamping (p18).
Czajka/Pacut [49] 2008 Permute iris stripes (p2).
Hartung/Busch [85] 2010 Hash Transaction Identifier in transaction information (p5).
Shelton et al. [197] 2012 Cancellable biometrics and biometric hashing (p1).
as encryption and digital signatures. As with the solutions proposed in Table 3.1, on untrusted smart
devices the attacker may have already injected the false biometric data prior to the addition of the
meta-data.
Table 3.2: Publications that propose adding a nonce or timestamp to the biometric data after capture.
Author(s) Year Proposed Solutions to Digital Replay Attacks
Bird et al. [19] 1993 Nonce-based generic authentication protocol (p7).
Klosterman/
Ganger [116] 2000 Nonce to prevent replay attacks (p10).
Mansfield/
Rejman-Greene [136] 2003 Encrypt, date, time, and sign biometric images (p22).
O’Gorman [158] 2003 Nonce-based challenge-response protocol (p16).
Xiao [249] 2005 Timestamped challenge-response protocol (p9).
Jain et al. [99] 2008 Use timestamps (p5).
Hyppo¨nen [91] 2009 Protect signatures using timestamps (p49).
Table 3.3 shows that many publications propose using intelligent biometric sensors that authenti-
cate the data. This may include the use of smartcards or special processors within the sensors. The
solution commonly proposed involves challenge-response techniques with the sensor providing the
necessary response. To allow the wide deployment of biometrics, existing smart devices provide
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the necessary sensor infrastructure. Unfortunately, these current smart devices do not possess the
necessary intelligent biometric sensor interfaces to perform such authentication.
Table 3.3: Publications that propose using challenge-response, smartcards, or other intelligent or
trusted biometric interfaces.
Author(s) Year Proposed Solutions to Digital Replay Attacks
Gifford et al. [78] 1999 Look for the same image twice; challenge-response (p3, p7).
Ratha et al. [179] 2001 Challenge-response to an intelligent sensor (p6).
Ratha et al. [180] 2001 Challenge-response to an intelligent sensor (p14).
Bolle et al. [21] 2002 Challenge-response to an intelligent sensor (p7).
Matsumoto et al. [140] 2002 Challenge-response device to protect fingerprint data (p3).
Thalheim et al. [221] 2002 Challenge-response biometric scanner (p18).
Frischholz/Werner [68] 2003 User interaction as a challenge-response system (p1).
O’Gorman [158] 2003 Challenge-response with random numbers (p16).
Ratha et al. [181] 2003 Challenge-response to an intelligent sensor (p7).
Ambalakat [6] 2005 Proposed challenge-response and smartcards (p5).
Xiao [249] 2005 Timestamped challenge-response protocol (p9).
Speicher [209] 2006 Challenge-response from [179] (p35).
Roberts [184] 2007 Hardware challenge-response to interface (p19).
Bringer/Chabanne [27] 2008 Assume sensor is always trusted (p3).
Jain et al. [99] 2008 Use challenge-response (p5).
Khan et al. [111] 2011 Challenge-response to an intelligent sensor (p1).
Anjos et al. [8] 2014 User interaction as a challenge-response system (p13).
Table 3.4 lists the publications that require the user to participate actively in the authentication pro-
cess. This participation may involve moving the head, speaking certain words, or selecting a specific
fingerprint. Whilst such interactions may be useful in limiting the success of digital replay attacks,
the solutions impose a burden on the user. Whitten and Tygar [244] note that users view security
as a secondary goal to using a system, and are generally unmotivated to assist with authentication.
Therefore, it is desirable to identify solutions that do not require specific user actions.
Table 3.5 identifies the publications that propose using encryption to solve the problem of digital
replay attacks. Many of these publications identify that poor communications security allows these
attacks to succeed, and propose encrypting links, either the external network or the internal com-
munication paths, to reduce the effectiveness of digital replay attacks. However, on non-specialised
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Table 3.4: Publications that propose user interaction to address digital replay attacks.
Author(s) Year Proposed Solutions to Digital Replay Attacks
Frischholz/Werner [68] 2003 User interaction as a challenge-response system (p1).
Chetty/Wagner [40] 2004 Pre-recorded passphrases (p2).
Roberts [184] 2007 Require user to register multiple biometric samples (p16).
Bonneau et al. [22] 2012 Time-variant challenge phrases (p24).
De Marsico et al. [52] 2012 User motion at a random time (p3).
Anjos et al. [8] 2014 User interaction as a challenge-response system (p13).
consumer devices, there is usually no internal communication path isolation so an attacker may tam-
per with the biometric data prior to transmission across a network.
Table 3.5: Publications that propose using encryption to protect the communication paths.
Author(s) Year Proposed Solutions to Digital Replay Attacks
Gifford et al. [78] 1999 Use “advanced cryptographic tools” (p2).
Soutar [208] 2002 Use “dynamic link encryption” (p3).
Thalheim et al. [221] 2002 Communicate using encryption (p18).
Xiao02 [248] 2002 Encryption is a standard solution (p38).
Maltoni et al. [134] 2003 “standard cryptographic techniques” on fingerprint data (p13).
Mansfield/
Rejman-Greene [136] 2003 Encrypt biometric image and templates (p22).
O’Gorman [158] 2003 Session keys to protect messages (p13).
Speicher [209] 2006 Encrypt biometric transmissions (p38).
Roberts [184] 2007 Encryption/digital signatures to protect biometric data (p11).
Jain et al. [99] 2008 Encrypt the data sent through the interface (p5).
Meghanathan [141] 2011 Encryption to create a secure channel (p9).
Derawi et al. [56] 2012 Deploy SSL (p7).
The final table in this series (Table 3.6) presents the publications that propose multi-modality
solutions. Essentially, these solutions require the attacker to reuse more than one type of biometric
modality (e.g., combining face verification and voice verification). Some solutions require user co-
operation, which can be problematic. Other solutions require multiple sensors, which may not be
present on consumer smart devices. Regardless, on untrusted smart devices, the use of more than one
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modality simply requires the attacker to target multiple locations using a repeat of the same digital
replay attack.
Table 3.6: Publications that propose multi-modality solutions.
Author(s) Year Proposed Solutions to Digital Replay Attacks
Chetty/Wagner [40] 2004 Face/voice combination (p2).
Ambalakat [6] 2005 Multi-modal biometrics (p6).
Bredin et al. [25] 2006 Face and voice synchronisation (p2).
Shelton et al. [198] 2012 Multiple sensors for more than one biometric (p1).
Rahman et al. [177] 2016 Video motion analysis and accelerometer data (p3).
Despite extensive searching of the current literature, there are no identified practical solutions
to digital replay attacks. Although several types of solutions are proposed, researchers have not
implemented and tested many of them. Some solutions are not viable due to the lack of suitable
hardware or they require significant user interaction. No solutions address digital replay attacks using
consumer grade smart devices.
3.5.5 Datasets
Extensive searching also did not identify any existing datasets that address digital replay attacks. The
closest datasets are designed to detect live people versus spoofing attempts (Type 1 attacks in Fig-
ure 2.7), but they do not (and cannot) attempt to validate that the biometric data was captured in
real-time and not tampered with (Type 2 attacks in Figure 2.7). In these datasets, the researchers
captured the videos in the past for later reuse. Their use is, in itself, a digital replay attack. Ex-
ample datasets include ZJU Eyeblink Database [166], NUAA Imposter [218], PRINT-ATTACK [9],
REPLAY-ATTACK [41], CASIA-FASD [254], 3DMAD [60], and MSU-MFSD [242].
3.5.6 Secondary Literature Analysis
Appendix A describes an alternative literature review technique. This technique examines the map-
ping of citations between more than 300 publications to identify papers and citation links of interest.
By examining the citation links of interest, it is possible to form an opinion on the depth of the present
literature review.
The technique automates the creation of a complete citation map, which is visualised using display
software. Manipulating the nodes in the map by grouping nodes into common themes allows the
examination of trends. The process then reduces the map by removing irrelevant nodes and links,
allowing the focus on only the important information.
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Figure A.5 shows the reduced citation map. This map identifies the citations of interest between
the topics of biometrics, authentication, and proposed solutions to digital replay attacks.
The citation map provides further confirmation that there are no practical solutions to digital replay
attacks for face verification systems.
3.6 Demonstration DRA-1 — Digital Replay Attack against a
Face Verification System
A simple demonstration shows that digital replay attacks are highly effective against a
recent face verification system operating on an uncontrolled device. The digital replay
attack completely bypasses the anti-spoofing mechanisms of this face verification system.
The Digital Replay Attack (DRA) demonstration shows the effectiveness of digital replay attacks
against an existing commercial state-of-the-art face verification system (KeyLemon [110]). This sys-
tem contains countermeasures to defeat spoofing attacks and is effective at distinguishing live faces
in front of the camera. Using a photograph or a video in front of the camera does not easily fool the
system, unlike other systems.
3.6.1 Setup for Demonstration DRA-1
The demonstration uses a Windows 7 Enterprise desktop in a VMware Player 6.0.4 virtual machine.
The installed face verification system typically uses the computer’s camera to provide the biometric
signal for user authentication. This system is designed to robustly detect when a spoofed image (such
as printed photo or video) is presented (spoofing attack) to the camera (e.g., as shown in Figure 3.1).
This demonstration used an external USB camera (Logitech QuickCam Pro 9000), and virtual
webcam software [240]. This virtual webcam device reads a previously created video file and presents
it to the system as though it were a live video feed from a camera device (digital replay attack).
The first step created two video files, one video of the real target user, and another of a colour
printed face of the target user. The demonstration configured the system either to use the physical
camera, or to display these files through the virtual webcam.
In a real attack scenario, attackers can use standard malware attacks to compromise systems by
replacing the video stream from the camera with their own video data and/or capturing suitable video
of the target victim by using their own web camera.
The demonstration attempted to authenticate the user to the lock screen, and consisted of four
phases:
1. Use a printed photo of a face to the physical camera;
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2. Replay a video of the printed face using the virtual webcam;
3. Use a real face to the physical camera;
4. Replay a video of a real face using the virtual webcam.
3.6.2 Results for Demonstration DRA-1
Table 3.7 shows the results of the digital replay attack demonstration.
Table 3.7: Observed results for Demonstration DRA-1. Note that the system authenticates the user
even when an old video file is used.
Object attempting authentication Physical Camera Virtual Webcam
Printed Face Not Authenticated Not Authenticated
Real Face Authenticated Authenticated
The demonstration shows that the system would not authenticate the user when using a photo. It
makes no difference with presenting the photo in front of the physical camera, or using a video of
a printed photo inserted into the system by the virtual webcam. These are expected results as they
represent a spoofing attack.
If a real user is in front of the physical camera, the system correctly authenticates the user. This is
the normal use case for this face verification system, so is also expected.
However, if the virtual webcam inserts a previously captured video of the live user into the system
from a file, the system will also authenticate that user, even though it may have been an attacker
presenting a fraudulent video of the victim.
The biometric system is unable to determine that the video data is fraudulent and captured at
a previous time. It subsequently authenticates the user contained within the video file incorrectly.
This demonstration shows that digital replay attacks against existing biometric systems succeed in
compromising the system. The demonstrated digital replay attack is easy to perform, especially on
uncontrolled consumer smart devices.
Despite KeyLemon using one of the best techniques to distinguish live faces from photographs, a
virtual webcam device that played a previously captured video image of a user defeated it easily.
This demonstration illustrates that the ability to deploy biometric face verification authentication
using uncontrolled consumer smart devices is currently severely limited.
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3.7 Smart Device Solution Requirements
Biometric authentication solves a number of current authentication issues. However, new
problems, such as digital replay attacks, are introduced that must be addressed. Smart
devices are currently not smart enough.
To combat digital replay attacks, the system must be able to verify the origin and integrity of the
video data from its capture to its examination for authentication decisions.
Section 2.4 discusses existing computer based authentication, and why it is inadequate. Adding
biometric authentication addresses many of these concerns. Section 2.6.2 covers various use cases
for biometric authentication on smart devices. In particular, continuous authentication throughout
the life of the transaction will disrupt a number of current attacks. However, as Bonneau et al. [22],
Garfinkel [75], and Whitten and Tygar [244] discuss, systems must have usability carefully designed
or users will reject them.
Therefore, any enhancement to computer-based authentication using smart devices for authenti-
cation must possess the following characteristics:
1. Be as easy to use as passwords, if not better. There is also an opportunity to enhance usability
for impaired users;
2. Support continuous authentication throughout the life of the transaction;
3. Authenticate the actual person, not knowledge or possession;
4. Not require additional hardware or expense to deploy;
5. Be resistant to a wide variety of attacks.
Section 2.6 concludes that most smart devices now possess the technical facilities to collect face
images and video for a face verification system. Usability is as easy as looking at the device, which
most people can achieve without significant impact or unnatural actions (point 1), even for the duration
of the entire transaction (point 2). Face verification not only matches the user’s face to the transaction,
but businesses may easily view audit logs containing the face image of the client in the event of
disputed transactions (point 3). Creating such a system will typically only involve the deployment of
new software or applications, as suitable hardware is already available (point 4).
Section 3.2 highlights that such systems can be resistant to simple spoofing attacks. Current
research is continuing to improve this resistance.
However, Demonstration DRA-1 (Section 3.6) effectively shows that such systems are currently
easily defeated using a digital replay attack (point 5).
Section 3.3 concludes that although the biometric data requires authentication, there are no prac-
tical solutions available currently that combat digital replay attacks.
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3.8 Summary
The lack of suitable solutions to digital replay attacks impairs the successful deployment
of widespread biometric systems using smart devices. This research, outlined in the next
series of chapters, leverages the existing facilities on consumer smart devices to limit the
effect of digital replay attacks.
Digital replay attacks are a significant threat to the successful deployment of biometric systems on
uncontrolled smart devices. Current literature identifies little progress into addressing these attacks.
It is important to understand that spoofing attacks and digital replay attacks are different from each
other. A digital replay attack bypasses simple or complex liveness testing normally used to combat
spoofing attacks. Biometric systems require countermeasures to address both attacks. Solving one
attack without solving the other leaves the biometric system open to significant abuse.
Chapter 4 begins the journey towards the first empirical research into addressing digital replay
attacks for face verification systems that use consumer smart devices as biometric sensors.
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Light Reflection Model
. . . though of course he saw dozens of eyes shin-
ing with the reflection of the fire, as you’ve seen
a rabbit’s or cat’s eyes in the headlights of a car.
C.S. Lewis, The Last Battle, 1956
Chapter Summary: Understanding the light reflection model allows a more detailed ex-
amination of the components that contribute to the proposed structured illumination re-
flection systems used to combat digital replay attacks.
4.1 Introduction
Face verification systems that use insecure consumer smart devices as biometric sensors
are vulnerable to digital replay attacks. The proposed defences use structured illumina-
tion from the device screen to insert a reflection watermark into the captured video.
At night, sitting in front of a campfire, the on-looker’s eyes shine bright with the reflections of the
flames. The pattern of the flames looks to be random, but the pattern reflected from their eyes is a true
copy of the original.
The primary aim of this research is to combat digital replay attacks for face verification systems.
Observing these campfire reflections inspired the investigation of a method to insert a special signal
into a video of a person. Using this signal can determine that the video was captured on a particular
device at the time that light was displayed, and not recorded from a previous time. This signal (or
watermark) marks the point in time when the video capture occurred. The inserted watermark is one
component in a challenge-response system.
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Although there are many ways to watermark a biometric signal (e.g., using intelligent interfaces),
this research limits the scope to using only consumer grade smart devices (as discussed in Section 2.6).
The conclusion is to use the front-facing camera to capture images for a face verification system.
The system inserts a digital watermark in the captured signal by reflecting light displayed on the
device screen from the object.
This chapter defines the model for the digital capture of reflected light from objects, which enables
later discussion of the interaction of the various components in the reflection systems.
4.2 Background
The systems use the inserted watermark to determine when and from where the capture of
the biometric signal occurred, thus addressing digital replay attacks.
To use biometric signals successfully in an authentication system, the source of that signal requires
authentication and the integrity preserved for any presented data. This authentication includes tempo-
ral information defining the time of capture of the biometric signal. Part of the biometric system that
is not under the control of the attacker must authenticate the biometric signal to prevent overriding
the authentication decisions.
Failure to authenticate when and where the capture of the biometric information occurred will
leave the system vulnerable to digital replay attacks. Chapter 3 provides a more detailed discussion
on digital replay attacks.
The biometric signal used in face verification systems often does not have sufficient information to
perform this authentication. Therefore, it requires augmentation. Using some form of authentication
meta-data, this augmentation is located either within the biometric signal (in-band) or as a separate
signal (out-of-band). The advantage of using in-band meta-data for validating the biometric signal is
that, once the face verification signal has completed validation, the signal is immediately useful. The
out-of-band technique suffers from the additional deficiency that the presented face verification signal
and separate meta-data may not be associated with each other during an attack.
In addition, if the system captures the biometric signal and then modifies it to include the au-
thentication data, this is not secure on insecure devices. The digital replay attack may have already
occurred before the system added the authentication data.
Therefore, the digital watermark requires generation at the same time the biometric is captured
(in-band), and should be part of the biometric signal. This will limit the attacker’s ability to alter
the combined signal before transmission to the remote authentication service. One suitable approach
to authenticate the timeliness of the biometric information is to watermark it in-band with suitably
generated meta-data [6, 179]. If the watermark represents a challenge nonce (number used once) in
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a challenge-response system, then only the appropriate response will successfully link the captured
face video to the issued challenge.
Provided the challenges are controlled/determined and authenticated by the authentication system
(not by the client system), then the attacker will have difficulty in influencing the authentication
system. If each of the challenges is relatively unique, the attacker will find it difficult to pre-compute
a list of all possible responses.
4.3 Motivation
Light reflected from objects is generally composed of several components that the system
can observe.
When light hits a surface, depending on the surface refraction index, some light reflects from the
surface and some light is absorbed. In general, the reflected light is composed of two parts [194]:
• Interface reflection, or specular reflection;
• Body reflection, or diffuse reflection.
While the terms interface and body are more precise and widely used in the technical optics liter-
ature, this research uses the terms specular and diffuse since they are more popular in the Computer
Vision literature [216].
Camera sensors then sense the reflected light, and quantise the light information in terms of pixel
intensity values.
Understanding the light reflectance phenomenon is of interest in the general Computer Vision do-
main. One such example is that, one could perform an approximated calculation to separate between
specular and diffuse components. Some studies focus on distinguishing between fake biometrics and
a real person using these specular components of reflection (e.g., [12, 133, 172, 242, 250]).
In this research, reflections from objects form a digital watermark used to combat digital replay
attacks.
4.4 Light Reflection Model Description
The light reflection model components that contribute to the total reflection system include
the ambient and added structured illumination, reflection, quantisation, and temporal
components.
Tan and Ikeuchi [217] use the dichromatic reflection model introduced by Shafer [194] to describe
the pixel taken by a digital colour camera of an inhomogeneous object as:
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I (x) = wd (x)
∫
Ω
S (λ,x)E (λ) q (λ) dλ+ ws (x)
∫
Ω
E (λ) q (λ) dλ, (4.1)
“where I = {Ir, Ig, Ib} is the color vector of image intensity or camera sensor. The spatial parameter
x = {x, y}, is the two dimensional image coordinates. q = {qr, qg, qb} is the three-element-vector
of sensor sensitivity. wd (x) and ws (x) are the weighting factors for diffuse and specular reflections,
respectively; their values depend on the geometric structure at location x. S (x, λ) is the diffuse
spectral reflectance function, whileE (λ) is independent of the spatial location (x) because we assume
a uniform illumination color. The integration is done over the visible spectrum (Ω).” [217]
However, Tan and Ikeuchi’s model requires modification to describe the digital watermark sys-
tems to combat the digital replay attacks proposed in this research, as discussed in the next three
subsections.
4.4.1 Simplified Light Reflection Model
To use screen illumination to reflect light from objects to combat digital replay attacks, there is no
need to distinguish between specular and diffuse reflections. Therefore, (4.2) simplifies (4.1) by
combining these two elements as:
I (x) =
∫
Ω
R (λ,x)E (λ) q (λ) dλ , (4.2)
where R (λ,x) is the overall reflectance function at location x, E (λ) is the illumination energy func-
tion for spectrum λ, and q (λ) is the camera quantisation vector for the three colour channels. Again,
this integration is performed over the visible spectrum (Ω). Note that, the integration function results
are pixel values generated by the camera.
4.4.2 Temporal Component
One challenge with the model in (4.2) is that, in the reflection systems described in later chapters, the
image is changing over time.
Firstly, the images are dynamic (e.g., hand-held cameras move against the background, objects
move within the camera frame, and human subjects change face gestures and blink their eyes). There-
fore, the pixel at location x may not be spatially associated with the same location at a different time.
As a result, the reflectance function changes over time.
Secondly, the illumination E (λ) also changes over time. This could include changes in ambient
illumination in a dynamic environment (e.g., flashing ambient light, dappled shade, flicker introduced
by fluorescent lighting). Since the goal is to observe changes in the reflection from an object while
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changing the illumination energy (structured illumination) over time, it is certain that the illumination
energy will be changing at some point.
Finally, cameras perform auto-adjustments periodically that affect the capture of the input sig-
nal. Even if the incoming reflection energy (R (λ,x)E (λ)) has not changed, the digital output from
the camera may change due to adjustments in brightness, contrast, focus, gain, white balance, and
saturation. Therefore, the sensor quantising function from (4.2) changes over time.
Equation (4.3) includes the essential temporal component as:
I (x, t) =
∫
Ω
R (λ,x, t)E (λ, t) q (λ, t) dλ , (4.3)
which defines the reflection intensity for pixel x at time t.
Since there may be changes between frames over time, it is likely that pixels within each frame
will be different from their corresponding pixels in other frames. As the time between the two frames
increases, the changes between those two frames also tend to increase. These changes are variable
and unpredictable.
4.4.3 Structured Illumination Component
Equation (4.3) represents the structured illumination approach used to combat digital replay attacks.
Figure 4.1 illustrates this approach. One of the key ideas is to insert structured illumination as a nonce
challenge into video/image data. To achieve this, the system uses an additional illumination source
(i.e., the device screen).
Screen
Illuminati
on
Camera
Ambient Light
Source
I(x,t)
q(λ,t)
R(λ,x,t)EA(λ,t)
R(λ,x,t)ES(λ,t)
EA(λ,t)
ES(λ,t)
Figure 4.1: Structured illumination reflection system illustrating the light reflection model compo-
nents at time t.
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Therefore, it is important to consider two illumination sources:
1. The ambient illumination, which comes from the surrounding environment such as the sun or
room lights;
2. The structured illumination source generated from the device screen.
The device camera senses and quantises both illumination sources as a single pixel value.
The function EA (λ, t) defines the ambient illumination energy across the spectrum λ at time t,
and ES (λ, t) as the added structured illumination energy. To include these components, (4.4) extends
(4.3) as follows:
I (x, t) =
∫
Ω
[
R (λ,x, t)EA (λ, t) +R (λ,x, t)ES (λ, t)
]
q (λ, t) dλ . (4.4)
Note that the only observed information is the quantised data in terms of pixel intensity val-
ues I (x, t). The goal is to isolate the structured illumination energy at an instance of time from
I (x, t) so that the system can recover the watermark signal. In other words, the reflection from both
EA (λ, t) and ES (λ, t) are latent variables and the goal is to isolate them from the observed compo-
nents (i.e., I (x, t)).
4.5 Isolating Structured Illumination through Pixel Subtraction
The system design attempts to isolate one reflection component from the combined signal
that includes all of the other components, by subtracting pixels that do not contain the
desired reflection component from the corresponding pixels in the total signal to isolate
that reflection component.
The aim of the proposed reflection systems is to encode a nonce challenge as the watermark and
then extract this watermark as the response. If the challenge and the response match, the system has
high confidence that it captured the video at the time the screen displayed the nonce and in close
proximity to that screen. The system will not accept a video from a previous time (a digital replay
attack), as the reflected nonce would be different to the displayed nonce.
In each of the proposed reflection systems (described in later chapters), the feature extraction pro-
cess aims to isolate and classify the structured illumination signal in the captured frames by subtract-
ing [an approximation of] the non-illuminated component from each pixel. Using the pixel subtrac-
tion method, differences in capture environments such as ambient light, background images, different
faces, and different camera quantisation responses should cancel out, leaving only the illuminated
colour as the variable of interest.
When the device screen is not displaying structured illumination, shown as:
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ES (λ, tn) = 0
⇒ R (λ,x, tn)ES (λ, tn) = 0 ,
(4.5)
the majority of pixels I (x, tn) in the captured reflection at time tn should be equal in colour and
intensity to their corresponding pixels in the reflection from a different image known to not contain
the structured illumination component (e.g., I (x, tm) at time tm).
When the device screen displays structured illumination, shown as:
ES (λ, tn) > 0
⇒ R (λ,x, tn)ES (λ, tn) > 0 ,
(4.6)
the majority of pixels I (x, tn) at time tn should display a heightened level of that illumination signal
when compared with a known non-illuminated image, due to reflecting the illumination displayed
upon the screen (the inclusion of the R (λ,x, tn)ES (λ, tn) component).
However, as mentioned in Section 4.4.3, the device camera is not able to observe the two variables
R (λ,x, tn)EA (λ, tn) and R (λ,x, tn)ES (λ, tn) separately. These latent variables are combined as a
single input prior to the quantising function q (λ, tn), so that only I (x, tn) is directly measurable.
To approximate the R (λ,x, tn)EA (λ, tn) latent component, the system measures the image from
a known non-illuminated frame. Due to the design of the system, pixels in the first frame in the
sequence at time t0 (I (x, t0)) contain no structured illumination, represented as:
I (x, t0) =
∫
Ω
R (λ,x, t0)EA (λ, t0) q (λ, t0) dλ . (4.7)
However, I (x, t0) from (4.7) is only an approximation for R (λ,x, tn)EA (λ, tn) q (λ, tn) due to
the dynamically changing environment (discussed in Section 4.4.2). As a result, for the two different
times tn and t0, the corresponding pixels in each of the two frames may not be equal.
Therefore, using the light reflection model from (4.4), (4.8) represents the pixel subtraction as:
ε (x, tn) + γ (x, tn) = I (x, tn)− I (x, t0) , (4.8)
where γ (x, tn) represents the measured structured illumination component, and ε (x, tn) represents
the residual difference (noise) between I (x, tn) and I (x, t0) (the remaining reflection after the ap-
proximation for the non-illuminated component R (λ,x, tn)EA (λ, tn) is removed from I (x, tn)).
When there is no structured illumination, γ (x, tn) = 0. The goal, therefore, is to distinguish the
signal γ (x, tn) from the noise ε (x, tn) for each frame. However, as stated in Section 4.4.2, as the
time between tn and t0 increases, the noise ε (x, tn) also increases. Ideally, although each component
is constantly changing, it is desired that γ (x, tn) > ε (x, tn).
59
Chapter 4. Light Reflection Model
Attempts to use the most recently classified non-illuminated frame (e.g., I (x, tn−1), instead of
I (x, t0)) to approximateR (λ,x, tn)EA (λ, tn) creates an unstable system. If I (x, tn−1) is incorrectly
classified as non-illuminated (i.e., is not supposed to contain the ES (λ, tn−1) component, but actually
does), the pixel subtraction method also removes the ES (λ, tn) component prior to classification.
This results in the system classifying I (x, tn) as non-illuminated, which perpetuates the problem
with limited ability to correct itself.
4.6 Summary
The light reflection model details the different components contributing to the total reflec-
tion system. Proposed reflection systems use the pixel subtraction method to isolate the
structured illumination component.
Understanding the model of how light reflects from objects allows a deeper understanding of the
interaction between the different components. In particular, the structured illumination used in the
subsequent reflection systems is important, as it is the key component. Less desirable components
such as the movement introduced by the temporal component contribute to noise, which makes dis-
tinguishing the structured illumination component from the total reflection much more difficult.
The next two chapters implement the first two reflection systems designed to combat digital replay
attacks. These systems adopt the pixel subtraction method described in this chapter, aiming to the
structured illumination component from the total reflection.
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Digital Replay Attack Countermeasures
using Eye Reflections
A friend’s eye is a good mirror.
Celtic proverb
Chapter Summary: Capturing reflections from a user’s eyes illuminated by light from a
computer screen is difficult, resulting in a small reflection region for analysis.
5.1 Introduction
The initial research proposal used light reflected from the eyes as a watermark signal.
The original research proposal aimed to use a sequence of colours displayed on the smart device
screen to reflect from the user’s eyes. These reflections form the response in a challenge-response
system. The reflections of light from the eyes determine that an attacker has not substituted a video
sequence in an attempt to authenticate fraudulently to a computer system.
This chapter describes the method and results of using light from a smart device screen to reflect
from the user’s eyes for validating that the image capture occurred only at the time that the screen
illuminated the eyes.
5.2 Background
Light reflects from the eye as four separate Purkinje images however, only the first Purk-
inje image (glint) is usable when using a smart device screen for illumination and a stan-
dard webcam for capture.
61
Chapter 5. Digital Replay Attack Countermeasures using Eye Reflections
Light reflects from the eyes not once but four times, although some reflections can be difficult to
see. These reflections are termed Purkinje images [251].
1. The first Purkinje image is a reflection from the front surface of the cornea. Since the normal
blinking response moistens the front surface of the eye, the reflection due to the first Purkinje
image is significantly higher than the other Purkinje images;
2. The second Purkinje image occurs when light reflects from the back surface of the cornea;
3. The third Purkinje image is a reflection from the front surface of the lens;
4. The fourth Purkinje image reflects from the back surface of the lens. This is unique compared
to the other Purkinje images as it is inverted.
1 42 3
Purkinje Reflection
Incident
Light
Lens
Iris Cornea
Figure 5.1: Illustration showing the four Purkinje images.
Some studies use these Purkinje images as a mechanism to determine “liveness” — that is, that the
subject is a live human being, and not some facsimile such as a photo, video, or 3D mask [50, 124].
Techniques to determine the direction the user is gazing (gaze tracking) also use the Purkinje im-
ages [123, 252]. However, these tasks often require the use of special equipment such as high-
resolution cameras and near-infrared illumination. Such equipment does not typically exist on con-
sumer smart devices. Hardware facilities that are most commonly available on existing devices limit
the proposed technique. These facilities primarily consist of the screen for illumination, and the web
camera for image capture.
By only using the screen for illumination, and the web camera for image capture, eye reflections
are then limited to using only the first Purkinje image (corneal reflection, or glint). Fortunately, the
first Purkinje image produces a much stronger reflection than the other Purkinje images [235].
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5.3 Motivation
The motivation of using light reflected from the eyes is the ability to locate the reflection
within the pupil region, and the high contrast between the reflected light and the dark
pupil.
Nishino and Nayer [151] indicated that complex images that reflect from the eyes create observ-
able reflections. Simple specular reflections appear as bright pinpoints of light within people’s eyes.
Even small illumination sources, such as a candle, are observable as a reflection from the eye. Fig-
ure 5.2 shows the basic components of a person’s eye.
Pupil
Sclera
Iris
Figure 5.2: Picture of an eye with basic parts labelled. Note how the top eyelid partially obscures the
iris, but not the pupil.
Although the eyelid often obscures part of the eye, the pupil of the eye is generally unobstructed.
If the user gazes directly towards a light source, the reflection from their eye is mostly located within
this pupil region when observed at a low angle of incidence (and, therefore, low angle of reflection).
When a user commonly uses a smart device, they look directly at the screen. This results in a
low angle of incidence of light shining on the user’s eyes from the screen. If a front facing camera
installed on the same device is located in close proximity to that screen, the low angle of incidence of
the light shining on the eyes returns with a low angle of reflection. The actual angle of incidence of
the light source reflecting from the eye to the camera varies, depending on the size of the screen and
the distance to the device during use (shown in Figure 5.3). At a typical usage distance of 35cm, the
angle of incidence (α, in Figure 5.3) for mobile phones used in portrait mode varies from 0.8° (top of
the screen) to 7.3° (bottom of the screen). For tablets used in landscape mode, α varies from 0.8° to
11.3°. Since the user is looking directly at the screen, the reflection in the eye from the screen light
should be located within the pupil region.
The pupil of a person’s eye is normally dark. Since the reflection will be located within the pupil
region, this provides a high contrast between the reflected light and the dark pupil.
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α
Figure 5.3: Picture of angle of incidence when using a smart phone.
Therefore, this first proposal analysed reflections in the eye from images displayed on the smart
device screen to validate that the capture of the video data occurred during the display of the images.
The images displayed on the smart device screen form a challenge, and the observed reflections form
the appropriate response.
If the displayed images (challenge) matched the reflections (response), then it could be assumed
that the video had been captured in real-time from the person attempting to authenticate, and further
biometric authentication such as face verification could then proceed. If the image and reflections did
not match, the video is fraudulent.
5.4 Description of the Eye Reflection System
The system illuminates the user’s eyes using colours displayed on the screen of a smart
mobile device. Analysis of the reflection in the eyes from the light determines if the system
can correctly classify the illuminating colour in the reflection.
The proposed technique uses colours displayed on the screen of the smart mobile device. The
authentication server forms a challenge by specifying a sequence of colours for display.
As the user gazes at the screen displaying the colours, the smart device captures a video sequence
of the user’s face returns it to the authentication server for analysis.
Contained within this video will be the reflections in the user’s eyes from the colours displayed
on the screen. These reflections effectively watermark the video using an in-band signal.
As noted in Section 5.3, the reflection adopted by the proposed system uses the first Purkinje
images. This is because it is the strongest reflection, and least susceptible to corruption due to external
environmental conditions such as ambient light.
The low angle of incidence and reflection to the eye means that if the person is gazing at the
challenge image, then the reflection will be located within the person’s pupil, where the reflectance at
all wavelengths is at its highest [235]. This makes it easier to locate the desired reflection, provides
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enhanced contrast for image analysis, and removes the need to correct for background colours of the
iris.
The captured video would then be analysed by the authentication server to identify the reflection
in the user’s eyes and determine if these reflections matched the displayed sequence of colours. These
reflections form a response to the challenge issued by the authentication server.
If the sequence of reflected colours matches the displayed sequence, then it can be assumed that
the video of the user was captured at the time those colours were displayed (and not before), and near
to the device that displayed the colours (not created on a different device).
If the reflections do not match the sequence of displayed colours, then the assumption is that the
supplied video is fraudulent, and not valid for use as part of the authentication process.
This system uses in-band watermarking, but the watermark is added before the video is captured
(reflection) and not after it is captured (digital post-processing), where it may be tampered with. This
system also does not require cooperation from the user, other than to look at the screen (which they
will already be doing).
The light displayed on the screen, the reflection from the eyes, and the captured image form a
closed-loop feedback system. The server specifies which colour sequences to display as part of the
authentication process. The sequence of colours is different each time the user attempts authentica-
tion. Examining the captured images determines if the same sequence of colours is observable in the
reflections. The displayed colour sequence is a form of challenge, and the captured reflections form
the response sequence. Figure 5.4 shows a diagram of the screen, eye reflection, and generic webcam
device for a smart phone. Note that the reflection is located within the pupil area. The system can
include tablets, laptop computers, and desktop computers.
Figure 5.4: Analysing eye reflections from images on the screen. The eyes reflect an image displayed
by the screen. The camera captures an image of this reflection. The eye image shows the captured
reflection in the pupil area circled and pointed to by the arrow.
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Provided the number of possible challenges is sufficiently large, it should not be possible to use
a video of an older challenge to respond to the current challenge, as the sequence of colours will be
different.
After verifying the colour reflections, additional authentication checks such as liveness or anti-
spoofing should then performed prior to using the video for face verification. Optional validation,
such as reflection brightness analysis to determine if the reflection conforms to a person’s eye or a
shiny mirror [124, 235] may provide additional security.
Although complex images were not required to watermark the video successfully, complex images
such as Quick Response (QR) codes [53] with error-correction might be possible to improve the
robustness of the system if the system was highly successful.
Finally, the use of spectacles, contact lenses, or cornea replacements might need consideration,
as these may alter the reflection from the surface of the pupil (glint). Other issues, including sclera
colouring, lens replacements, and diseases that affect the colouring of the eyes (e.g., jaundice), gener-
ally do not alter this reflection. However, if the general use of spectacles or contact lenses increased
the amount of reflected light, then this would be a positive.
5.5 Experiment ECR-1 — Reflecting Colours from the Eyes
Experiment ECR-1 showed that, under ideal conditions, it was possible to classify the
reflected colours in the majority of cases correctly. Different colours, such as White and
Red, performed better than other colours, such as Green and Blue.
A small experiment tested the effectiveness of the eye reflection technique.
5.5.1 Experiment ECR-1 Setup
Experiment ECR-1 (Eye Colour Reflection) used a consumer eight megapixel webcam (Logitech
Pro 9000) connected to a Windows 7 desktop computer. The camera used default settings except
for manual focus. The user positioned the smart phone directly beneath the camera, and held the
combined camera and phone assembly at a comfortable, normal usage distance (see Figure 5.4). The
use of the smart phone modelled the low lighting capabilities of small devices.
The screen on the phone displayed different colours using 100% of the screen at full brightness.
Subjects gazed towards the top of the screen to ensure that the light reflection remained within the
pupil boundaries. The camera captured an image of the user’s face while they looked at the screen.
The colour on the screen was changed, and the process repeated.
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Captured face images were analysed to identify the subject’s pupil(s). Currently, a manual process
crops these pupils from the image for analysis. Future systems may automate this process step using
techniques such as those described in [33].
A three-dimensional feature vector v ∈ R3 represents each cropped pupil imageW . Each dimen-
sion in v is the average value of the reflection region on c channel c ∈ {r, g, b}:
vc =
1
|E|
∑
x∈E
Ic (x) , (5.1)
where vc is the cth dimension of the feature vector, |E| is the number of pixels belonging to the
reflection region E, Ic (x) is the value of pixel Ic in image W on channel c at location x = {x, y}
(from (4.1), and E is the eye reflection region determined via:
E(x) =
{
1 if α < J(x) < ω
0 otherwise
, (5.2)
where E(x) ∈ {0, 1} determines whether pixel location x belongs to the reflection region (value 1
means the pixel belongs to the region); J (x) is the greyscale of I (x) (I (x) from (4.1)); α and ω
are the minimum and maximum threshold values. The upper threshold ω is required for excluding
over-saturated pixels.
The feature vector v is normalised so
∑
c vc equals to one. The feature captures the colour propor-
tion of the reflection. `1 norm is used to measure the dissimilarity between two vectors. The classifier
used is Nearest Neighbour.
Nearest Neighbour estimates the reflected colour by classifying the extracted features from the
pupil images. Leave-one-out cross validation was used for the experiments. In this setting, all images
from one subject are the test images, and the remainder are the training images.
Using this system, four people participate in Experiment ECR-1 to determine the feasibility of
challenge-response systems using eye reflections.
Different colours (White, Magenta, Red, Yellow, Green, Cyan, and Blue) are displayed on the
mobile device screen (in this case, an Apple iPhone 3G) while the user looks at it. Figure 5.5 shows
the user holding the phone setup while participating in Experiment ECR-1.
An external USB camera (Logitech Pro 9000) captures the entire face as a single static image.
This image includes the reflections in the user’s eyes. Figure 5.6 shows an image of a face with the
light reflecting from the subject’s eyes prior to cropping the pupil region for analysis.
Figure 5.7 shows for each colour in the challenge image, the resulting reflections in the cropped
pupils of each subject.
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Figure 5.5: User participating in Experiment ECR-1.
5.5.2 Experiment ECR-1 Results
Figure 5.8 shows the percent Correct Classification Rate (CCR) of analysed reflections for each colour
for all subjects. The results show that reflected images are observable within the region of the pupil.
The CCR for the different colours varied. Colours such as White, Magenta, Red, and Cyan were
easier to classify than others were. These results showed that for the spectral colours of Yellow,
Green, and Blue, there was a corresponding decrease in the CCR, highlighting that reflections from
light towards the longer visible wavelengths (e.g., Red) are easier to detect than are those with shorter
wavelengths (e.g., Blue). White should perform well as it is a combination of all colours. Cyan is close
to a combination of Green and Blue and expected to perform similar to these colours, and Magenta
is a combination of Red and Blue and expected to perform between these colours. The results in
Figure 5.8 largely remain consistent with these predictions.
Van Norren and Tiemeijer [235] observed that the reflectance factor for light reflecting from dif-
ferent retinal locations was lowest for blue light, and increased through the spectrum to be highest for
red light. These results from Experiment ECR-1 are also largely consistent with their findings.
5.5.3 Experiment ECR-1 Issues
Experiment ECR-1 identified a number of issues that require additional research. Camera focus,
camera movement, distance from the camera, and image format all have an effect on the quality of
the captured images.
In particular, the camera auto-focus blurred images. Whilst this did not appear to affect the reflec-
tion classification, it did reduce the level of reflected light and affect the ability to find the reflection
automatically. As a result, the analysis manually cropped the reflections.
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Figure 5.6: Reflection of light in the person’s eyes using light from a hand-held computer screen
(Apple iPhone 3G).
As the level of illumination rose, the camera tended to auto-adjust its settings to reduce the ob-
served light. This also made the automated finding of the reflection difficult. The test system then
disabled the auto-adjustment of the camera, and a wide range of manual settings evaluated. However,
no suitable manual settings could be identified that performed better than the automatic settings of the
camera, so the auto-adjustment of the camera was re-enabled.
One of the more challenging issues was that the screen size of the device and the ambient light
affected the level of reflected light available for capture. The experiment reduced the ambient light
by operating in a darkened room.
The front surface of the eye (cornea) is a convex mirror, so reflected images form a virtual image
behind the eye [252]. Reflections get smaller as the distance between the object and the eye increases.
The window size of the reflection in the pupil was directly proportional to the capture image size. In
Experiment ECR-1, the captured images were 3264×2448 pixels. This resulted in a reflection size
of around 73 pixels. However, if the system only supports a basic camera, it may only be capable of
an image capture size of 640×480 pixels. Images of this size result in a reflection size of only 2×2
pixels. These reflection sizes are inadequate to display complex images such as Quick Response (QR)
codes [53] accurately, which forced abandoning that idea.
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Figure 5.7: Pupil reflections for all subjects showing colour reflections from challenge images. This
image best viewed in colour.
Eye gaze and the position of camera affected whether the reflection was located within the pupil
boundaries, and/or obscured by the eyelid or eyebrows. The user’s eyes move relative to screen
constantly, so tracking became a significant issue. Various techniques to track eyes, such as Hough
circle detection [89] and HAAR cascades [238, 130], did not produce useful results. Further attempts
performed face detection first, and then attempted to locate the eye within the face window, before
finally detecting the reflection within the pupil. However, all of these techniques were unreliable in
detecting the desired reflection accurately and reliably. As a result, the experiment adopted a manual
reflection cropping approach.
Additional analysis in identifying the correct reflection could include detecting that the reflection
is within the expected size range, or that the amount of returned light is within the expected range
including measuring a decrease in reflection dependent on the light wavelength [124, 235]. It may
also be possible to perform further image analysis to identify inconsistent boundaries near the eyes.
Experiment ECR-1 uses a small set of single colours as the challenge. The attacker can build
a set of pre-recorded correct responses that that they can replay on demand in response to a given
challenge. To defend against this, the system must produce random challenges chosen from a wide
set of possibilities. The random display of a sequence of changing colours creates these challenges.
However, to generate sufficient randomness and to reduce the length of time required for the user to
stare at the screen, the frequency of colour changes may be increased. There is a risk to some users
of photosensitive epilepsy [245], which requires further consideration.
Using absolute values in each of the RGB channels for classification highlighted that the required
thresholds are different for each channel. In addition, the colours in the different channels react to
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Figure 5.8: Correct Classification Rate (in %) for each colour reflection from the eyes.
each other in a feedback cycle so are constantly changing. As one colour is increased in intensity (e.g.,
Red is increasing, but not Green or Blue), the measured reflection from other colours also increased in
intensity (i.e., both Green and Blue also exhibited a small increase in intensity). This made classifying
colours using absolute thresholds difficult.
5.6 Summary
Experiment ECR-1 also identified that the proposed system contained many issues, in-
cluding small reflection regions, difficulty in finding the reflection in the pupils, impact of
ambient light and camera settings, and the need to improve the security of the currently
static system. Chapter 6 describes the next system.
The original research proposal was to use illumination from a smart device screen to create re-
flections from the user’s eyes. These reflections were to watermark the captured video to confirm the
real-time capture of the video. Whilst experimental analysis determined that the technique showed
some promise, it also identified several issues.
Tracking the reflections in the eyes was extremely difficult. The amount of light reflected from
the eyes was extremely small unless the system uses a higher resolution camera. Higher resolution
cameras are not always available on consumer devices, and a higher resolution would consume more
network bandwidth as part of the authentication system.
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The small reflections were highly sensitive to ambient light, as well as automatic camera responses
and relative movements. These issues contributed to the system performing poorly except under ideal
conditions.
Therefore, the conclusion was that eye reflections were not a suitable solution to the digital replay
attack. However, the light illumination also reflects from the entire face, not just the eyes. A new
system using the entire face region for reflections continues the next phase of this study in Chapter 6.
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Digital Replay Attack Countermeasures
using Multi-Colour Face Reflections
Who sees the human face correctly:
the photographer, the mirror, or the painter?
Pablo Picasso. 1881–1973
Chapter Summary: Reflecting colours from the entire face provided a large area for
reflection analysis. Experiments showed that the system could correctly classify the re-
flected colours under ideal conditions. Some colours performed better than others did.
The FRAUD1 dataset [206] provides data to enable further research.
6.1 Introduction
Since reflections from the eyes were too small to analyse, reflections were analysed from
the entire face instead.
As discussed in Chapter 5, the attempt to reflect light from a user’s eyes illuminated by a mobile
device screen resulted in a small area of reflection for analysis. However, the entire facial area also
reflects the same illumination.
Although this facial reflection is at a lower intensity than eye reflections, the face region is signif-
icantly larger than the region of light reflected from the eyes. Therefore, further research continued
into the feasibility of using the face region for reflections illuminated from the smart device screen.
This chapter outlines the direction and results from reflecting coloured light from the user’s face.
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6.2 Background
Using generic webcams on consumer smart devices to capture images of the user requires
augmenting this signal with a watermark to prevent digital replay attacks.
Chapter 2 outlines the desire to enhance online authentication using biometrics. The chosen bio-
metric modality is face verification as this is easy to use, by simply looking at the device. Smart
phones, tablets, laptops, and desktop computers generally possess a webcam that is suitable for use
for face verification. Such widespread deployment of these devices could enable the wider general
use of face verification systems for online authentication.
However, these smart devices do not usually contain special facilities that are capable of authenti-
cating the face biometric signal appropriately. The devices are uncontrolled, which opens a significant
threat from malicious software. As discussed in Section 3.3, a successful digital replay attack replaces
the face biometric signal with a different face biometric signal.
The reason that digital replay attacks are so successful is that face verification biometric signals
do not have sufficient information used by consumer smart devices for authentication purposes. If the
attacker modifies or replaces the digital biometric signal, any anti-spoofing techniques will be unable
to distinguish between a real biometric signal and a substituted signal.
There is a requirement to augment the biometric signal to enable the ability to determine when,
and from where, the system captured the signal. For the face verification system, the proposal is
to illuminate the user’s face with a coded signal of light displayed from the smart device screen
(structured illumination). This illumination reflects from the user’s face, and forms a watermark in
the video captured for the face verification system.
Provided the coded reflections match the mandated illumination sequence, there is a higher con-
fidence that the capture of the biometric signal occurred while displaying the illumination sequence.
If the coded reflections do not match the illumination sequence, the attacker may have replaced the
biometric signal with a different biometric signal (which does not contain the appropriate illumination
sequence in the reflections).
6.3 Motivation
Inserting a watermark into the captured video by reflecting light from the entire facial
region provided four orders of magnitude more pixels for analysis than reflections from
the eyes.
The work in this chapter was a direct extension of the work in Chapter 5. That work noted
that the reflection region in the eyes was too small. Observations in Chapter 5 showed that typical
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consumer web cameras only recorded reflection images in the order of 4-12 pixels per pupil, resulting
in inconsistent classification.
The face region also reflects a large portion of illumination. Although the reflection is not as bright
from the face (mostly, diffuse reflection) as it is from the shiny pupil (mostly, specular reflection),
there is a significantly larger area of the face to analyse. A well-positioned face could occupy in the
order of 25% of the frame width, and 50% of the frame height. Equation (6.1) calculates the facial
region ellipse area:
A = pi × h
2
× w
2
, (6.1)
where A represents the calculated face region area, h is the height of the face region, and w is the
width of the face region.
For a frame of size 640×480 pixels, this could result in a facial region ellipse area of more than
120,000 pixels. Therefore, pixels with the correct reflection (signal) should significantly outweigh
individual pixel errors (noise).
The proposed system uses colours displayed on the device screen to illuminate the face while
the camera captures the reflections. The reflected colour digitally watermarks the captured face im-
ages. The sequence of displayed colours forms the challenge in a challenge-response system. The
reflections in the face are analysed to calculate the appropriate response. If the calculated response
matches the sequence of displayed colours, there is a higher confidence that the system captured the
video at that moment in time and on that specific device. If the video does not contain the correct
reflected colour sequence, then its capture did not occur at the correct time on the correct device, and
the attacker may have inserted a previously captured video.
The digital watermarking of face images is performed in-band, with the watermark added before
the video is captured (reflection) and not after the capture (where digital post-processing could alter
it). In its ideal form, this system does not require cooperation from the user, other than to look at the
screen (which they will already be doing).
6.4 Description
The design of the system used several colours to reflect from the face. The system captured
non-illuminated frames as a baseline, and subtracted those from illuminated faces to iso-
late the colour reflection for analysis. Experiments identified several challenges. Some of
these challenges were resolved, and others left to further analysis.
The new system illuminates the user’s face using structured (or coded) illumination from the
device screen. The camera captures the face images, including the reflections. The system then
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analyses these images to determine if the illumination sequence is visible in the reflections. The
sequence of illumination states forms a unique nonce (number used once) in the reflections that will
be different each time the face images are captured.
Figure 6.1 shows a diagram of the screen, face reflection, and generic camera device for a tablet
computer. The system also expands to include smart phones, laptop computers, and desktop comput-
ers.
Figure 6.1: Analysing face reflections from images on the screen. The face reflects a colour image
displayed by the screen. The camera captures this face with the colours reflected from it.
Illuminating the face with just a single bright colour (such as White) provides an excellent re-
flection response, but has little entropy (or uncertainty) [195] for a challenge-response system. The
challenge is always White. The use of multiple colours provides the necessary uncertainty, especially
when used in a sequence. The entropy in the system increases with the use of more colours in longer
sequences.
6.4.1 Colour Sequence Construction
The initial choice of colours was Black, White, Red, Green, and Blue. Later, the colour list expanded
with the addition of Yellow, Cyan, and Magenta to increase the number of possible states. White was
removed from the list since it represents a level of illumination rather than a single Hue.
The separation of token symbols for the embedded colour watermark occurred on the transition
from one colour state to a new colour state — i.e., there was never a situation where one colour state
followed the same colour state.
The length of time that each colour state was displayed on the screen was adjusted to minimise
the time displayed for each state. This was to increase the entropy in the system by displaying as
many colour states as possible in the shortest possible time, while still having a sufficient number of
captured frames for each colour state to enable analysis. However, reducing the display time for a
colour state too far resulted in the failure to capture reflections in time for some colours.
Therefore, the system captured three frames for each displayed colour, with the aim of improving
the robustness of the colour analysis.
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The first reflection capture protocol used individual processor threads. The first thread would alter
the illumination state on the screen, while the second thread would use the camera to capture and save
images as fast as possible.
6.4.2 Frame Differencing
A number of external variables exist that must be addressed. The mobile nature of the target consumer
devices means that these devices will operate in widely differing environmental conditions. Hardware
devices differ significantly. Even a simple software update to a driver can alter the response charac-
teristics.
As described in Section 4.5, the proposed technique attempts to counter many of these variations
by using frame differences (pixel subtraction), similar to the concept proposed by Galambos [71].
Equation (4.8) describes the results of performing this subtraction on a per-pixel basis.
After reading the first frame of the captured video, the initial window W0 (W p×q) is extracted
from this frame. Subsequent frames then segment the same window (represented as Wtn for the
frame at time tn) before performing a clipped subtraction of W0 from it in the RGB colour space.
This results in isolating the added structured illumination reflecting from the object in the frame
window (the face, in this instance) for analysis.
The isolated colour region (∆Wtn) is calculated using (6.2) by subtracting the initial window
from the current window:
∆Wtn = max (Wtn −W0, 0) , (6.2)
whereW0 represents the region of interest window from the first received frame, andWtn represents
the region of interest window at time tn.
When the screen is not displaying any colour, the majority of pixels in Wtn (each of I (x, tn)
from (4.4)) should be equal in colour and intensity to their corresponding pixels in W0 (each of
I (x, t0) from (4.7), known to not be illuminated by the screen). Therefore, ∆Wtn should result in a
predominantly non-illuminated response (i.e., for each pixel in ∆Wtn , ε (x, tn) = 0 and γ (x, tn) = 0
from (4.8)) due to (4.5).
When the screen displays a colour, the majority of pixels in ∆Wtn should show a heightened
level of that colour due to reflecting the colour displayed upon the screen (i.e., for each pixel in
∆Wtn , ε (x, tn) = 0 and γ (x, tn) > 0 from (4.8), thus highlighting the R (λ,x, tn)ES (λ, tn) latent
component from (4.4)) due to (4.6).
Using the frame difference technique, differences in capture environments such as ambient light,
background images, different faces, and individual camera responses should cancel out (ε (x, tn) =
0), leaving only the illuminated colour as the variable of interest (γ (x, tn)).
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6.4.3 Challenges/Constraints with Current Consumer Smart Devices
Research identified that using a consumer device introduces a number of other variables that are
difficult to control. Current technology required by the proposed approach may not yet be sufficiently
mature.
Face is constantly moving
The device and user’s face constantly move relative to each other, which alters the position of the face
within the camera frame. This can affect the colour classification due to additional artefacts in the
difference image. To counter this, the system could use a face detector to identify the face region, and
segment only that region for analysis.
Face detectors are inconsistent
Despite the significant amount of research that has been undertaken into face detection [88, 128], it
was difficult to get a freely available face detector that worked consistently in all lighting conditions,
with all types of faces, and particularly, with the presence of spectacles. Small differences in the de-
tected face location contributed to errors in the colour classification. In addition, real-time processing
was challenging if the detector failed to find a face, as some detectors took several seconds to process
a single frame. Therefore, during classification, after detecting the face window on the initial frame,
all subsequent frames used the same window.
Screen illumination is poor
Initial work used a smart phone sized screen. However, the illumination provided by the small screen
made classification difficult in a bright environment. This current research used a tablet-sized screen
for illumination in a darkened environment. Chapter 10 outlines further studies to determine the lower
limits on illumination levels.
Camera devices behave differently
Each camera device and its associated driver exhibit a range of different characteristics, especially
relating to auto-focus, auto-exposure, and auto-white balance. Some cameras would blur the image
during auto-focus, resulting in a drop in reflected illumination. Cameras also ceased capturing frames
while they completed an auto-adjust cycle, so the frame rate was inconsistent. Auto-white balance
produced its own set of challenges, as the camera appeared to modify the captured image by changing
the colours. Manual exposure settings were extensively tested but none could be identified that were
superior to the automatic settings produced by the driver (results not shown). Using manual settings
requires determining suitable settings for each camera and driver, and every environmental situation.
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Therefore, the system continued to use automatic settings. To counter these challenges, the capture
protocol started the camera prior to capturing the required frames, allowing time for the camera set-
tings to settle in the current environment, and displayed colours were interspersed with Black to limit
the camera’s variable response to the illumination.
Increased resolution resulted in decreased frame rate
Increasing the resolution of captured frames increases the number of reflected pixels that classify
the displayed colour. However, this often results in a decrease in frame rate, sometimes as low as
five frames-per-second (fps). As well, increased resolution would require significantly more band-
width to send captured frames to the host computer for processing. For example, increasing from
640×480@30fps to 1024×768@30fps requires a 256% increase in bandwidth, from 221Mbps to
566Mbps uncompressed.
Ambient and reflected light levels are unpredictable
As it is difficult to predict the ambient lighting levels across all three channels, analysis of colours in
the RGB colour space is difficult. Converting to the HSV space combines the hue of the three colour
channels (RGB) into one channel (H), and separates the brightness component into another channel
(V ). This significantly simplifies the colour processing.
Non-atomic imaging
Unlike film-based cameras, which capture the image atomically, digital cameras often scan the image.
This takes a non-zero amount of time to complete so if the scene is changing, the captured image
may contain temporal anomalies. In the research phase of the proposed system, as the displayed
colour changed, this resulted in captured images that were partially illuminated (top or bottom) with
the previous colour, and partially illuminated with the new colour. The initial proposal to counter
this discarded the first captured frame after the colour illumination was changed. As this was not
sufficient, the system delayed frame capture by 100msec to allow the screen time to update, as well
as discarding the first captured frame in an attempt to ensure that the capture buffer had a complete
image. Chapter 8 provides further analysis of this issue.
6.4.4 Capture Algorithm
Algorithm 1 outlines the process used to capture images of objects illuminated by the device screen.
Different cameras reacted differently with automatic settings such as focus, brightness, saturation,
and white balance. Starting the camera early (several seconds prior to data capture) allowed time for
automatic adjustments to complete, which increased the consistency between different cameras.
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Algorithm 1: Image Capture Algorithm for Colour Illumination
1: Start camera and allow camera settings to settle
2: Display Black
3: Capture and save four frames
4: for four cycles do {Four cycles is approx. one second of video}
5: Display random colour and wait 100 msec
6: Capture and discard one frame
7: Capture and save three frames
8: Display Black and wait 100 msec
9: Capture and discard one frame
10: Capture and save three frames
11: end for
12: Capture and save three frames
13: return Captured frames; List of displayed colours
However, once the illumination changed (as colours were displayed), the cameras again responded
differently, especially regarding Automatic White Balance (AWB). AWB attempts to correct for the
white balance in a captured image. General AWB algorithms often operate by finding the brightest
pixels in an image, and attempting to make them as white as possible [216]. It appeared that the
camera driver constantly adjusted the colour responses, making correct reflected colour classification
difficult. Although the frame differencing technique outlined in Section 6.4.2 attempts to minimise
the influence of external variables such as different facial skin colour, complexion, and texture (e.g.,
blushing, anaemia, perspiration levels, facial hair), Martinkauppi et al. note that skin colour models
require updating in the presence of abrupt illumination changes [137]. In the attempt to delay the
AWB adjustment, the updated capture algorithm interleaved each colour frame with a period of no
colour (Black). This resulted in fewer automatic camera adjustments during the capture process.
Chapter 7 provides a deeper analysis of the effect of Automatic White Balance.
Interleaving each colour frame group with Black allows the restriction discussed in Section 6.4.1
of not allowing a colour to display in consecutive groups to be relaxed, as the Black provides the
necessary tokenisation.
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6.4.5 Frame Difference Analysis Algorithm
Algorithm 2 outlines the analysis algorithm for identifying the reflected colour for each difference
frame ∆Wtn .
Algorithm 2: Difference Frame Analysis Algorithm for Colour Illumination
1: W0 ← firstframe
2: for allWtn ← captured frames do
3: ∆Wtn ← apply (6.2)
4: Convert ∆Wtn from RGB to HSV colour space
5: v1 ← apply (6.3) and (6.4)
6: vn ← apply (6.5) and (6.6)
7: Classify Cn ← SVM (vn)
8: end for
9: return Predicted frame colours (i.e., Cn)
The analysis system converts each ∆Wtn from the RGB colour space to the HSV colour space
and extracts its seven dimensional feature vector v ∈ {0.0 · · · 100.0}7.
Equations (6.3) through (6.7) use the following terminology. Lowercase bold symbols represent
a vector (e.g., v). Bold italics symbols represent a matrix (e.g.,M ). vn references the nth element in
vector v. M (x) references the element at location x in matrixM . The colour space channel for each
element in an image matrix is represented asM (x) [·] (e.g., ∆Wtn (x) [V ] represents the brightness
channel for the element at location x of ∆Wtn).
The first dimension in v (v1) for ∆Wtn
p×q represents the percentage number of dark pixels. Dark
pixels have a low value in the V (brightness) channel. Dark pixels in the experiments in Section 6.5
were designated as any pixel value less than or equal to two (2) in the V channel. Equation (6.3)
describes v1 as follows:
v1 =
∑p
i=1
∑q
j=1 M (∆Wtn (x) [V ])
|∆Wtn|
× 100
1
, (6.3)
where:
M (∆Wtn (x) [V ]) =
{
1 if 0 ≤∆Wtn (x) [V ] ≤ 2
0 otherwise
, (6.4)
x = {i, j}, and |·| equals the number of elements (i.e., |∆Wtn| = p× q).
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Dark pixels still have values in the H (Hue) channel but these values do not represent useful
colours, as they are too dark. The remaining dimensions vck represent the percentage distribution of
the H for pixels not designated as a dark pixel. Table 6.1 details the colours, colour index (ck), and
their H values.
Table 6.1: Hue Values (ηck) and Colour Index (ck) for Displayed Colours.
Colour Name Hue Value (ηck) ck
Red 0 2
Yellow 30 3
Green 60 4
Cyan 90 5
Blue 120 6
Magenta 150 7
For each colour in Table 6.1, (6.5) defines vck as:
vck =
p∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
N (∆Wtn (x) , ηck) , (6.5)
where:
N (∆Wtn (x) , ηck) =
{
1 if ∆Wtn (x) [V ] > 2 and ∆Wtn (x) [H] = ηck
0 otherwise
, (6.6)
x = {i, j}, and Table 6.1 defines ηck . Using (6.7), vck is then normalised as a percentage of the
number of pixels in all colours in Table 6.1.
vck = vck/
7∑
ck=2
vck ×
100
1
. (6.7)
The feature vector for the difference frame, v, uses the Multi-class Support Vector Machine
(SVM) in OpenCV [161] (based upon LibSVM [36]) to predict the reflected colour. The SVM uses
a linear kernel with default settings (i.e., the cost parameter c = 1, svm type = C SV C). Training
uses feature vectors from ground truth data obtained by flashing each colour from Table 6.1 against a
blank white sheet of paper, then extracting and manually labelling each feature vector with the correct
colour classification, discarding frames where the classification was inconclusive. This resulted in
training data consisting of a minimum of 50 classifications for each colour in Table 6.1, and over 600
classifications for Black. Experiments FCR-1–FCR-3 in Section 6.5 use this ground truth data.
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As each ∆Wtn is analysed in isolation to every other ∆Wtn , the analysis algorithm is therefore
independent from the capture algorithm, provided the initial frame contains a base image without
any screen illumination. This allows other methods of analysing frames without modifying other
components in the proposal.
6.4.6 Colour Classification Algorithm
The colour sequences predicted by the SVM are analysed to determine the reflected colour. The cap-
ture algorithm in Section 6.4.4 captures three frames of each colour illumination. The classification
algorithm identifies these groups of three frames by finding the first set of Black frames that follow
the first set of colour frames. These two sets then identify the start of each set of three colour frames.
Therefore, this classification algorithm does couple tightly with the capture algorithm in Section 6.4.4.
The colour is determined by choosing the majority colour classified in the set of three frames
(ignoring Black). If there is no clear majority, the final colour in the set of three frames is chosen (rea-
soning that this is the most likely colour after the camera has performed any adjustments). The use of
three frames adds redundancy to the classification process, improving the correct colour classification.
6.5 Experiments — Reflecting Colours from Objects
Experiments using light reflected from different objects produced some unexpected results.
These experiments showed that it is possible to classify colours reflecting from the face
correctly under ideal circumstances. Colours reflecting from plain white paper produced
significantly lower correct classifications, requiring further analysis.
The colour reflection experiments in this section provide empirical analysis on the feasibility of
the face reflection technique proposed in Section 6.4. The correct classification rate in the experiments
provides a measure of the feasibility of classifying reflected light from an object.
The aim of this series of experiments is to determine the feasibility of the proposed challenge-
response system using light reflection from different objects.
6.5.1 Experiment Setup
These three experiments used a Microsoft Surface Pro 2 tablet running Windows 8.1 Pro. Due to
limitations with interfacing the integrated Microsoft LifeCam with OpenCV, the experiment software
was developed using Ubuntu Linux 13.10 and OpenCV 2.4.8 running on a VMware Player 6.0.2
virtual machine. The experiments were each repeated using the internal Microsoft LifeCam (internal
camera), and an external Logitech Pro 9000 camera (external camera).
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The objects used to reflect the displayed colours were positioned approximately 35cm from the
camera, which is located at the top centre of the landscape-oriented screen. The screen resolution was
set to 1920×940 pixels. Video capture resolution was set at 640×480 pixels at 30fps.
Experiments flashed a sequence of colours using 100% of the tablet screen against the target
object. The sequence consisted of four colours chosen randomly from Table 6.1, with each colour
interleaved by displaying a blank screen (or Black).
For Experiments FCR-2 and FCR-3, which use faces as the object, the goal was to use a face
detector to create a region of interest for use as the window when calculating the frame differences.
Due to the difficulties with consistency in face detection, the system defined a static Region Of Interest
(ROI) and the user is encouraged to remain static within this ROI. To achieve this, the screen displays
a blue alignment oval. A red oval surrounds the current detected face position. The user must align
their face outline red oval with the blue alignment oval and maintain that stable position. If the capture
process detects a good alignment for approximately one second, the face outline oval changes from
red to green, indicating a good alignment and encouraging the user to maintain this position. If the
capture process detects a good alignment for a further one second (a total of around two seconds of
good alignment), the face position is considered sufficiently stable to proceed with the data capture.
All experiments required a darkened room to achieve reasonable results.
The video capture files, ground truth information of displayed colours, and the classified reflection
results for all experiments are bundled to create the FRAUD1 dataset [206].
6.5.2 Experiment FCR-1 — Blank White Paper
Experiment FCR-1 captured images reflected from a blank white sheet of paper. The use of paper
was to provide a simple, static, smooth surface for initial analysis. The system started the camera and
allowed it to settle for approximately three seconds prior to executing the capture algorithm. This
experiment captured and analysed 150 sequences of four colours, and used the entire frame as the
window for analysis.
6.5.3 Experiment FCR-2 — Printed Photo of a Face
Experiment FCR-2 captured images reflected from a life-sized printed face statically mounted in front
of the camera. First, each face image has extraneous background information removed by cutting
along the boundary. The location of the experiment ensures that there is no background surface (such
as a wall) in close proximity. The experiment uses a camera tripod to mount the face and align it
with the displayed alignment oval on the screen. The use of the static face removes the problem of
relative movement between frames. This experiment also captured and analysed 150 sequences of
four colours.
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6.5.4 Experiment FCR-3 — Live Person
Experiment FCR-3 repeats Experiment FCR-2, but replaces the paper face with live people. Each of
ten different human subjects had the reflections from 15 sequences of four colours captured and anal-
ysed. The ten human subjects were from different ethnic backgrounds (five Asian, three Caucasian,
two Middle Eastern). Three of the ten subjects wore spectacles, and the remaining seven did not. The
total number of colour sequences for all subjects was 150.
6.5.5 Experiment Results
Figure 6.2 shows the Correct Classification Rate (CCR) for each of the three experiments, using both
the internal and external cameras. This shows that classifying reflections from white paper performed
poorly, but classifying reflections from faces performed well.
The excellent correct classification rates for reflecting colours from faces (paper or live) demon-
strate that, under the right conditions, the proposed colour reflection technique is feasible. It is there-
fore possible to apply an in-band digital watermark to captured face images by illuminating those
faces with colours displayed on the screen of a smart device. As a result, these captured reflections
can determine that the video was not a replay from a previously captured video, as the replayed video
may not contain the appropriate watermark.
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Figure 6.2: Correct Classification Rate (in %) for colour reflections against blank white paper, paper
faces, and faces from live people, in a darkened room environment. Note that faces perform well, but
blank white paper does not.
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Classifying colour reflections from white paper produced a significantly lower classification rate
than reflections from faces. The correct classification rate for white paper reflections also differed
significantly between the internal and external cameras. These results warrant additional analysis.
Table 6.2 details the Classification Matrix of white paper colour reflection classifications in Ex-
periment FCR-1 for the internal camera. The element on each row shows the displayed colour, and
the element in each column shows the percent correct classification rate of each classified colour for
that displayed colour. The misclassification of colours from the table show that whilst some colours
classified relatively accurately (e.g., Green), others classified poorly (e.g., Magenta). Additional anal-
ysis shown in Figure 6.3 demonstrates that the vast majority of errors are due to the misclassified
colours migrating towards Blue.
Table 6.2: White Paper Reflection Colour Classification Matrix (in %) for the Internal Camera. Higher
numbers in the grey cells are better.
Displayed Correct Classified Colour (in %)
Colour Red Green Blue Magenta Cyan Yellow
Red 85 0 0 13 1 1
Green 0 98 0 0 1 1
Blue 0 0 97 1 0 2
Magenta 0 1 88 11 0 0
Cyan 0 1 34 1 64 1
Yellow 0 27 0 7 15 51
Hue
Red
Yellow
Green
Cyan
Blue
Magenta
Figure 6.3: Experiment FCR-1 Colour Classification Errors for Internal Camera. The origin of the
arrow is the displayed colour while the destination of the arrow is the erroneously classified colour.
In contrast, the external camera produced significantly different results. Table 6.3 details the
Classification Matrix of colour classifications in Experiment FCR-1 for the external camera. Using
the external camera, the analysis process classified most colours correctly, but often misclassified
Magenta as either Green or Blue.
86
Chapter 6. Digital Replay Attack Countermeasures using Multi-Colour Face Reflections
Table 6.3: White Paper Reflection Colour Classification Matrix (in %) for the External Camera.
Higher numbers in the grey cells are better.
Predicted Classified Colour (in %)
Colour Red Green Blue Magenta Cyan Yellow
Red 100 0 0 0 0 0
Green 0 100 0 0 0 0
Blue 0 0 100 0 0 0
Magenta 0 36 18 45 0 0
Cyan 0 1 1 0 97 0
Yellow 1 0 0 1 0 98
Comparing the results of white paper reflections with the results of face reflections indicates that
uncontrolled variables remain in the process. These variables are more evident using the internal
camera than the external camera.
By analysing which of the four colour sequences (as described in Algorithm 1, line 4) produced
errors, insight is gained into the variables introduced by each camera. Figure 6.4 shows the misclas-
sification rate of the four colour flashes for both cameras. As the system flashes more colours, the
number of errors increases when using the internal camera, suggesting that it is more actively engaged
in altering the response image than the external camera.
6.5.6 Discussion
Experiments FCR-2 and FCR-3 show that the proposed approach works well under controlled condi-
tions when reflecting colours from faces. However, Experiment FCR-1 shows that that there are still
uncontrolled variables in the system that may reduce the overall system performance across the wide
variety of devices.
Initial thoughts are that the automatic settings of the cameras continue to manipulate the captured
images. This manipulation will vary across different hardware devices and software drivers. More
precisely, the analysis of the results in Experiment FCR-1 indicates that the Automatic White Balance
process may be significantly contributing to the errors in colour classification. This may be due to the
reflection of colours from a large white area, thus triggering the automatic white balance faster than
if the colours reflected from a smaller coloured facial area. Chapter 7 provides a deeper discussion on
this area.
The robustness of the proposed method requires a relatively high level of correct classification of
reflected colours. If certain colours do not perform well, this reduces the number of available colours
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Figure 6.4: Experiment FCR-1 Colour misclassifications (in %) by frame sequence number for colour
classifications against blank white paper showing the error rates for each of the four colour displays
in the sequence.
for use in the system, reducing the amount of uncertainty (or entropy) that is required for securely
addressing digital replay attacks.
The entropy of the system also relates to the number colour sequences displayed. Shortening the
display time for each colour, and/or increasing the number of colour display cycles, will increase
the entropy. However, this increases the overall time for the user to authenticate. An upper limit
of time taken to complete authentication affects the usability of the system, which requires further
exploration.
Increasing the frequency rate of change in colours also increases the risk to some users of photo-
sensitive epilepsy [245], which requires further consideration.
6.6 Summary
The reflection system using colours reflected from the face works extremely well under
ideal conditions. Further analysis is required to identify why reflections from white paper
are poorly classified, why some frames appear to have two colours, how to improve the
entropy in the system, and how to improve the robustness of the system in less than ideal
environmental conditions.
88
Chapter 6. Digital Replay Attack Countermeasures using Multi-Colour Face Reflections
This chapter outlines one approach for a face verification system than could counter digital replay
attacks by using colours displayed on the screen to reflect from the user’s face. These reflections
determine that the face image capture occurred while displaying the colours on the device screen.
The experiments show that, under ideal conditions, it is possible to classify the colour reflections
from the face correctly. These results provide image reflection techniques to defeat simple digital
replay attacks in face recognition systems.
Future research is required to determine the physical limits of such a system, such as screen
illumination levels, video image resolution, camera settings, and environmental conditions. Robust
face tracking solutions should reduce the impact of face movement on the classification results.
Further work is also required to improve the security of the system by increasing the entropy.
Using more colours or increasing the number of colour challenges will increase the entropy.
Chapter 9 details the next phase of this research. Before proceeding to this next phase, Chapter 7
provides further analysis on the perception of colour, and Chapter 8 provides further analysis on the
reason why this system observes frames with two different illumination states.
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Chapter 7
Computer Perception of Colour
If one says ‘Red’ (the name of a color) and there
are 50 people listening, it can be expected that
there will be 50 reds in their minds. And one can
be sure that all these reds will be very different.
Josef Albers, Interaction of Color, Ch. 1. 1963
Chapter Summary: Experimental analysis failed to identify why some colour reflections
from white paper are not correctly classified. The conclusion is that there are uncon-
trolled variables that limit the choice of colours to a small subset, thus restricting the
entropy in the system. Without understanding the primary cause for poor reflection clas-
sification, identifying appropriate settings for all consumer devices is difficult. As a result,
the monochrome illumination in Chapter 9 replaces the coloured illumination system.
7.1 Introduction
Chapter 6 identified that colour reflections from blank white paper were more difficult to
classify than reflections from faces.
Experiment FCR-1 in Section 6.5 produced extremely poor results when illuminating blank white
paper versus either paper or live faces. This chapter explores this situation in greater depth, attempting
to explain the fundamental causes for this observation.
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7.2 Proposed Theories for Poor Colour Classification
The hypothesis is that the feature most likely affecting the colour classification is auto-
matic white balance (AWB), where the system attempts to correct the colour based upon
certain criteria.
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 show that, when illuminating blank white paper, the system incorrectly
classifies a number of the reflected colours. The different cameras (internal and external) performed
differently, but both had trouble classifying Magenta. This is despite the effort to forestall automatic
camera adjustments by interspersing the colour illumination with no illumination (Black frames) in
Algorithm 1.
On the other hand, the system performed exceptionally well when illuminating faces.
Figure 6.3 shows that there is a tendency to classify the reflected colour as containing a higher Blue
component. This led to the hypothesis that the automatic camera settings were adjusting the received
video image. That is, the quantisation function q (λ, t) in (4.4) was adversely affecting the colour
representation. In particular, there was conjecture that the colour misclassification occurred more
frequently, if the sequence of colours did not widely vary with colours repeating after the interval of
no illumination.
There are several settings that cameras and drivers may auto-adjust, including:
• Focus;
• Brightness;
• Contrast;
• Gain;
• White Balance.
Of these, the Auto-White Balance (AWB) is the most likely setting affecting the observed colour.
Szeliski [216] states, “Before encoding the sensed RGB values, most cameras perform some kind of
color balancing operation in an attempt to move the white point of a given image closer to pure white
(equal RGB values).” However, since consumer device peripherals are essentially a closed system,
the ability to influence their performance is limited.
Section 7.3 outlines several experiments designed to gain a better understanding of why reflections
from white paper perform poorly.
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7.3 Experiments — Reflecting Single Colours
Several experiments using reflected vs. directly observed illumination, AWB vs. no AWB,
different cameras, and different capture protocols, failed to identify the primary cause for
incorrect colour classifications.
The following experiments use single colours displayed on the computer screen, rather than a ran-
dom choice of colours used in Section 6.4. The displayed colours intersperse colour groups with Black
frames, or display a single colour for 74 frames. The system captures colour reflections from white
paper, or captures colours directly from the screen. Analysis first uses the same techniques applied
in Section 6.4.5, before expanding the number of analysed colours from 12 to 180 and modifying the
analysis protocol.
7.3.1 Experiment Setup
The following experiments use the same equipment used in Experiment FCR-1 (described in Sec-
tion 6.5.1).
7.3.2 Experiment DCC-1 — Single Colour using Algorithm 1, White Paper
Reflection, and Discrete Colour Analysis
Experiment DCC-1 (Direct Colour Classification) repeats Experiment FCR-1, with minor modifica-
tions.
The reflection object is a blank white piece of paper statically mounted in front of the camera.
Algorithm 1 describes the capture algorithm.
The first modification is to increase the number of possible colours from six to twelve. The Hue
value sequence for each colour starts at 0 (where 0 represents Red) and increases by 15 (modulo 180)
for the next colour.
The second modification is that, instead of choosing random colours, the experiment uses the
same chosen colour in all four groups of the colour illumination sequence, with each colour group
still interspersed with Black. The experiment repeats six times for each colour, resulting in 24 colour
groups.
The experiment uses both the Microsoft LifeCam internal camera, and a Logitech Pro 9000 exter-
nal camera. For both cameras, the experiment tests with the AWB setting turned on, and AWB turned
off.
The classification algorithm detects the Black frames using (6.3) and (6.4). If v1 > 70 (i.e., greater
than 70% of the pixels have a value ≤ 2 in the V channel), the frame is deemed to be Black.
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If v1 < 30, then the frame contains enough light pixels to possibly represent a colour. The colour
is determined by applying (6.5) and (6.6), with the exception that there are now twelve colours instead
of six. Provided the pixel has sufficient light (V > 2) and has a value of one of the twelve Hue values,
the pixel counts against its Hue value. The total counts are then normalised so that their sum equals
100%. For each colour frame, if a Hue value has more than 60% of the pixel count, then that Hue
value determines the frame’s colour.
If a frame is neither Black nor determined to be a colour, the frame colour is unknown.
The final colour classification for each group of frames is determined by either the majority of
colours within the group or, if there is no clear majority, the classification of the final frame in that
colour group. For example, the group {Red, Red, Magenta} classifies as Red, while the group {Red,
unknown, Magenta} classifies as Magenta.
Figure 7.1 shows the number of correctly classified colour groups for each displayed colour (from
24 possibilities — six videos, each containing four classified colour sequences). These results show
that some colours (e.g., Red — H = 0) classify perfectly (zero errors) while other colours (e.g.,
Purple — H = 135) failed to classify any attempts correctly.
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Figure 7.1: Results of Experiment DCC-1 showing the number of correct colour classifications (out
of a maximum of 24) using a subset of 12 colours at discrete Hue values, two cameras, and AWB on
and AWB off. Note that some colours perform significantly better than others.
Figure 6.4 indicated that the error count was lower for colour groups early in the sequence and
higher for colour groups later in the sequence. Figure 7.2 shows the number of classification errors for
each group of frames in the sequence using the data obtained in Experiment DCC-1. Each sequence
contains 72 colour groups (12 colours, each with six videos). Whilst this figure shows that the two
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cameras performed differently from each other, and that setting AWB affected the result, the analysis
does not support the theory that the errors relate to the position of the colour group in the sequence.
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Figure 7.2: Results of Experiment DCC-1 showing the colour classification errors (out of 72 maxi-
mum) for each number in the colour display sequence, using a subset of 12 colours at discrete Hue
values, two cameras, and AWB on and AWB off. Note that the results are generally consistent, re-
gardless of where in the sequence the colours are displayed.
7.3.3 Experiment DCC-2 — Single Colour Drift using Algorithm 1, White Pa-
per Reflection, and Full Colour Analysis
Experiment DCC-1 assumes that the observed colours will be one of discrete twelve illumination
colours. Since the some colours do not classify well, the question arises as to what the observed
colours actually represent.
Experiment DCC-2 performs a different analysis on the data collected during Experiment DCC-
1. Instead of only counting colours at discrete Hue values, once a pixel is determined to be bright
enough (using (6.3) and (6.4)) with v1 < 30, the pixel is counted against its Hue value in the H
channel, where H ∈ [0, 179].
The observed Hue value for each video is the average of the Hue value with the highest pixel
count in the frames determined to have a colour. Note that when calculating this average, the Hue
values are cyclic modulo 180. That is, it is more correct to represent the average of two different Hue
values, 0 and 179 as -0.5 rather than 89.5.
The average observed Hue value for the six videos of a displayed colour is the average of the
observed Hue value for each of the six videos.
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Figure 7.3 compares the average observed Hue value against the displayed Hue value by showing
the difference between them.
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Figure 7.3: Results of Experiment DCC-2 showing the offset between the observed colours (180
possible colours) reflected from white paper and the displayed colour (subset of 12 possible colours
at discrete Hue values), using two cameras, with AWB on and AWB off. The classification trend is
consistent, regardless of settings.
In Figure 7.3, if the observed Hue value point is positive, this shows that the observed Hue values
were greater than the displayed Hue values. If the observed Hue value is negative, then the observed
Hue value was less than the displayed Hue value. Where the observed Hue value lies on the x-axis,
this is when the observed Hue value is the same as the displayed Hue value (i.e., the desired situation,
where the colour is correctly classified).
Note that, regardless of the choice of camera or AWB setting, the results for each setup are ap-
proximately the same. Some colours classified with Hue values close to the displayed Hue value (e.g.,
Red — H = 0), while other colours classified radically differently to the displayed Hue value (e.g.,
displayed H = 45 resulted in a classified Hue range of 58–66).
7.3.4 Experiment DCC-3 — Single Colour Drift, no Interim Black Frames,
White Paper Reflections, and Full Colour Analysis
Experiments DCC-1 and DCC-2 identified that the observed colours are different from the displayed
colours on the screen. The current capture protocol inserts Black frames in between the colour se-
quences, aiming to limit the camera’s auto-adjustment, especially regarding auto-white balance.
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However, in the previous experiments, turning AWB on or off did not appear to affect the observed
errors in classifying the correct colour.
Therefore, Experiment DCC-3 modifies the capture protocol. Instead of inserting Black frames,
this experiment reflects a single colour only from the white paper. The experiment starts the camera
and captures 74 frames of video for analysis. The analysis protocol is the same as for Experiment
DCC-2, except that the observed Hue value for the frame is the average from all 74 frames of the Hue
value with the highest pixel count in each frame. Note that when calculating this average, that Hue
values are cyclic modulo 180 (see Experiment DCC-2 for further details).
Figure 7.4 shows the difference between the average observed Hue value and the displayed Hue
value for Experiment DCC-3.
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Figure 7.4: Results of Experiment DCC-3 showing the offset between the observed colours (180
possible colours) reflected from white paper and the displayed colour (subset of 12 possible colours
at discrete Hue values), using two cameras, AWB on and AWB off, taken from 74 frames of colour
with no Black frames inserted. The classification trend is consistent, regardless of settings.
As with Experiment DCC-2, the different cameras and settings produced reasonably consistent
results compared to each other. Observing a solid stream of a single colour (no Black frames inter-
spersed between the colour groups) produced slightly different results to Experiment DCC-2, but the
general trend remains consistent. Red (H = 0) continues to classify well, while the three different
green colours (H ∈ {45, 60, 75}) all classified close to H = 60 and Purple (H = 135) classified
close to H = 120 (Blue).
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7.3.5 Experiment DCC-4 — Single Colour Drift using Algorithm 1, Direct
Screen Observation, and Full Colour Analysis
Experiment DCC-4 extends Experiment DCC-2 by eliminating the white paper, while using the same
capture protocol as Experiment DCC-1 and the same analysis protocol used in Experiment DCC-2.
Instead of reflecting the colours from a piece of white paper, Experiment DCC-4 points the external
Logitech Pro 9000 camera directly at the display screen to record the displayed colours. The internal
Microsoft LifeCam camera does not face the screen, as it is built-in. Therefore, this experiment does
not use the internal camera.
Figure 7.5 shows the difference between the average observed Hue value and the displayed Hue
value for Experiment DCC-4.
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Figure 7.5: Results of Experiment DCC-4 showing the offset between the colours observed directly
from the screen (180 possible colours) and the displayed colour (limited to 12 possible colours at
discrete Hue values), using one camera, with AWB on and AWB off. The classification trend is
consistent, regardless of settings.
These results show that the different AWB settings tended to produce similar results to each other.
As in Experiment DCC-3, Red (H = 0) classifies well, but Purple (H = 135) does not, showing a
classified Hue value of 122 which is close to Blue.
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7.3.6 Experiment Results
These experiments determine that the automatic adjustment of white balance is not contributing to
the poor classification of colours. In addition, reflecting colours from white paper or observing the
colours directly from the screen both show significant errors in colour classification.
It is interesting to note that, on some LCD screens, displayed colours change significantly de-
pending on the viewing angle. This phenomenon may possibly contribute to the misclassification of
reflected colours.
Experiment DCC-4 uses the camera to observe the displayed colours directly from the screen.
This reduces the number of components to the display and video capture sub-systems. For consumer
level devices, these sub-systems are black box devices; i.e., they operate as complete components
leaving applications with little visibility into, or ability to influence, their internal operation.
Using the results from Figure 7.4, three Hue values (45, 60, and 75) are displayed side-by-side
on the screen. Although these colours are visually different when viewed by humans, the camera
observed all three colours directly from the screen as Hue H = 60. Figure 7.6 shows these colours.
This leads to a conclusion that cameras see colours differently from the way that humans perceive
them.
R=127,mG=255,mB=0
H=45
R=0,mG=255,mB=0
H=60
R=0,mG=255,mB=127
H=75
R=0,mG=255,mB=0
H=60(85)
R=0,mG=255,mB=0
H=60(85)
R=0,mG=255,mB=0
H=60(85)
DisplayedmColourm(RGBmvalues,mHuemvaluesm odm180)
ObservedmReflectedmColourm(RGBmvalues,mHuemvaluesm odm180)
Figure 7.6: The top row shows three different colours (Hue ∈ {45, 60, 75}), with the corresponding
position in the bottom row showing the colour observed by the camera in Experiment DCC-4. This
image best viewed in colour.
It is clear that only a small subset of colours are suitable to be used in a face reflection system as
reflections from other colours do not classify correctly. Blank white paper should produce the best
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results due to the high reflectance without chromatic aberrations, but experiments consistently show
that this is not the case.
7.4 Illumination Signal Strength
Structured illumination using white light is three times stronger than the illumination from
individual RGB colours.
The system described in Chapter 6 required a darkened environment to perform well. Lowering
the ambient light EA (λ, tn) from (4.4) for each frame at time tn has the effect of reducing the mag-
nitude of the introduced noise ε (x, tn) from (4.8) and thus also reducing the variations between the
different values of ε (x, tn) over time tn. The performance of this system decreased significantly as
EA (λ, tn) increased (increasing ε (x, tn)) such that ε (x, tn) > γ (x, tn), making the signal γ (x, tn)
difficult to classify from the noise ε (x, tn).
Requiring a darkened environment to achieve workable results is not practical. The signal strength
for each individual colour channel is too weak to overcome the noise created by the ambient illumina-
tion. Figure 7.7 illustrates example non-illuminated and illuminated signal strength ranges for colour
and white illumination in the Dark environment. Each dark block represents the minimum to max-
imum observed signal with no structured illumination, and each light block shows the minimum to
maximum with structured illumination. Equation (9.9) (described later in Chapter 9) calculates the
signal strength values as the total of all pixel values in the RGB colour space. Note that the strength
of each colour signal is less than 30% of the white signal strength. It is clear from Figure 7.7 that
one mechanism to increase the structured illumination ES (λ, tn) is to use white illumination (which
maximises illumination from all thee colour channels), rather than the duller individual colours.
7.5 Summary
Colour processing in consumer devices is likely to be difficult to control. The system in
Chapter 9 replaces the use of multiple colours with monochrome white illumination.
Despite extensive testing, the primary cause for misclassifying colours is not determined. Given
the wide variety of consumer devices, the ability to identify ubiquitous camera or screen settings that
perform well will be a significant challenge.
Increasing the number of colour choices increases the entropy in the system (discussed in Sec-
tion 6.4). This study shows that the number of colour choices is severely limited, thus restricting the
entropy.
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Figure 7.7: Minimum/Maximum signal strengths for colour (Dark environment only) and white struc-
tured illumination created from example videos in FRAUD1 and FRAUD2 [206]. Note that White
illumination is stronger than the individual colours.
As a direct consequence from this study, the system of using different colours was not progressed
further. Instead, Chapter 9 describes a system that uses only monochromatic light (Dark and Light).
This has the added bonus of increasing the structured illumination signal strength ES (λ, tn).
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Chapter 8
Frame Capture Delays
Time is an illusion. Lunchtime doubly so.
Douglas Adams,
The Hitch Hiker’s Guide to the Galaxy. 1979
Chapter Summary: Empirical analysis from several experiments identified that the pri-
mary cause of “semi-illuminated frames” was that the device screen did not update
immediately or atomically, allowing the camera to capture reflections partially illumi-
nated by two different states. The modified frame capture protocol used in the system
outlined in Chapter 9 significantly reduces, but does not fully eliminate, the capture of
semi-illuminated frames.
8.1 Introduction
Observations of reflections in some frames showed them to be in an inconsistent state,
with colours from the previous illumination state co-existing with colours from the next
state. These semi-illuminated frames interfered with the correct transition between the
colour states.
During analysis of the captured frames from the systems in Chapter 6 and Chapter 9, a problem
arose where a frame was in an ill-defined illumination state. When using all eight colours (Black,
White, Red, Green, Blue, Cyan, Yellow, Magenta), the transition from one colour to the next was in-
consistent. For example, when transitioning from Red to Blue, the classification algorithm determines
the frame to be Magenta.
Further viewing and analysis of the frame identified that this inconsistent frame consisted partially
of the former colour, and partially of the latter colour. Frames that demonstrate an inconsistent colour
illumination are termed semi-illuminated frames.
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Figure 8.1 shows a sequence of frames as the illumination state on the screen changes. Note that
the reflection in the second frame shows increased illumination in the lower portion of the frame, but
not the top. As time progresses, the reflection is observed across most of the frame (third frame).
During the next transition (in this case, to a non-illumination state on the screen), it is observed that
the reflection in the fourth frame shows the decreased illumination in the lower portion of the frame,
while the upper portion remains illuminated. Finally, the system settles with the complete frame in a
consistent (non-illuminated) state. (Note: for clarity and illustration purposes, not all of the frames in
the transition sequence have been included here).
Figure 8.1: Semi-illuminated frames showing frames only partially illuminated at the top or bottom
of the frame. (Some frames removed for clarity and illustration purposes).
The desired design of the system is that the illumination states are discrete, and transition be-
tween these states is effectively instantaneous. However, the presence of semi-illuminated frames
illustrates a failure to meet these design goals. Furthermore, the presence of semi-illuminated frames
introduces classification problems that require addressing. In terms of a synthesised musical signal,
semi-illuminated frames exhibit the behaviour of a continuous attack, as well as a continuous re-
lease, shown in Figure 8.2. The rising and falling signal levels require a non-trivial length of time to
complete.
Attack Decay Sustain Release
Figure 8.2: Desired signal (square wave) versus a continuous Attack-Release signal over time.
This chapter analyses the possible reasons for the creation of semi-illuminated frames. It then
outlines experimental work that identifies the primary cause for these frames. New system designs
explore methods to eliminate the semi-illuminated frame problem, resulting in a new illumination
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protocol that significantly reduces the problem. However, some semi-illuminated frames are still
present.
8.2 Theories for Semi-illuminated Frames
Semi-illuminated frames may result from digital cameras non-atomically scanning the
screen as it updates, or the device screen may not be updating atomically with the digital
camera capturing an image partway through an update cycle.
Two primary areas exist that may be contributing to the creation of semi-illuminated frames:
• The digital camera operation in the image capture process;
• The screen update operation in the illumination process.
8.2.1 Digital cameras use rolling shutter
Many documents detail that digital cameras do not capture the image in an atomic operation, but rather
scan the image pixel-by-pixel and line-by-line (rolling shutter) [13, 24, 129]. This is in contrast to
older film-based cameras or more expensive digital cameras, which snap an instant exposure of the
entire image in a single operation (global shutter). If the objects within the image are exhibiting high-
speed motion, then a rolling shutter can result in distorted images. Such distortions include partial
exposures where the lighting conditions change, or object smear where the object moves, during the
scanning process. This allows scanning of parts of the object more than once during image capture.
Figure 8.3 shows some examples of the smear distortion in photos of a normal pedestal fan taken
using the camera in an Apple iPhone 3G.
Figure 8.3: Smear distortion from a digital camera (iPhone 3G) scanning a rotating object.
In the first image, the fan blades are stationary. The second image shows the fan blades in slow
motion (note the distorted size of each fan blade when compared to the others). The third image is
similar to the second image, but the blades have increased in speed slightly. The fourth image shows
the fan when it has reached operational speed.
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Therefore, one possible reason for capturing semi-illuminated frames could be that the screen
illumination updates during the image scan process, resulting in partial exposure distortion where
the camera captures part of the image in one illumination state, and part of the image in another
illumination state.
8.2.2 Screens do not update atomically
Another possible explanation for semi-illuminated frames is that the screen may not update from one
colour state to another state in a single operation, or within a trivial amount of time.
During the experiment phases of this research, observations identified that the image screen would
update in blocks, as a partial percentage of the screen. Figure 8.4 shows some examples where this
has occurred.
As a result, a second possible reason for capturing semi-illuminated frames could be that the entire
screen update requires a non-trivial length of time to complete, and is not a single atomic operation.
Figure 8.4: Sequence of frames showing periods where the screen updates in blocks from the top-right
corner, instead of a single atomic operation.
One possible cause for the screen to update in phases is the common practice of using more than
one display buffer inside the frame buffer. This allows updating of one display buffer, while displaying
a second display buffer. Once the update concludes, the system switches the display buffers (page
flips), and the second display buffer is now available for updating. This design limits the screen from
displaying partially constructed frames during an update operation.
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Changing the entire screen from one colour to another requires a maximum period update oper-
ation, as it requires updating every pixel on the screen. This may result is a slow update operation,
requiring multiple page flips to complete the entire colour update operation.
8.3 Interim Solution for Colour Face Reflections
The system in Chapter 6 adopted a reasonably stable image capture protocol, where, once
the system directed the screen to update, it then waited 100msec and discarded the next
captured frame before capturing and using the next frame.
In the belief that the likely cause for the semi-illuminated frames was due to the scanning nature
of digital cameras, a capture protocol discarded first one, and then two, captured frames before using
the next captured frame. This was not successful at removing semi-illuminated frames from capture.
To identify what the intended colour state in the semi-illuminated frames should be, each captured
frame includes the name of the displayed colour. Analysis of these frames showed that the purported
displayed colour did not align with the observed colour in the video capture. The system captured
several frames displaying the name of the new colour state, but still observing the previous colour in
the illumination, before eventually capturing a semi-illuminated frame when the illumination transi-
tioned from the previous colour to the new colour. As a result, the next thought was that the screen
was taking a longer period to complete its update process.
The next proposed protocol imposed a fixed delay of 100msec to allow sufficient time for the
screen to have completed updating so that the camera would not be scanning images of a screen that
was still updating. This still produced semi-illuminated frames. The next modification to the protocol
discarded the first captured frame after the delay, in case the camera was using a buffer to complete
the scanning. This would flush the buffer if the camera were capturing a partially updated image.
At the same time, it was desired to reduce the length of time that the colours were displayed, as
this allowed for more colours to be displayed within a given window of time.
However, reducing the colour display time too far, as well as adopting the new image capture
protocol, resulted in a failure to observe some of the colour changes.
Therefore, in addition to the new image capture protocol, the colours were displayed for 200msec,
which at 30 frames per second (30fps) would allow for 3–5 frames to be scanned, depending on when
the screen was updated, and the image capture protocol commenced.
The updated image capture protocol significantly reduced the instance of semi-illuminated frames.
However, the system still captured a small number of semi-illuminated frames.
Another modification to the protocol discarded two frames after waiting 100msec instead of dis-
carding one frame after waiting 100msec. Although this improved the situation slightly, it was still
not sufficient to provide an overall solution as some semi-illuminated frames remained, albeit at a
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continuing reduced rate. This modification did not provide sufficient improvement to warrant adopt-
ing.
Since the design of the image capture protocol used in Chapter 6 tested multiple frames for each
colour, the system could tolerate a small number of semi-illuminated frames. Therefore, the remain-
der of the colour reflection experiments in Chapter 6 adopted the current protocol of waiting 100msec
following by discarding the next captured frame. This provides a balance between reducing the num-
ber of captured semi-illuminated frames, and increasing the system entropy by reducing the required
time for each colour display.
Algorithm 1 details the final protocol used for the system in Chapter 6.
8.4 Testing Frame Quality for Monochrome Face Reflections
Testing frames upon capture to identify and discard frames that have not yet changed
illumination state did not perform well, as it was difficult to determine if the illumination
change had completely occurred or was still in transition.
The updated system in Chapter 9 used only monochrome illumination to replace the different
colours. The use of monochrome increased the level of illumination, resulting in a system that was
usable in harsher environments.
However, using the capture delay from Section 8.3 still produced semi-illuminated frames. In fact,
the number of semi-illuminated frames, and frames that had not even begun to change state, increased
in frequency. It appeared that, at times, the frame capture process occurred too early.
As a result, further modifications to the image capture process attempted to eliminate the semi-
illuminated frames from capture.
Rather than delay frame capture by a fixed period of time, the system captured frames immediately
after instructing the screen illumination state to change. Examining the illumination level of each
frame determined if there had been a significant shift in illumination state. If illumination had not
changed significantly, the capture process discarded the frame and proceeded to capture and examine
the next frame.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to pre-determine the levels of illumination for each state as each
capture environment would widely differ. In addition, automatic camera adjustments would alter the
illumination levels. As a result, this process continued to capture semi-illuminated frames since semi-
illuminated frames still exhibit a significant illumination state change, even if they have not changed
state completely.
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8.5 Fixed Update Delay
The time required before observing a complete illumination state change was approxi-
mately constant, regardless of the camera used or the frame rate. Delaying the capture
of the image by a fixed 200msec after an illumination state was changed resulted in a
significant decrease in the frequency of semi-illuminated frames.
When testing the image quality using the system outlined in Section 8.4, the number of frames
required before an illumination state change completed was generally constant. This observation was
consistent for each camera.
In particular, when the camera driver chose to operate at 15fps, the number of frames required was
approximately 50% of the number of frames required when the camera driver was operating at 30fps.
Further experiments confirmed the finding that the number of frames required to observe a complete
illumination state change was directly proportional to the frame rate of the camera.
The actual number of frames differed slightly for each frame rate, depending on when the capture
of the first frame occurred. This is similar to calendar months where one month that has 30 days
might have four Saturdays, but another month with 30 days may have five Saturdays, depending on
what day the month commences.
The cameras typically required six to seven frames when operating at 30fps, three to four frames
when operating at 15fps, and one to two frames when operating at 5fps, before the observing the
illumination state change to complete.
Therefore, the conclusion is that the delay in observing an illumination state change does not
relate to the number of frames captured by the camera, but a fixed time interval.
8.6 Experiments — Analysing Semi-Illuminated Frames
Experiments identified that the screen required a non-trivial length of time to perform
the colour change transition, whereas the cameras were capturing the images almost
immediately. In addition, the colour change transition on the screen was not atomic.
This section outlines experiments designed to determine which system component that was intro-
ducing the delay observed in Section 8.5. These experiments measured the performance of the image
capture device (the camera) and the illumination device (the display screen) independently.
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8.6.1 Experiment SIF-1 — Validate delay times in camera capture
The first experiment (Semi-Illuminated Frame) used an Arduino Uno [10] as an alternative illumina-
tion source. Figure 8.5 shows the experiment setup using the Arduino Uno as an alternative illumina-
tion source.
Figure 8.5: Experiment SIF-1 setup, using an Arduino Uno as the illumination source, and the Life-
Cam camera from the Microsoft Surface Pro 2 tablet to capture the images.
Initially, the Arduino Uno program would pulse an on-board LED at a fixed rate of approximately
one cycle (on/off) per 100msec. This LED was video captured by the camera, and the resulting video
stream displayed on the screen.
However, this experiment was insufficient. Since the illumination sequence was relatively short
and constant, it was impossible to distinguish any delays in the captured image stream, especially if
the delay was a multiple of 100msec.
The next illumination sequence illuminated the LED for 100msec, and then off for 1000msec. This
allowed sufficient time for any delays in the camera to complete before the LED changed illumination
state.
The results of viewing the video stream from the modified illumination sequence showed that the
camera would immediately capture the illumination state change. That is, as soon as the LED changed
from on to off, or off to on, the captured image on the screen would update immediately.
However, this experiment is still insufficient, as an illumination period of 100msec is not easy to
observe fully by humans.
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A final modification to this experiment reprogrammed the system so that the Arduino Uno reported
the LED state to the capture program via the COM port. A simple protocol was designed where if
the Arduino Uno sent a ‘1’, this indicated that the LED state was on, and if the Arduino Uno sent
a ‘0’, this indicated that the LED state was off. This allowed the capture program to determine the
expected LED state. An individual thread in the multi-threaded capture program maintained the LED
state indication from the Arduino Uno.
The second thread in the capture program updated each captured frame with its perception of the
LED state. That is, the Arduino Uno would advise the capture program of the LED state, and there-
after, and captured frames from the camera would be modified to indicate the indicated state of the
LED. The capture program saved the modified captured frames to disk to allow individual examina-
tion. Figure 8.6 shows a subset of the results of Experiment SIF-1. Note that, when each frame shows
an update for the indicated illumination status of the LED, the LED has also changed state immedi-
ately. The numbers in the text within each frame represent the current time in milliseconds, modulo
1000msec. For clarity and illustration purposes, Figure 8.6 omits the frames prior to, and following,
those shown.
Figure 8.6: Sequence of frames from Experiment SIF-1 with the camera capturing the changed illu-
mination state of the LED immediately. (Some frames removed for clarity and illustration purposes).
The resulting analysis confirmed that, as soon as the LED illumination state was changed, this
changed illumination state was observed by the camera in the next captured frame — that is, al-
most immediately. At no time was the LED illumination commanded to update without the camera
observing the LED change illumination state immediately.
The conclusion from this experiment is that cameras are capturing images as fast as the frame rate
allows, without introducing any significant delay.
8.6.2 Experiment SIF-2 — Validate delay times in screen updates
Following the results from Experiment SIF-1, a second experiment evaluated the performance of the
illumination device (the screen).
The setup for this experiment was to simply point the camera at the screen and capture frames as
fast as possible. The screen illumination used the same illumination protocol adopted in Experiment
SIF-1 (i.e., 100msec on, 1000msec off). A separate program thread modified each captured frame to
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include the perceived illumination state. A second thread of the multi-threaded program performed
the screen update procedure. Figure 8.7 shows the setup for Experiment SIF-2.
Figure 8.7: Experiment SIF-2 setup, using a Microsoft Surface Pro 2 tablet screen as the illumination
source, while pointing an external Logitech Pro 9000 camera directly at the screen.
Figure 8.8 shows the results for Experiment SIF-2. Note that, as the illumination status in the
frame updates, the system captures several frames showing the previous illumination state of the
screen before the illumination state eventually observing the change. Figure 8.8 omits some frames
for clarity and illustration purposes.
The resulting analysis confirmed that, even though the system commanded the screen illumination
state to update, the actual update occurred after capturing several frames.
The conclusion from this experiment is that using the screen as the illumination source introduces
a delay. By counting the number of frames captured prior to the illumination state change being
observed, coupled with the current frame rate of the camera, it is possible to approximate the actual
time delay.
8.6.3 Experiment SIF-3 — Combined experiments SIF-1 and SIF-2
The next experiment combines the setup from Experiments SIF-1 and SIF-2. The design of this
experiment is to confirm that there are no other delays in the image capture process when using the
device screen for illumination.
The experiment setup for Experiment SIF-3 points the camera at both the Arduino Uno and the
device screen at the same time. Figure 8.9 shows the setup for Experiment SIF-3.
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Figure 8.8: Sequence of frames from Experiment SIF-2 showing that the camera captures several
frames before the screen eventually updates. (Some frames removed for clarity and illustration pur-
poses).
This experiment also uses multi-threaded programming. There are four threads running in parallel.
The first thread updates an internal variable every second to alternate its state between ‘0’ and ‘1’ (for
“light off” and “light on”, respectively). When the thread updates the variable, it advises the next two
program threads of the state change. The second thread reads the variable state from the first thread
and instructs the Arduino Uno via the serial port to update the status of the LED. The Arduino Uno
program receives this status command and updates the LED accordingly. The third program thread
also reads the variable state and updates the device screen. The final thread continually loops to
capture frames as fast as possible. It updates each frame with the status of the internal state variable,
and saves the updated frame.
This system uses an illumination protocol of 1000msec on, and 1000msec off.
The results shown in Figure 8.10 confirm that the Arduino Uno updates its LED relatively quickly,
but the screen does not update until several captured frames later. This occurs both during the transi-
tion from no illumination to full illumination, and from full illumination to no illumination.
The conclusion is that the screen is the contributing factor to the illumination update delays, and
not the camera.
In addition, this experiment continued to capture frames in a semi-illuminated state.
8.6.4 Experiment SIF-4 — High Speed Capture of Screen Updates
Finally, to confirm the theory of non-atomic screen updates in Section 8.2, an iPhone 6s recorded the
screen using the hi-speed video facility of 240fps as the screen changed from one illumination state
to another. It is interesting to note that the block update phenomenon in Figure 8.4 is not present.
However, this hi-speed video confirms that the screen does not update atomically, but updates in
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Figure 8.9: Experiment SIF-3 setup, using a Microsoft Surface Pro 2 tablet screen and an Arduino
Uno as the illumination source, while pointing an external Logitech Pro 9000 camera directly at the
screen.
stages from the top to the bottom of the screen. To confirm that this update was due to the screen
and not the scanning nature of the camera, a second video captured the screen placed on its edge at
90° to the camera. This video showed the screen updating from left to right (i.e., from the top of the
screen which was at the left of the video frame, to the bottom of the screen which was at the right of
the video frame). Therefore, the conclusion is that the update time is due to the screen and not the
camera.
Figure 8.11 is a partial frame sequence, showing the screen updating over a period of several
frames. Note that, although the state change for the screen illumination completes within six frames,
there is no indication of the number of captured frames prior to these six frames between the command
to update the screen state, and the time the state change commences.
8.6.5 Experiment Conclusions
Experiments SIF-1 and SIF-3 strongly indicate that the camera used by these experiments captures
updated images in close to real-time. Since the camera is only operating at 30fps then the delay
introduced by the Arduino Uno in updating the LED, or advising the capture program of the updated
LED status, is negligible and does not contribute to the overall delay in observing the illumination
state changes in the system.
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Figure 8.10: Sequence of frames from Experiment SIF-3 showing that the camera captures the change
in illumination state of the LED almost immediately, but the screen takes several more frames before
eventually updating. (Some frames removed for clarity and illustration purposes).
Figure 8.11: Hi-speed frame capture (iPhone 6) showing the screen updating from top to bottom in
stages rather than as a single atomic operation
On the other hand, Experiments SIF-2, SIF-3, and SIF-4 show that there is a significant delay
introduced by the screen as it updates. Although the capture program instructs the screen to change
illumination state, a significant time delay elapses before state change is actioned by the computer
system. This delay results in capturing several frames with the illumination in the previous state
before the camera observes the new illumination state.
In particular, Experiment SIF-3 shows both the LED and the screen illumination states as they
change, highlighting that the introduced delay is due to the screen and not the camera.
Experiment SIF-4 shows that the screen update operation is not atomic and progresses over a
non-trivial period.
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8.7 Updated Capture Protocol for Monochrome Face Reflections
A workable solution for the monochrome illumination system executes a static delay of
200msec after commanding the screen to update to a new illumination state, before cap-
turing the next frame from the camera for use.
In Section 8.6, it was determined that there was no delay introduced by the camera. Therefore, the
previous technique of waiting 100msec and then capturing the next frame and discarding it required
modification.
Using the results of the analysis performed in Section 8.5, the capture system introduced a fixed
delay. It was determined that delays of 100msec, 150msec, and 170msec were not sufficient to reduce
the number of semi-illuminated frames to a reasonable level consistently. Therefore, the capture
system adopted a delay of 200msec. During this delay, captured frames would continue to display in
the preview window, but not used as part of the overall digital watermark system.
The system inserted this delay only if the illumination state was required to change. If the illumi-
nation state did not change, the system used the next captured frame without any imposed delay.
Section 8.6 showed that, since the cameras observed the illumination state change almost imme-
diately, it was determined that a condition where the capture buffer was only semi-updated by the
camera would never exist. Therefore, the procedure of discarding frames is no longer used.
The number of frames captured before an illumination state change had fully completed deter-
mined the fixed delay period of 200msec. Although in some cases, the illumination state change had
completed earlier than 200msec, a sufficient number of state changes required closer to the 200msec
to complete, requiring a choice of the higher time delay. On rare occasions, a semi-illuminated frame
occurred even after the application of the 200msec fixed capture delay.
Therefore, the monochrome illumination system described in Chapter 9 uses the fixed 200msec
delay instead of the technique outlined in Section 6.4.3 of discarding the first captured frame after
a 100msec delay. As will be seen is Section 9, the few remaining semi-illuminated frames do not
significantly affect the overall performance of the monochrome illumination system.
8.8 Summary
The primary cause for semi-illuminated frames was due to the non-atomic screen update
operation, the rolling shutter of the digital webcam scanning the image, and the lengthy
delay in updating the screen. The new system detailed in Chapter 9 imposes the 200msec
delay after screen illumination updates.
The analysis of the primary cause for semi-illuminated frames identified a number of key issues:
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• The screen update is not an atomic operation. At times, the screen partially update in sections.
If the screen has not completed updating during the capture of the image, a semi-illuminated
frame may result;
• The digital camera used in smart devices deploys a “rolling shutter” which scans the image
over time. If there is a change in the image during the scanning process, this results in dis-
torted frames. If the illumination changes during the scanning process, this can result in semi-
illuminated frames;
• The screen does not update immediately, but takes a significant period to complete. As a result,
the process captures several frames before, during, and after the screen update process. Due to
the rolling shutter effect described in the previous bullet, this represents a change in illumination
of the screen, which could contribute to the capture of semi-illuminated frames.
The system in Chapter 9 uses a static delay of 200msec. Generally, this delay was sufficiently long
enough to allow the screen illumination state to settle before capturing the frame for use. However,
the system still captured semi-illuminated frames occasionally. This analysis system handled this
situation by allowing a small number of errors. Increasing the capture delay above 200msec would
further reduce the instance of semi-illuminated frames, at the cost of increasing the overall time
required to display a sufficient number of illumination states to provide a digital watermark signal
that contained sufficient entropy.
The use of an alternative lighting source (such as a LED), or changing the hardware of the devices
so that screen updates occur much faster, will reduce the requirement for this 200msec delay.
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Digital Replay Attack Countermeasures
using Monochrome Face Reflections
When infinite colors exist between the dark and the light,
who among us would choose to see only black and white?
Gene Bertsche
Chapter Summary: Using high-contrast monochromatic light as a binary signal to re-
flect from the face performs extremely well in all indoor environments. The FRAUD2
dataset [206] provides data for additional research.
9.1 Introduction
The colour reflection system in Chapter 6 required a dark room to operate correctly, and
small movements introduced errors. This new system resolves many of these problems.
Chapter 6 detailed a system using colour sequences displayed on the smart device to insert a
watermark as reflections from the user’s face. Classifying the colour reflections performed well, but
only in a limited environment (dark room). The method was also sensitive to small movements,
reducing the usability of this system significantly.
To improve the level of displayed light from the device, instead of encoding a watermark signal
as a series of colours, this next proposed system uses high-contrast monochromatic illumination. The
proposed system encodes the challenge signal as a binary stream using individual frames as tokens.
The use of monochromatic illumination provides higher contrast between the two illumination states
in a wider variety of environments and mitigates colour constancy problems. In addition, instead
of using a Support Vector Machine and specific training data, the new system uses a classification
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algorithm that adaptively learns its model from the current environment. The improved system is far
more tolerant to small hand movements, which naturally occur when the smart device is hand held.
9.2 Motivation
The colour illumination system requires a stronger signal to operate robustly in a wider
set of ambient environments.
The system developed in Chapter 6 required a darkened room in order to achieve suitable perfor-
mance. This reduced the usability of the system to strict environmental conditions.
The new thought was that if it were possible to increase the illumination level, then the system
performance would improve in a wider variety of environments. This would require a new approach
to tokenisation of symbols. Nitschke et al. inspired the solution by using coded illumination to
transmit information. In particular, they note, “temporal coding achieves maximum signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) and robustness” [152].
9.3 Proposed Monochrome Illumination System
This modified face reflection system uses high contrast monochromatic illumination to
produce the reflected watermark. Each symbol uses a single video frame, allowing the
capture of more frames in the sequence.
In the previous colour system in Chapter 6, the watermark was a sequence of colours, using colour
state change as the boundary between symbols. This required that colours must change state in the
sequence (i.e., no colour state may follow itself immediately). The interspersing of Black frames
between each colour served as symbol boundaries, but reduced the overall entropy of the system (see
Chapter 11 for more details).
White illumination produced a much brighter reflection (R (λ,x, t)ES (λ, t) from (4.4)). How-
ever, this system could no longer use the colour change as symbol boundaries, as this would provide
no entropy or uncertainty [195]. Instead, each frame represented one binary symbol, and the illumi-
nation level represented the binary nonce signal.
Reducing each symbol from six frames used in Chapter 6 (three frames of colour plus three frames
of non-illumination), to only one frame, allowed the use of more symbols in the signal, thus increasing
the uncertainty (or entropy). To achieve a suitable level of entropy, the system used a binary signal
of 31 bits. However, the longer sequence introduced more opportunities for noise, so the proposed
system allows for up to two errors when classifying the reflections. This tolerance improved the
performance of the system in all indoor environments (see Section 9.4.2).
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This high contrast signal, coupled with an adaptive analysis process, provides a robust and prac-
tical solution to the digital replay attack problem in a wider variety of environments. The watermark
is now a binary nonce challenge in a challenge-response system, inserted into the video prior to the
intruder gaining access to the video signal.
The entire screen of the device displays the watermark challenge signal as a random sequence
of illumination levels (Light or illuminated means screen illumination on; Dark or non-illuminated
means screen illumination off ). The challenge signal can include consecutive displays of the same
illumination level. This displayed illumination reflects from the person or object positioned in front
of the camera. Each time the screen displays the next illumination level in the sequence, the webcam
captures an image of the object for later analysis to determine the level of reflection from the object.
The reflections from the object form the response in the challenge-response system. If the re-
flection sequence is (mostly) the same as the displayed illumination sequence, this determines that
this device captured the video at the same time it displayed the illumination sequence. The reflection
sequence is random so this will defeat any attempt to replay this video later, as the next challenge
sequence will be different.
9.3.1 Binary Watermark Insertion
The binary watermark insertion process uses a static Region Of Interest (ROI) window, to assist with
analysis. This window is 30% of the width by 50% of the height of the video frame, centred on
the frame, which is the approximate face region when normally using a webcam. After starting the
camera, the system displays the video without capture for three seconds to allow the automatic camera
settings to settle. During this time, the user aligns their face with the ROI and remains relatively
stationary throughout the remainder of the capture process.
In practice, a robust face detector could replace this static ROI. However, the use of the static
ROI here instead of the face alignment technique deployed in the system in Chapter 6 was still robust.
Users found this system much easier to gain correct alignment than they did with the previous system.
The system captures and records six frames of Dark, followed by one frame of Light. These
frames form analysis start and calibration signals.
The challenge signal is then displayed as a randomised sequence of 31 illuminations (Dark or
Light) while the images are captured and recorded. The capture protocol concludes with six Dark
frames. The proposed challenge signal forms a 231 entropy challenge. Figure 9.1 shows a captured
sequence of Light and Dark frames, with the different illumination states representing the inserted
binary watermark.
Initial testing identified that, when changing illumination state, captured frames would continue
to display reflections from the previous illumination state, either fully or partially, for several frames.
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Figure 9.1: Video sequence of example frames from the monochrome watermark system showing a
non-illuminated and illuminated Live Face object in the Dark environment.
The primary cause of this problem was that the screen is slow to update its illumination state, as
discussed in Chapter 8.
Therefore, the process to insert watermarks implements a delay of 200msec each time the illumi-
nation level changes. If the illumination state is unchanged, the system uses the next captured frame
immediately.
Algorithm 3 outlines the capture process algorithm.
9.3.2 Binary Watermark Extraction
The first proposed process to extract the binary watermark from the video data stream uses an adaptive
analysis technique that incrementally updates the model, based upon that data stream. Unlike the
system in Chapter 6 that used multiple colour states, this system uses only Light and Dark illumination
states.
An intensity feature represents the intensity of reflected illumination above the ambient back-
ground in each ROI window (see Section 9.3.1). An illumination state classifier that adaptively
updates its model determines the frame’s illumination state. The sequence of classified illumination
states represents the extracted binary watermark signal.
Intensity Feature Extraction
Equation (9.1) defines the intensity feature function, θ, as:
θ : Rp×q×3 7→ [0, 1] . (9.1)
The function extracts the intensity feature from the ROI window,W . The matrixWtn defines the
ROI window in the frame at time tn as a static area, centred on the frame, using (9.2):
Wtn ∈ Rp×q×3 , (9.2)
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Algorithm 3: Image Capture Algorithm for Monochrome Illumination
1: Start camera and allow camera settings to settle
2: Display Dark
3: Capture and save six frames
4: Display Light
5: Wait 200msec
6: Capture and save one frame
7: prev state← Light
8: for 31 cycles do
9: curr state← random (Dark, Light)
10: Display curr state
11: if curr state 6= prev state then
12: Wait 200msec
13: end if
14: Capture and save one frame
15: prev state← curr state
16: end for
17: Display Dark
18: if prev state 6= Dark then
19: Wait 200msec
20: end if
21: Capture and save six frames
22: return Captured frames; List of displayed illumination states
where p and q are 30% of the width and 50% of the height of the frame (the same as that used by the
watermark insertion process in Section 9.3.1). This is the most likely area within the captured frame
to find the object of interest. Discarding the rest of the frame removes extraneous background infor-
mation, which may produce spurious results due to subtle movements. The noise (ambient light and
static scenery) is first minimised by performing a clipped subtraction of a non-illuminated window,
W0, from the subsequent windows,Wtn , in the RGB colour space, using (9.3) (same as (6.2)):
∆Wtn = max (Wtn −W0, 0) , (9.3)
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where ∆Wtn is the result of the clipped subtraction. This result forms a difference window.
Converting the difference window, ∆Wtn , from the RGB colour space to the HSV colour space
isolates the intensity using the V channel (similar to the technique used in Chapter 6). In this method,
the actual colour (or Hue) used for illumination is irrelevant and is therefore ignored.
The final extraction step calculates the function, θ using (9.4), as the normalised, weighted level
of intensity in the V channel.
θ (∆Wtn) =
∑p
i=1
∑q
j=1 P (∆Wtn (x) [V ])
α× p× q , (9.4)
where:
P (∆Wtn (x) [V ]) =

0 if 0 ≤∆Wtn (x) [V ] < β
β if β ≤∆Wtn (x) [V ] < α
α if α ≤∆Wtn (x) [V ]
. (9.5)
The parameter ∆Wtn (x) [V ] represents the value of the V channel of the pixel at location x = {i, j}
of ∆Wtn . The parameters α and β are defined from experimental analysis. The weighting function
in (9.5) quantises the V channel values to limit the effect of noise pixels from relative movements
during the capture process. Other techniques can be explored here that may produce better results.
Illumination State Classifier
The illumination state classifier determines if the illumination state for the current frame will implic-
itly remain the same as for the previous frame, or be explicitly set to a particular state. In order to
detect if the illumination state requires updating, (9.6) first defines the change in intensity between
consecutive frames, ∆θn, as:
∆θn = θ (∆Wtn)− θ
(
∆Wtn−1
)
. (9.6)
Small movements of the subject during the capture process result in small changes in ∆θn. There-
fore, a threshold, τ1, determines the required level that the illumination level must change to trigger an
update to the current illumination state. If |∆θn| > τ1, the illumination state will then be determined
appropriately.
Light and Dark models, λL and λD, represent the average intensity of the previously classified
Light and Dark windows. The extraction process updates these models as each frame is classified.
Equation (9.7) calculates τ1 as the square of the Euclidean distance between λL and λD.
τ1 = max
(||λL − λD||22 , ψ) . (9.7)
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Squaring the Euclidean Distance, places more emphasis on larger differences between λL and
λD, and less emphasis on smaller differences. Enforcing that τ1 is not less than ψ addresses the
situation where the difference between λL and λD is small, resulting in updating of the illumination
state regardless of the magnitude of ∆θn.
In addition, as discussed in Chapter 8, a time delay of 200 msec when capturing frames removes
almost all of the semi-illuminated frames. However, occasionally, this time delay still allows the
capture of a semi-illuminated frame. As a result, ∆θn or ∆θn+1 might not exceed τ1, whereas, the
complete illumination change from ∆θn−1 to ∆θn+1 would have exceeded τ1.
Therefore, a further condition determines the illumination state, based on the intensity of the
current frame (θ (Wtn)). This condition first requires that |∆θn| > ψ to ensure that some illumination
has occurred. If this is true, then the condition determines the illumination state by whether θ (Wtn)
is closer to λL or λD.
To this end, (9.8) defines a second threshold, τ2, as the mid-point between λL and λD.
τ2 =
λL + λD
2
. (9.8)
If θ (Wtn) < τ2, the illumination state of Wtn is defined as Dark. If θ (Wtn) > τ2, the illumina-
tion state of Wtn is defined as Light. If θ (Wtn) = τ2 or |∆θn| ≤ ψ, the illumination state remains
unchanged from the previous frame.
The illumination state classifier therefore uses the results of the following four test conditions as
input:
L1: sign (∆θn − τ1) = +; (i.e., ∆θn > τ1);
L2: sign (∆θn − ψ) = sign (θ (Wtn)− τ2) = +;
D1: sign (∆θn + τ1) = −; (i.e., ∆θn < −τ1);
D2: sign (∆θn + ψ) = sign (θ (Wtn)− τ2) = −.
Meeting either condition L1 or condition L2 sets the illumination state forWtn to Light. Meeting
either condition D1 or D2, sets the illumination state for Wtn to Dark. Otherwise, the illumination
state forWtn remains unchanged fromWtn−1 . Note that Li and Di are mutually exclusive.
Due to the increased entropy in this system, it is possible to tolerate a small number of incorrect
illumination state classifications without significantly reducing the security of the system, resulting in
a more robust and practical solution.
Algorithm 4 details the complete analysis process.
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Algorithm 4: Difference Frame Analysis Algorithm for Monochrome Illumination
Input: I ← displayed illumination sequence, W ← frame sequence windows
1: W0 ← first frame window
2: for allWtn ← captured frame windows do
3: ∆Wtn ← apply (9.3)
4: Convert ∆Wtn from RGB to HSV colour space
5: θ (∆Wtn)← apply (9.4)
6: ∆θn ← apply (9.6)
7: τ1 ← apply (9.7)
8: τ2 ← apply (9.8)
9: Cn ← Cn−1
10: ifWtn−1 = Dark then
11: if L1 or L2 then
12: Cn ← Light (Wtn is classified as Light)
13: end if
14: end if
15: ifWtn−1 = Light then
16: if D1 or D2 then
17: Cn ← Dark (Wtn is classified as Dark)
18: end if
19: end if
20: Update λL and λD
21: end for
22: E ← Count (Cn 6= In)
23: if E ≤ 2 then
24: return Matches
25: else
26: return Does not match
27: end if
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9.4 Experiment FMR-1 — Reflecting Monochrome Light from
Objects
Experiments performed using soft toys, paper faces, and live people showed that the pro-
posed monochrome illumination system was robust for indoor environments.
Experiment FMR-1 (Face Monochrome Reflection) implements the proposed system and tests
against several different objects in multiple ambient environments.
9.4.1 Experiment FMR-1 Setup
Experiment FMR-1 sets the weighting values in (9.4) and (9.5) (α and β), to 30 and 3, respectively.
It also sets ψ, from (9.7), and Conditions L2 and D2, to 1% of the maximum possible value of the
function θ.
The experimental equipment consists of: Microsoft Surface Pro 2 tablet; Windows 8.1 Pro;
VMware Player 6.0.4 virtual machine; Ubuntu 13.10; OpenCV 2.4.9; internal Microsoft LifeCam
webcam; external Logitech QuickCam Pro 5000 webcam; external Logitech QuickCam Pro 9000
webcam; screen resolution 1920×940 pixels; video capture resolution 640×480 pixels at either 15fps
or 30fps (selected automatically by the camera driver, depending on the lighting conditions).
The experiment uses six environments: Dark Room; Office Light (using fluorescent lights); Nat-
ural Light indoors; Cloud Cover outdoors; Full Shade but under an open sky; and Full Sunlight. In
Chapter 6, the environment was restricted to only a darkened room, which is not a typical use case for
online authentication.
Although the primary use case for this technique is face verification systems, any objects in front
of the camera are sufficient to generate suitable reflections for classification. All objects are positioned
approximately 35cm in front of the screen, which is a normal usage distance. The experiment uses
three primary objects.
The first set of objects consists of Soft Toys. The use of 20 Soft Toys provides a wide variety of
shapes, sizes, textures, and colours. The Soft Toys are hand-held in front of the tablet to simulate the
hand-holding of the smart device. The experiment records each toy five times in each environment.
This results in 100 videos for each of the six environments.
The second set of objects consists of faces printed on paper with the face outline cut out and the
background removed. This contrasts the results against those obtained in Chapter 6. The Paper Faces
are hand-held in front of the tablet to simulate the user holding the smart device. The experiment
captures five recordings of five different faces in each environment. This results in 25 videos for each
of the six environments.
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The final set of objects consists of Live Faces of real people. Five participants hold the tablet
computer in their hands, which introduces additional movement relative to the background in the
video. The experiment records each participant five times in the six environments, resulting in 25
videos per environment.
Figure 9.2 shows an image of each of these objects as they engage in the capture process.
Figure 9.2: Different objects engaging in Experiment FMR-1.
To enable additional research, the resulting FRAUD2 datasets (Face Replay Attack UQ Dataset)
are available online [206].
9.4.2 Experiment FMR-1 Results
Figure 9.3 shows the results for the experiment. In all cases, the classification system accepts up to
two errors in frame illumination classification (i.e., a Hamming Distance of two is acceptable) out of
the 31 illumination classification possibilities.
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Figure 9.3: Correct Classification Rate (in %) for all objects in each environment.
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The white illumination system improved the performance over the colour system in Chapter 6 by
increasing ES (λ, tn).
As can be seen, for a typical indoor environment, the proposed technique performs exceptionally
well, regardless of the object used in front of the camera. All cameras performed equally well (detailed
analysis not shown here). Despite hand-holding and simulated hand-holding of the tablet computer
during the video capture, which produces normal relative movements, the results demonstrate that
this proposed technique is robust to these movements.
For outdoor environments, the results are much less favourable. The Cloud environment produced
a significantly decreased correct classification rate than all indoor environments. In particular, the
performance for Live Faces was no better than any other outdoor environment (i.e., 0%).
Chapter 10 further examines the system constraints that contribute to the poor performance in
outdoor environments.
9.4.3 Experiment FMR-1 Discussion
As with the colour illumination system in Chapter 6, as the ambient light EA (λ, tn) (and thus,
ε (x, tn)) increased, the system performance degraded. The white illumination is brighter than the
colour illumination (shown in Figure 7.7), resulting in γ (x, tn) > ε (x, tn) in some environments.
This allows the white illumination system to perform well in a wider variety of ambient illumination
levels (mostly indoor environments). However, as before, as the ambient illumination level increases
significantly (outdoor environments), ε (x, tn) increases, eventually resulting in ε (x, tn) > γ (x, tn),
thus reducing the performance of the classification process.
Figure 9.4 shows a comparison of the minimum and maximum signal strengths for monochrome
non-illuminated and illuminated frames in example videos for the six environments from the FRAUD2
dataset [206]. There are three items to note:
• For the bright outdoor environments (Cloud, Shade, and Sunlight), the camera has auto-adjusted
to lower the overall brightness, thus compressing the signal (and noise);
• The difference between non-illuminated and illuminated signals is greatest for the indoor envi-
ronments (Dark, Office, and Natural), confirming their superior performance over the outdoor
environments;
• The non-illuminated and illuminated signal strengths overlap considerably for the outdoor en-
vironments, confirming the difficulty in isolating the signal γ (x, tn) from the background noise
ε (x, tn).
Although this system replaces the face detector system from the previous colour system in Chap-
ter 6 with a static region of interest, if the user moved their face slightly during the video capture,
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Figure 9.4: Minimum/Maximum signal strengths for white monochrome structured illumination cre-
ated from example videos from the six environments in FRAUD2 [206].
this would also increase the noise. The pixel subtraction method introduces the noise due to these
movements.
The noise ε (x, tn) from (4.8) can result in the failure to classify the reflected illumination signal
correctly. Figure 9.5 shows the results for pixel subtraction from sample videos in the six different
environments from the FRAUD2 dataset [206]. This figure illustrates ε (x, tn) when the reflection
does not contain the structured illumination signal, and ε (x, tn) + γ (x, tn) when the reflection does
contain the structured illumination signal. Three items to note from Figure 9.5 are:
• The lack of illumination noise in the non-illuminated difference window in the Dark environ-
ment (EA (λ, tn) and ε (x, tn) are small);
• The increasing noise ε (x, tn) in the non-illuminated difference windows as the ambient light
EA (λ, tn) increases from left to right in each row. Also, note that the noise appears to have
decreased from Natural through to Cloud and Shade. This could be due to the camera quantisa-
tion function q (λ, t) auto-adjusting the entire signal to compensate for the increased brightness,
thus decreasing I (x, tn), which in turn decreases γ (x, tn);
• The strong difference between illuminated (ε (x, tn)+γ (x, tn)) and non-illuminated (ε (x, tn))
reflections in the Dark environment, but increasing difficulty to differentiate γ (x, tn) from
ε (x, tn) as the reflection from the ambient lightR (λ,x, tn)EA(λ, tn) increases, and the camera
decreases the overall signal strength I (x, tn).
One challenge for the classification process is that ε (x, tn) varies for different values of tn. If
these differences are large compared to γ (x, tn), then γ (x, tn) becomes lost in the noise, making it
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Figure 9.5: Difference frames showing ε (x, tn) for each of six environments from the FRAUD2
dataset [206] when not illuminated by structured illumination, and ε (x, tn) + γ (x, tn) when illumi-
nated by structured illumination. Extracted from FRAUD2 [206] using Microsoft LifeCam camera,
Live Faces object, Subject 4, first video for each environment.
difficult to identify. Therefore, the classification process must successfully distinguish γ (x, tn) from
the variations in ε (x, tn) for the performance of the reflection system to be robust.
Modifying different components in the model generally improves the performance. For example:
• Decreasing the noise ε (x, tn), by decreasing the ambient lightEA (λ, tn) (e.g., using a darkened
room, used in the colour reflection system in Chapter 6);
• Decreasing the noise ε (x, tn) by decreasing the time between tn and t0, without decreasing
the ambient light EA (λ, tn) (e.g., reducing the screen update time and/or increasing the capture
frame rate to decrease the capture time for a sufficient number of frames. Both suggestions
require new hardware);
• Decreasing the noise ε (x, tn), without decreasing either, the time between tn and t0, or the
ambient light EA (λ, tn) (e.g., reducing the differences between frames by requiring the user
and the device to be absolutely still. This suggestion decreases the usability of the system);
• Increasing the reflection R (λ,x, t)ES (λ, t) (e.g., increasing the structured illumination from
the device screen, moving the object closer to the camera (examined in Section 10.6.1), or
increasing the reflectance properties of the object (also examined in Section 10.6.2)).
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To address these issues, the next section details a revised feature extraction that operates at the
entire image level rather than the pixel level.
9.5 Proposed Total Reflection Feature Extraction
The total reflection feature proposal simplifies the watermark extraction function by cal-
culating the total intensity feature from each frame independently. The new proposal
performs frame intensity comparison in feature space, rather than calculating the frame
differences prior to performing feature extraction.
The feature extraction in Section 9.3.2 used pixel subtraction to remove ambient illumination
from reflections in an attempt to isolate the structured illumination signal. However, any movement
between frames introduces noise (increasing ε (x, tn)), thus requiring the user to remain stationary.
Using face detection and tracking systems also introduced noise due to the slight jitter in the detected
location of each face.
To observe the structured illumination signal in the face reflections, it is only interesting to observe
the overall brightness of the reflection, not the individual pixels. Therefore, the new proposal updates
the monochrome system to use a total brightness feature, replacing the feature based upon pixel
subtraction. The updated system is not susceptible to noise introduced by small movements between
frames. Provided the face is largely within a predefined region of interest, the slight movement of
the user’s face only trivially affects the overall reflection feature measurement. This vastly increases
the usability of the system, as the user is no longer required to be strictly stationary. Equation (9.9)
defines the total reflection brightness B (t) at time t for each frame window as:
B (t) =
∫
x
∫
Ω
[
R (λ,x, t)EA (λ, t) +R (λ,x, t)ES (λ, t)
]
q (λ, t) dλ dx . (9.9)
In practical terms, (9.9) is the sum of the quantised values of all colour channels for all pixels in
the region of interest window. Equation (9.10) defines this as:
B (tn) =
p∑
i=1
q∑
j=1
∑
c∈{R,G,B}
Wtn (x) [c] , (9.10)
where x = {i, j},Wtn represents the region of interest window at time tn, p and q are the dimensions
ofWtn , and c is the RGB colour channel.
Figure 9.6 illustrates the total reflection brightness for frames from sample videos taken from each
of the six environments from the FRAUD2 dataset [206]. There are three important observations from
these total reflection signals in Figure 9.6:
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Figure 9.6: Sample of total reflection signals for each environment in FRAUD2 [206]. Extracted
from each environment, Soft Toys object, Microsoft LifeCam camera. The signal is strong for indoor
environments, but much weaker for outdoor environments.
• In each of the indoor environments, the structured illumination signal is strong, but it is quite
weak in each of the outdoor environments;
• In the Cloud and Shade environments, there is a decrease in the reflected brightness despite the
overall increase in ambient illumination. The conclusion is that the camera has auto-adjusted
settings such as gain, brightness, and contrast, thus reducing the overall signal, which also
reduces the structured illumination signal;
• For the Sunlight environment, the reflection from the background ambient light is stronger than
the Cloud and Shade environments, suggesting that there are limits as to how far the camera
can compensate for increased illumination.
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The results shown in Figure 9.6 indicate that classification based upon the total reflection bright-
ness of the reflection is possible. This total reflection brightness feature contains both the ambient
light component (EA (λ, t)) as well as the structured illumination signal component (ES (λ, t)).
The minimum and maximum values of B (tn) presented in (9.10) are governed by the presence
and absence of the structured illumination light source. The value of B (tn) approaches the mini-
mum when the structured illumination light source is absent, and approaches the maximum when the
light source is present. Therefore, the difference between maximum and minimum values of B (tn)
achieves the goal of identifying the structured illumination signal. To that end, the feature extraction
process normalises the value of B (tn) into [0, 100], which simplifies the classification step. Unfortu-
nately, as shown in Figure 9.6, the differences between the maximum and minimum values decrease in
proportion to the ambient illumination component strength due to changes in the camera quantisation
function. This could affect the system performance.
Figure 9.7 illustrates the normalised reflection signals for the sample videos for the outdoor envi-
ronments in Figure 9.6, plotted against the structured illumination signal for each video. Figure 9.6
shows that the normalised signal for the indoor environments is strong so these are not illustrated.
Using this total reflection feature, the next section examines a range of classifiers.
9.6 Proposed Total Reflection Feature Classification
Classifying reflections based upon the total reflection rather than individual pixel subtrac-
tion is more robust to small movements. A hybrid absolute and relative classifier produces
superior results to the original adaptive classifier.
Illustrating the total reflection feature from the previous section in Figure 9.6, shows that classi-
fying the reflection signal based upon total reflection should be possible.
This section outlines different classification algorithms to classify the data from the FRAUD2
dataset [206]. The aim is to determine if the frame contains a structured illumination signal (a Light
frame) or not (a Dark frame). Again, this classification processes uses the same protocol as Sec-
tion 9.3, allowing up to two errors in classification of the 31 signal frames.
Table 9.1 shows the correct classification rate for videos using these different classification algo-
rithms. Each result combines the results from three different cameras. Each group of three results
represents [S]oft Toys, [P]aper Faces, and [L]ive Faces objects, respectively. Bold text highlights the
best results for each environment and object. Dark grey cells show a decrease from results reported
in Chapter 6, and light grey cells show an increase.
The next three subsections discuss each of the classification algorithms.
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Table 9.1: Correct Classification Rate (CCR, in %) of videos for six different environments from
FRAUD2 [206] using different classifiers on three object categories (Soft Toys - S, Paper Faces - P,
Live Faces - L).
Environment Dark Office Natural Cloud Shade Sunlight
Objects S P L S P L S P L S P L S P L S P L
From Chapter 6 100 100 100 100 100 97.3 100 100 96.0 28.3 49.3 0 10.7 0 0 0 0 0
Absolute α= 0.4 100 100 100 99.3 100 96.0 100 100 85.3 24.3 50.7 0 7.3 0 0 0 0 0
Absolute α = 0.5 100 100 100 100 100 98.7 100 100 86.7 27.0 57.3 0 7.0 0 0 0 0 0
Absolute α = 0.6 100 100 100 94.0 98.7 93.3 100 100 86.7 23.7 56.0 0 8.7 0 0 0 0 0
Relative α = 0.1 100 100 100 72.7 94.7 97.3 87.3 82.7 98.7 48.0 40.0 0 23.0 0 0 0 0 0
Relative α = 0.15 100 100 100 82.7 98.7 100 95.7 96.0 96.0 51.0 61.3 0 25.0 1.3 1.3 0 0 0
Relative α = 0.2 100 100 100 93.0 98.7 98.7 99.3 100 96.0 46.0 68.0 0 22.0 0 0 0 0 0
Relative α = 0.25 100 100 100 98.0 100 98.7 100 100 94.7 42.0 62.7 0 17.0 0 0 0 0 0
Hybrid Abs/Rel 100 100 100 100 100 98.7 100 100 93.3 51.0 61.3 0 25.0 1.3 1.3 0 0 0
9.6.1 Simple Absolute Classification
Following visual observation of the normalised reflection signals in Figure 9.6, the initial classification
algorithm determined Light and Dark frames using a simple absolute threshold.
To calculate the absolute threshold, the process first updates the minimum and maximum val-
ues of B (tn) that apply to the frame at time tn, upon the receipt of each frame. The minimum
(min {B (t0) . . . B (tn)}) is the element with the smallest value for the total reflection feature of
the currently received frames {B (t0) . . . B (tn)}, and the maximum (max {B (t0) . . . B (tn)}) is the
largest element of the total reflection feature of {B (t0) . . . B (tn)}. By setting α = 0.5, (9.11) cal-
culates the threshold τ as the midway point between the updated minimum and maximum values. If
B (tn) > τ the frame is classified as Light. If B (tn) ≤ τ , the frame is classified as Dark.
τ = (min {B (t0) . . . B (tn)}+ max {B (t0) . . . B (tn)})× α . (9.11)
Table 9.1 (Absolute α = 0.5) shows that the results are similar to those reported in Section 9.4.2 for
the indoor environments, and generally worse for the outdoor environments. Using smaller (Absolute
α = 0.4) and larger values (Absolute α = 0.6) for α produces even lower results.
Detailed examination of the results for the Cloud environment, Soft Toys object, Microsoft Life-
Cam camera, reveals that in many videos, although the signal is quite strong, the changes in illumi-
nation level between frames are insufficient to cross the midway boundary (e.g., see Figure 9.7).
To counter this, the modified classification algorithm detects relative changes in the reflection
level instead of using the absolute level for classification.
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Figure 9.7: Normalised reflection signals for each outdoor environment, when illuminated and not
illuminated. Microsoft LifeCam camera, Soft Toys object, sample video from each environment. The
signal is difficult to observe for the three outdoor environments.
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9.6.2 Simple Relative Classification
Rather than relying on an absolute level of total reflection, the observation was that when frames
changed illumination levels, the total reflection value changed by more than a trivial amount. Equa-
tion (9.12) calculates the relative change in the level of reflection as:
∆B (tn) = B (tn)−B (tn−1) . (9.12)
The relative classification process again uses (9.11) to calculate the threshold τ . If ∆B (tn) > τ
the frame is classified as Light. If ∆B (tn) < −τ the frame is classified as Dark.
Table 9.1 (Relative α = r) details the results from four different values for r (0.1, 0.15, 0.2, and
0.25). These results show that the relative comparison between adjacent frames produces significantly
better results in illumination level classification for the outdoor environments, but with degradation in
performance for some indoor environments.
The results for the best performing relative classification level over all of the outdoor environ-
ments (Relative α = 0.15) showed a decreased performance for the Soft Toys objects in the Office
environment using the Microsoft LifeCam camera. A deeper analysis of the results showed that this
performance reduction occurred due to a common reason (with two sub-variants).
Analysis showed that the camera’s auto-adjustment created problems if the illumination sequence
consisted of either . . . LLDDDD. . . or . . . DDLLLL. . . (D is Dark or non-illuminated and L is Light
or illuminated).
In the first sub-variant, the camera adjusted to the brighter illumination, so when the next Dark
frame occurred, the total reflection was darker than normal. However, in the next frame, the camera
compensated for the lower light by raising the illumination signal. Although the ambient and struc-
tured illumination did not change, the overall brightness of the frame increased sufficiently due to the
camera adjustment that the classifier detected this as a change from Dark to Light. Thereafter, the
classifier would misclassify the remainder of the sequence of DDD. . . frames as Light, resulting in a
classification of . . . LLDLLL. . . .
In the second sub-variant, the camera had adjusted to the low level of illumination, so when the
next Light frame occurred, the total reflection was brighter than normal. However, in the next frame,
the camera compensated for the increased illumination by lowering the illumination signal. Again,
this lowering of the signal was sufficient to classify the frame illumination as having changed from
Light to Dark. Thereafter, the classifier would misclassify the entire sequence of LLL. . . frames as
Dark, resulting in a classification of . . . DDLDDD. . . .
Figure 9.8 illustrates the normalised signal for an example video from the Office environment,
Soft Toys object, using the Microsoft LifeCam camera. Note the decrease in the reflected illumina-
tion during the second and fourth period of screen illumination, and the steady increase in reflected
illumination during the final period of no screen illumination.
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Figure 9.8: Normalised reflection signal for a sample video from Office environment, Microsoft Life-
Cam camera, Soft Toys object. Note how the signal strength changes, even though the structured
illumination has not changed.
This analysis identifies that a classification algorithm that only measures relative illumination
changes is unstable if camera auto-adjustments can cause the reflected signal to exceed the relative
threshold. Since the illumination state of the current frame may depend on the state of the previous
frame, if an illumination state change is incorrectly deemed to have occurred, it may require several
frames (all of which will continue to be incorrectly classified) before the algorithm observes a change
of sufficient magnitude to classify the next illumination state change. The difference in illumination
levels between Light and Dark frames for the outdoor environment appears to be sufficiently small
enough that the camera does not perform an auto-adjustment of the light levels sufficient to exceed
the relative threshold, leading to increased performance using this classifier.
9.6.3 Hybrid Absolute and Relative Classifier
The absolute classifier performs well when the difference between illuminated and non-illuminated
frames (signal strength) is greater. If this difference is lower, the relative classifier performs better.
As a result, a hybrid classifier combines both the absolute classifier and the relative classifiers into
a single classification algorithm. To choose which of the sub-classifiers to use, the hybrid classifier
calculates the difference between the total brightness of last frame of the opening sequence of Dark
frames and the Light frame used as the start frame. If this difference is sufficiently large (in this case,
10% of the total brightness of the Dark frame) then the relative classifier is used. Otherwise, the
absolute classifier is used.
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The results from combining the best performing absolute classifier over all of the indoor envi-
ronments (Absolute α = 0.5) with the best performing relative classifier for outdoor environments
(Relative α = 0.15) are shown in Table 9.1 (Hybrid Abs/Rel).
9.6.4 Hybrid Classifier Results Discussion
The hybrid classifier that combines absolute and relative classifiers produces superior overall results
to each classifier used alone. This classifier produces results that are significantly better than the
results reported in Section 9.4.2. For the outdoor environments, the improvements include:
• Soft Toys objects, Cloud environment: 22.7 percentage points (180% improvement);
• Paper Faces objects, Cloud environment: 12.0 percentage points (24.3% improvement);
• Soft Toys objects, Shade environment: 14.3 percentage points (233.6% improvement).
Note that the results for the Live Faces object in the Natural environment are slightly higher
than the results reported for the absolute only classifier (Absolute α = 0.5). This is due to some of the
videos in this group having the signal strength sufficiently low enough to choose the relative classifier,
producing better results for those videos.
However, as with the previous absolute only classifier, the results for the Live Faces object in the
Natural environment are slightly lower than the results reported in Section 9.4.2. Closer examination
of these results identifies that a common cause for the decrease in correct classification is that the
initial non-illuminated frames are much darker than non-illuminated frames throughout the remain-
der of the sequence, resulting in the latter non-illuminated frames being misclassified as Light since
B (tn) > τ for those frames. This situation appears to be due to the camera auto-adjustment. Fig-
ure 9.9 illustrates the normalised signal for one of these videos. Note how, during the middle period of
the sequence, the non-illuminated frame signal fails to fall below the necessary threshold. A camera
auto-adjustment later in the sequence produces a more balanced signal. More complex classification
algorithms may be able to account for this situation to improve the performance.
9.7 Summary
The monochrome illumination system is an important step forward to addressing digital
replay attacks for face verification systems that use consumer smart device cameras. The
system is robust in a variety of practical ambient environments.
The results of Experiment FMR-1 show that the proposed technique of inserting a binary water-
mark into captured video using reflected Light and Dark illumination is highly effective and practical
in most indoor environments.
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Figure 9.9: Normalised reflection signal for a sample video from Natural environment, Microsoft
LifeCam camera, Live Faces object, Subject 2. Note that the signal rises above the 50% threshold in
the absence of structured illumination.
The FRAUD2 dataset [206] provides video data for further research in defeating digital replay
attacks.
Chapter 10 next proposes a light reflection model that shows each individual component and how
it affects the overall system performance. Further analysis then identifies constraints that, if addressed,
could improve this performance in the future in all environments.
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Reflections as a Communications System
In order for the light to shine so brightly,
the darkness must be present.
Francis Bacon, 1561–1626
Chapter Summary: The level of ambient light significantly affects the ability to identify
the reflected illumination signal. It was determined that this effect was more due to the
level of object reflection from illumination produced by the smart device, rather than any
camera settings.
10.1 Introduction
As the level of ambient light increased, the performance of the face reflection system
decreased. Measuring the different light levels provided insight into potential changes to
the system to address this issue.
The reflection systems in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 9 implement a communications sys-
tem. The transmitted signal is the displayed nonce challenge, and this signal must be observable
in the reflection despite the noise introduced by ambient illumination, movement, and component
performance.
The system developed in Chapter 9 identified that performance varied in different environments.
Figure 9.3 showed that indoor environments performed extremely well, while outdoor environments
performed extremely poorly.
It was clear that further analysis was required to determine the reason why outdoor environments
did not perform well, to identify a quantitative measure and the required thresholds for successful
performance, and to investigate ways to improve the performance of the system.
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This chapter measures and compares the ambient and reflected light levels, investigates the pos-
sible causes for the varied performance of the system in Chapter 9, validates the findings through
experiments, and explores methods to improve the system.
10.2 Encoding Signals with Light
The structured illumination systems use the screen to encode a signal, and transmit it
through a noisy envionment (the ambient illumination). The different systems use different
signal encoding.
The reflection systems attempt to insert a digital watermark in-band into the video stream to
detect if the video capture occurred at the time the screen displayed the illumination sequence. The
illumination sequence is a communication signal transmitted through a noisy channel.
Face movement, device movement, ambient light, poor reflections, camera performance, and pos-
sibly a variety of other factors introduce the noise.
Many scholars have studied communications systems over a long period. Seminal works by
Nyquist [156] and Shannon [195, 196] provide the fundamental foundations for modern communica-
tion systems. Symbol encoding, entropy, throughput limitations, signal strengths, and noise strengths,
all apply to the face reflection system.
For example, the nonce signal requires modulation for carriage across the illumination medium.
There are three primary choices for digital modulation:
• PSK: Phase-Shift Keying encodes the signal by varying the phase of a carrier signal. Since
there is no coherent carrier signal in the illumination system, PSK is not a viable modulation
scheme;
• FSK: Frequency-Shift Keying encodes the signal using different frequency values. The colour
reflection systems in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 use different colours as symbols, implementing
a FSK modulation scheme. Symbol encoding boundaries occurred upon detection of a change
in colour;
• ASK: Amplitude-Shift Keying encodes the signal using different signal amplitudes. The illu-
mination system in Chapter 9 modulates the signal using monochrome light illumination levels,
and uses individual frames for binary symbol encoding.
The face reflection systems must transmit the signal through a noisy channel. Although FSK
modulation achieved some results, the noise in the system quickly overwhelmed the signal.
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The use of monochrome illumination in Chapter 9 allows for the maximum difference between
signal states, thus improving the signal strength. In this case, the system uses ASK modulation to
encode the signal. This system achieves superior results.
The next section measures the signal and noise levels, to provide a quantitative measure of these
components.
10.3 Reflected and Ambient Light Measurement
The light meter in a dSLR camera measures the amount of reflected light using different
illumination sources (the signal strength) and different ambient environments (the noise).
There are a number of ways of representing the level of light. Illuminance measures the perceived
power of the light over a given area. Therefore, it is a suitable metric for this analysis. Lux is the
general unit of measurement for illuminance.
To calculate the lux for given reflections, the luminance (in cd/m2) is first measured using a dSLR
(Digital Single-Lens Reflex) camera. In this case, the camera was a Canon EOS 700D with a Canon
EF-S 18-55mm f/3.5-5.6 IS STM lens. It is then easy to convert the measured luminance values to
illuminance (in lux).
The first step used the dSLR camera in each environment to measure the reflected light from a
piece of white paper that was illuminated by ambient light. The distance between the camera and the
paper was approximately 35cm, which is the same positioning distance for objects in Chapter 9.
The next step measured the light reflected from a white sheet of paper illuminated by the following
devices (in a dark room):
• Apple iPhone 6 screen;
• Apple iPad 3 screen;
• Apple iPhone 6 backward facing LED in normal lighting mode;
• Apple iPhone 6 backward facing LED in flash mode;
• Microsoft Surface Pro 2 screen.
The light meter in the dSLR determined the appropriate shutter speed and aperture for the given
ISO setting. Different ISO speed settings were set on the dSLR while recording measurements us-
ing fixed shutter speeds and variable aperture, and fixed aperture and variable shutter speeds. Al-
though these measurements sometimes produced slightly differing results (as lighting conditions
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subtly changed), the measurements were sufficiently consistent to choose a suitable average mea-
surement. In this instance, an exact reading is not required, as an approximate trend will suffice for
analysis.
ISO2720 [94] defines luminance, L, when calibrating reflected light meters as:
L =
K1A
2
tS
, (10.1)
where A is the f -number (or aperture), t is the exposure time (or shutter speed, in seconds), and S is
the arithmetic film speed (in ISO). K1 is a calibration constant, defined by Padfield [163] as:
K1 = pi × ρ× σ , (10.2)
where pi converts luminance in cd/m2 to lux, ρ is 12.4 (ISO2720 [94] defines the range as 10.6 to
13.4), and σ is a correction factor of 1.3 to account for lens absorption and diffuse reflectance.
Using (10.1), the lux values for each of the environments and smart devices were calculated.
Table 10.1 shows sample measurements and calculated lux values for each environment (repre-
sented as R (λ,x, t)EA (λ, t) in Section 4.4.3).
Environment ISO Speed Shutter Speed (seconds) Aperture (f -stop) Lux
Dark Room 100 1.3 4.5 7.8
Dark Room 1600 1/5 7.1 7.9
Office 100 1/10 5 125
Office 100 1/8 5.6 125
Natural 100 1/50 5.6 784
Natural 100 1/25 8 800
Cloud 200 1/1000 6 9000
Cloud 400 1/500 12 9000
Shade 200 1/1000 7.1 12603
Shade 400 1/1000 10 12500
Sunlight 200 1/2000 11 60500
Sunlight 400 1/1000 22 60500
Table 10.1: Sample light meter measurements and calculated lux for white paper reflections illumi-
nated by six ambient environments.
Table 10.2 shows sample measurements and calculated lux for each illuminating device (repre-
sented as R (λ,x, t)ES (λ, t) in Section 4.4.3). Note that these calculated lux values are a guide only
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as the lighting varies under different conditions. For example, office lighting varies between locations,
cloud cover is highly variable, and sun illumination varies with geographic location, time of day, and
season.
Smart device ISO Speed Shutter Speed (seconds) Aperture (f -stop) Lux
iPhone 6 Screen 100 1 6.3 20
iPhone 6 Screen 100 2 9 20
iPad 3 Screen 100 1/2 8 64
iPad 3 Screen 100 1 11 60.5
iPhone 6 LED (Lighting) 100 1/6 4.5 60.8
iPhone 6 LED (Lighting) 200 1/6 6.3 59.5
iPhone 6 LED (Flash) 100 1/6 11 363
iPhone 6 LED (Flash) 200 1/6 16 384
Surface Pro 2 Screen 800 1/10 13 52.8
Surface Pro 2 Screen 800 1/5 18 50.6
Table 10.2: Sample light meter measurements and calculated lux for white paper reflections illumi-
nated by five smart devices.
10.4 Signal-to-Noise Ratio Analysis
Modelling the reflected light analysis system as a typical communication system in a noisy
environment allows the use of Signal-to-Noise Ratio to model the performance of the
system in different environments.
The design of the reflected light analysis system watermarks the video of a user with a series of
illumination states (a signal). The watermark signals are now an integral part of that video. The
ambient video capture environment also illuminates the user (noise) at the same time.
At times, the signal can be strong (bright screen illumination) and the noise weak (dark environ-
ment), or the signal could be weak compared to a much stronger noisy environment.
By viewing the system as a typical communication system in a noisy environment [196], it is
possible to quantify the problem by calculating the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR).
Equation (10.3) defines the SNR using a logarithmic decibel scale (SNRdB) as the power ratio
between the signal (Psignal) and the noise (Pnoise):
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SNRdB = 10× log10
(
Psignal
Pnoise
)
. (10.3)
Using (10.3), the SNR for each environment (from Table 10.1) and the reflected signal illuminated
by each device (from Table 10.2), is calculated. Figure 10.1 shows the calculated SNR results for each
environment.
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Figure 10.1: Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR, in dB) for different devices in each environment.
Figure 9.3 shows that indoor environments (Dark Room, Office, and Natural) performed extremely
well, compared to outdoor environments (Cloud, Shade, and Sunlight) which performed extremely
poorly. Figure 10.1 shows that, as the SNR decreases, the system performance also decreases.
The illumination from the Microsoft Surface Pro 2 tablet produced a SNR of -22dB in the Cloud
environment. The system performance in this environment ranged from 49% CCR for paper faces, to
0% CCR for live faces.
The Shade environment produced even lower results. The measured ambient lux for this environ-
ment was 39% more than the Cloud environment, decreasing the SNR to -24dB. This resulted in a
significant decrease in performance, ranging from 10% CCR for soft toys, to 0% CCR for live and
paper faces.
In Sunlight with a SNR of -31dB, it was not possible to determine any significant difference
between when the subject was illuminated by the screen, and when it was not (i.e., the CCR was 0%
for all objects).
On the other hand, the Natural indoor environment performed extremely well with a CCR range
of 95% to 100%. The SNR in this environment was -12dB.
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From Figure 10.1, this suggests that the minimum SNR to perform adequately is somewhere
towards -15dB.
10.5 Possible Causes of System Failure
The raw signal values degrade in brightly lit environments, possibly due to camera set-
tings, or possibly due to insufficient signal compared to the background noise.
There are several possible causes for the failure to discriminate reflections when in outdoor envi-
ronments.
The first possible cause is that the structured illumination reflection from the subject (signal) is
not strong enough to be distinguished from the ambient light reflection (noise; i.e., the SNR is too
low). Using the model from Section 4.4.3, this means that, when comparing the reflection from the
structured illumination against the reflection from the ambient illumination, R (λ,x, t)ES (λ, t) 
R (λ,x, t)EA (λ, t). The ability to improve the SNR relies on either increasing the signal, or decreas-
ing the noise.
The second possible cause for discrimination failures is that the camera may adjust its auto set-
tings to a point where it can no longer reliably observe the reflections. Under these circumstances, one
possible solution is to use manual settings. However, Section 6.4.3 shows that the use of manual cam-
era settings is extremely difficult. Manual calibration is required for each device, each device driver,
and each environment. Therefore, manual camera settings are not a viable solution. Alternatively,
it may be possible to increase the signal to a point where the camera is able to observe the signal
reliably using the automatically adjusted camera settings (either increase the illumination ES (λ, t),
or increase the reflection R (λ,x, t)ES (λ, t) from Section 4.4.3).
Plotting the total reflection signal in the system illustrates the difficulty in signal classification in
noisy environments. A total reflection value was calculated for two videos, one in a Natural indoor
environment (the most challenging indoor environment), and the second in a Sunlight environment
(the most challenging outdoor environment). Equation (9.10) calculates the total reflection B (tn) for
a frame at time tn. The total score for each frame is then normalised to the range of [0, 100%], using
the observed maximum and minimum signal strength values for the total set of frames as limits.
Also shown is the input challenge signal displayed on the device screen for this video (which is
artificially set to either 0% for no illumination or 100% for full illumination).
As Figure 10.2 shows, there is a strong signal in the Natural environment, but the signal is much
more challenging to identify in the Sunlight environment.
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Figure 10.2: Input signal and total reflection signal strength (in %) for sample videos from Natural
and Sunlight environments taken from the FRAUD2 dataset.
10.6 Experiments to Improve Signal Quality
Increasing the Signal-to-Noise Ratio improved the performance of the system. The camera
settings appear not to affect the results.
As discussed in Section 10.5, improving the SNR may improve the overall performance of the
system. Additionally, increasing the signal strength may overcome any issues relating to the camera
settings.
Either, or both, of two primary adjustments will improve the SNR:
• Increase the signal strength;
• Decrease the noise in the system.
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Since the ambient lighting conditions produce the noise in the system, decreasing this noise re-
quires decreasing the ambient light (decrease EA (λ, t)). As shown in Section 9.4.2, typical indoor
environments already perform well. For outdoor (or brightly lit) environments, simply moving to a
darker environment (such as indoors) could achieve this noise reduction.
Unfortunately, moving to an indoor environment may not always be feasible. Note that users
might opt not to use their smart device in full sunlight anyway, due to the difficulty of seeing in-
formation displayed on the screen. In addition, the use of polarised sunglasses adds to the problem
if there is a misalignment between the screen polarisation and polarisation of the sunglasses. This
misalignment can result in a completely blacked-out screen.
The alternative to decreasing the ambient light is to identify ways to increase the signal strength.
It is also possible that the camera performance is affecting the overall results. Automatic set-
ting adjustment or pixel saturation in bright environments may also be reducing the perceived signal
strength.
Two experiments determine if increased signal strength improves the overall system performance.
10.6.1 Experiment SNR-1 — Decrease the Object Distance
Experiment SNR-1 (Signal-to-Noise Ratio) demonstrates that decreasing the distance between the
object and the screen/camera improves the performance. Since light follows the inverse-square
law [212], bringing the object closer to the screen should increase the signal (reflection). Investi-
gating this theory required positioning an object (in this case, a hand) closer to the screen and camera
(approximately 5cm) while repeating the experiment in Chapter 9. Using the model in Section 4.4.3,
moving an object closer to the screen increases ES (λ, t), resulting in a corresponding increase in
R (λ,x, t)ES (λ, t). Holding a hand at 5cm distance in the Shade environment resulted in a 93.3%
Correct Classification Rate (CCR), allowing for zero or one errors. This is an improvement of using
a face at 35cm in the Shade environment, which only resulted in an overall CCR of less than 4%.
Figure 10.3 shows that reducing the distance to the object leads to an improvement the reflection
signal.
(Note: Moving the object closer to the screen may also decrease the ambient light EA (λ, t)).
10.6.2 Experiment SNR-2 — Increase the Reflection
Experiment SNR-2 shows that increasing the reflection from the object also improves the perfor-
mance. This experiment uses an object that exhibits a higher reflection capability, in this case, a small
hand-held mirror. Using the model in Section 4.4.3, ES (λ, t) remains constant, but modifications
to the reflection function increase the output value of R (λ,x, t)ES (λ, t). Positioning the mirror at
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Figure 10.3: Input signal and total reflection signal strength (in %) using a hand held close to the
screen and the camera in the Shade environment.
35cm distance in the Sunlight environment (the most challenging outdoor environment due to the high
level of lighting noise) resulted in a 100% CCR (with zero errors).
Figure 10.4 shows the significant improvement in reflected signal using a mirror as the object.
The reflected signal is easy to observe, even in the harshest of environments (Sunlight).
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Figure 10.4: Input signal and total reflection signal strength (in %) using a hand-held mirror for
reflections in the Sunlight environment.
10.6.3 Experiment Discussion
These two experiments showed that increasing the SNR significantly improved the overall perfor-
mance of the system. The experiments also confirmed that camera settings do not contribute to the
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classification problem as, in the harshest of environments (Sunlight), increasing the SNR produced a
100% CCR. This means that the noisy environment does not adversely affect the camera subsystem
(i.e., R (λ,x, t)EA (λ, t) remains relatively constant).
10.7 System Redesign
Redesigning the system to provide increased illumination or reflection could result in a
system that functions in all environments, but has usability issues that require addressing.
The Apple iPhone 6 already has a white LED that provides seven times the illumination of the
Microsoft Surface Pro 2 screen (see Figure 10.1), and a camera that can record at 240fps. These
facilities may create a usable system in most environments (Sunlight may remain challenging, but
most people will not use their phone in full sunlight as it is too difficult to read the screen).
To test this, a simple system using two 40000mcd white LEDs connected to an Arduino Uno
provided an alternative illumination source. However, these LEDs only produced an illumination
level of approximately 50lux, which is equivalent to the Surface Pro 2 screen illumination. As well,
the concentrated light was uncomfortable to look at by the user, reducing the usability of such a
system.
Recently, Apple released the iPhone 6s Plus with a new 5 megapixel front facing camera, which
uses the display screen to illuminate the face to match the ambient lighting when taking photos.
Further investigation into the use of these later model devices, as well as the use of alternative
lighting, such as infrared or near-infrared, would be valuable.
10.8 Summary
The level of illumination from the device and the level of ambient illumination in the en-
vironment have significant impact on the overall performance of the reflected light clas-
sification system.
Detailed analysis and additional experiments show that the level of illumination produced by
screen on the smart device has a significant effect on the overall performance of the system in all
environments. The current system in Chapter 9 works well in indoor environments, but does not
perform well in outdoor environments. The ratio of illumination light to ambient environment light
must exceed 15dB to perform well.
Decreasing the ambient light is relatively easy to achieve by moving indoors.
Increasing the level of illumination from the device may require new facilities on the device, such
as front-facing LEDs or brighter screens. However, LEDs capable of producing a sufficient level of
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illumination may result in discomfort to the user. Illumination such as infrared and near-infrared may
provide suitable alternatives.
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Security Analysis of Face Reflection
Countermeasure System
The only truly secure system is one that is powered off,
cast in a block of concrete and sealed in a lead-lined room
with armed guards — and even then I have my doubts.
Eugene H. Spafford,
Computer Recreations: Of Worms, Viruses and Core War. 1989
Chapter Summary: Security countermeasures are never perfect, and never sufficient. The
only perfectly secure system is unusable.
11.1 Introduction
Structured illumination watermarks serve to make digital replay attacks more difficult to
perform, and therefore, less successful. However, these watermarks are not a guaranteed
protection, as new attacks will eventually defeat them.
Currently, digital replay attacks succeed since captured biometric data is later reusable unaltered
in a different context. Adding a watermark to the video using the systems proposed in Chapter 6 and
Chapter 9 serves to make the captured video data difficult to reuse later on systems that test for its
presence, as each capture sequence will be different.
However, whilst watermarking the images using illumination reflections makes it harder to per-
form a digital replay attack, it does not make it impossible (as with most security techniques).
This chapter examines some of the security considerations surrounding the proposed systems, and
highlights some additional defences.
In the end, no system is perfectly secure — it just has to be secure enough.
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11.2 System Entropy
The uncertainty in the system prevents an attacker from collating a set of watermarked
responses to the challenge, as each challenge is different.
If the watermark in each video is the same illumination sequence, then this results in a system that
is no better than having no watermark. The uncertainty used to add security to the system is missing.
The attacker will always know the sequence of the watermark and can easily reuse a previously
captured video.
The uncertainty, or entropy, in the system forces the attacker away from the easy reuse of a pre-
viously captured video. Shannon’s theories provide an excellent discussion on entropy and noise as
applied to communication systems. Shannon quotes, “In the discrete case the entropy measures in an
absolute way the randomness of the chance variable.” [195].
In the proposed face reflection systems, the entropy in each system represents the number of
possible combinations of illumination sequences. To attack this system using a simple digital replay
attack, the attacker must accumulate a complete set of possible responses.
This type of attack is similar to the use of rainbow tables to pre-compute the output of hash
and password scrambling functions. Oechslin originally derived the concept of a rainbow table from
rainbow chains [157]. Although the term applied to splitting up pre-computed chains of hashed
information into separate lookup tables, the more common use today applies to a single table of pre-
computed outcomes. Other terms applied to this type of attack include dictionary attack (using a
subset of possible likely responses) and codebook attack (known responses to a given challenge).
Here, the term codebook attack represents all of these classes of attack.
The entropy in the system described in Chapter 6 is currently relatively small, but may be large
enough to prevent a codebook attack. At this time, this early system uses the six colours from Ta-
ble 6.1, and displays a colour four times in the sequence (from Algorithm 1). The entropy from this
system is 64 = 1296 (≈ 210 or 10 bits of entropy).
On the other hand, the system described in Chapter 9 uses monochrome illumination as a binary
state challenge. The challenge sequence consists of 31 possible state changes (from Algorithm 3).
The entropy from the revised system is 231. However, the analysis process described in Algorithm 4
allows up to two bits of error. Therefore, the final entropy of this system is 229 = 536, 870, 912.
These systems do not require the use of a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number gener-
ator (PRNG). They only require that the random sequence is sufficiently random to ensure a relatively
even distribution over time, and that each chosen state is independent of a previously chosen state or
sequence of states.
The security offered by these systems arises from the difficulty in providing the correct response
to the illumination challenge. The only requirement imposed upon the user to respond correctly to the
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illumination challenge sequence is to remain aligned and relatively still in front of the camera. The
attacker must do significantly more work to be able to replace the video with a correctly watermarked
video of an imposter. As with the PIN system, the possibility exists to lock the account after several
failed access attempts.
Section 11.3 discusses mechanisms that will increase the entropy in the system used in Chapter 9.
Section 11.4 further discusses enhanced attacks that may defeat these protection systems.
11.3 Frame Rates and Delays
The adoption of modified hardware will significantly increase the entropy of the system,
allowing for a higher tolerance for slight errors, while also reducing the total time for
capturing the watermarked video.
As noted in Chapter 8, the capture process used in Chapter 6 used a delay of 100msec plus dis-
carding the next captured frame each time the screen illumination state changed, while the system in
Chapter 9 used a delay of 200msec. This was to allow the screen sufficient time to update. In addi-
tion, since the camera is typically operating at 30fps, then each frame takes approximately 33msec
for capture.
Using these values, the overall delay for each system is calculated. Table 11.1 shows the total time
to complete the capture using the colour illumination system described in Chapter 6.
Table 11.2 shows the total time to complete the capture using the monochrome illumination system
described in Chapter 9.
Reducing the screen update time in the capture devices (e.g., using a LED for illumination instead
of the screen) reduces or removes the 200msec time delay. Recent smart phones now possess bright
white LEDs. With appropriate hardware, it is possible to use a LED instead of the screen to illuminate
the user’s face. These LEDs update quickly, as shown in Chapter 8. However, usability considera-
tions are paramount as it may be uncomfortable for the user to be staring at such a bright LED. The
alternative is to improve the time required to update the screen. Apple recently released the iPhone
6s Plus which uses the screen as a flash for front-facing photography. The illumination update time
of this screen may have bene improved already.
Additionally, some newer smart devices now possess a high-speed camera capable of capturing at
240fps. Combining such a camera with an improved illumination system will significantly reduce the
time required to complete a video capture that contains a high entropy watermark signal.
For example, the time to complete the capture process in Table 11.2 could fall to 3,183msec,
including the camera settle and face alignment time, for a 231 entropy. A modified system could allow
many more frames to be captured in a shorter time (e.g., an entropy of 2238 would require 4,000msec),
significantly increasing the entropy and allowing for an increased tolerance to classification errors.
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Table 11.1: Time to complete the capture process for watermarking the face with colour illumination.
Colour Illumination used in Chapter 6
Number of frames Time per frame (msec) Total Time (msec)
Camera Settle (1) 3,000 3,000
Start Sequence (4) 33 4×33
Colour Frames (3) 33 100 + 33 + 3×33
Black Frames (3) 33 100 + 33 + 3×33
Colour Frames (3) 33 100 + 33 + 3×33
Black Frames (3) 33 100 + 33 + 3×33
Colour Frames (3) 33 100 + 33 + 3×33
Black Frames (3) 33 100 + 33 + 3×33
Colour Frames (3) 33 100 + 33 + 3×33
Black Frames (3) 33 100 + 33 + 3×33
Close Sequence (3) 33 3×33
Total 5,087
Therefore, new techniques will significantly reduce the capture time in the present system, further
reducing the problem of movement occurring during the capture process.
11.4 Attacking the Digital Replay Attack Protection System
Digital replay attacks against the face verification system remain, but with each counter-
measure, these attacks becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to implement.
To defeat the structured illumination protection against digital replay attacks provided by these
systems, an attacker must be able to create a correctly watermarked video of their chosen target face
images, in real time. Since the attacker already controls the client system, they can observe which
illumination state is next to be displayed, so the ability to predict that state provides no additional
information.
The attacker can deploy several techniques to attack the digital replay attack protection.
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Table 11.2: Time to complete the capture process for watermarking the face with monochrome illu-
mination.
Monochrome Illumination used in Chapter 9
Number of frames Time per frame (msec) Min Total Time (msec) Max Total Time (msec)
Camera Settle (1) 3,000 3,000 3,000
Start Sequence (6) 33 6×33 6×33
Start Frame (1) 33 200 200
Signal Frames (31) 33 31×33 31×200
Close Sequence (6) 33 200 + 5×33 6×33
Total 4,786 9,796
11.4.1 Build a Codebook of Responses
As discussed in Section 11.2, the illumination system watermarks the video using a signal created
by displaying a sequence of two or more colours. The more colours displayed, and the longer the
illumination state sequence, the higher the number of possible combinations.
If the number of illumination sequence combinations is too small, attackers may simply record
many interactions over time, and build a library of correct responses against the challenges issued by
the system. It is therefore critical to ensure that the number of possible sequences (the entropy) is
sufficiently large enough that building a codebook of responses is impractical.
11.4.2 Adding the Illumination Sequence to the Video
Given that the attacker controls the client system, they therefore know which illumination sequence
will be displayed. Whilst they cannot change that sequence to their own, they may attempt to water-
mark their own video of the intended victim with the correct illumination sequence.
Firstly, the attacker requires a suitable video of the victim. Then they must tailor the attack to
each intended victim, increasing the cost of each attack. The widespread automation of this attack
becomes much more difficult to achieve.
Next, the attacker performs real time processing of their video sequence to insert the illumination
sequence watermark. There are several ways to perform this.
Watermark the entire image
In this scenario, the attacker adds the watermark to the entire image. Techniques to do this include
video post-processing, or adjusting the gain, brightness, and/or contrast during the video capture.
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Therefore, not only will the face change illumination, but also the rest of the background in the
image. Countermeasures to this attack should be relatively easy to implement to detect if the entire
image is changing illumination at a constant level.
However, in a legitimate video sequence, the screen may also partially or fully illuminate the
image background. For example, during testing, the system in Chapter 9 would successfully match
the illumination sequence in a lit indoor environment since it observed a reflection from the wall
across the other side of the room, even though there was no object in front of the camera.
Therefore, a countermeasure to this attack could be to ensure that watermark exists only in the
face region, and background pixels do not contain a watermark with similar characteristics.
Watermark the face region only
The attacker might only watermark the face region. This may show as a hard boundary between the
watermarked and non-watermarked areas, especially on the boundary of the facial region. Analysing
this boundary may provide information about an attempted attack.
There may be an absence of the illumination signal across the remainder of the image, such as
other foreground objects such as the neck and chest of the person or the image background. Testing
these regions may determine if the correct signal is present.
The watermarked area may show a flat response across the entire face region. Faces produce
patterned spectral reflections. The contours of these reflections may be analysed to determine that
they conform to a facial structure.
Attempts to add a watermark that conforms to a face spectral reflection pattern may be challeng-
ing, and alignments errors may persist that are detectable.
11.4.3 Stitching Frames Together
The attack against these systems that is currently most likely to succeed is a targeted attack when a
video response sequence is constructed using frames previously captured.
For the colour reflection system, the attacker must capture at least one frame of the victim’s face
illuminated by each colour. For the monochrome system, the attacker must capture at least two frames
of the victim, one illuminated and one non-illuminated.
Then, after the system issues the challenge sequence, the attacker simply creates a video stream
by inserting the appropriately illuminated frame (or frames) into the response.
The simplest countermeasure against this attack is to compare all received frames against the
previously supplied frames to look for repeated frames. The subtle movements introduced by using
a smart device ensure that no two captured frames will be the same — there will always be small
differences between frames.
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The attacker could then defeat this countermeasure by possessing sufficient frames to ensure that
there are no repeated frames in the sequence.
However, a temporal component can be analysed to determine the consistency of the video stream.
It may be possible to deploy techniques like optical flow [29] to determine if the video sequence is
temporally consistent. If the sequence demonstrates spatial shifts that do not appear to be consistent
across time, then this may indicate an attempt to defeat the watermark system.
Note that the time delay introduced during the capture process (discussed in Chapter 8) causes
some problems in this area, as there is a 200msec delay between capture frames. This may result in
6–8 frames being discarded, producing a significant spatial or temporal shift that will be detected as
an attack.
The ability to detect a video sequence that is constructed from individual frames remains an open
area requiring further research.
11.4.4 Session Hijack
Finally, the attacker may infiltrate the client system, wait for the legitimate user to authenticate cor-
rectly, and simply hijack the current session to issue fraudulent transactions.
Session management and session hijacking are generally beyond the scope of this research. How-
ever, this research makes a necessary and valuable contribution to addressing these issues by enabling
the convenient adoption of continuous authentication.
11.4.5 Continuous Authentication
The use of face verification for authentication opens up a new security service. Until now, it has
not been feasible to require the user to authenticate continually throughout the life of the transaction.
Requiring the user to enter their password every 15 seconds, or swipe their finger every five seconds,
simply annoys the user.
However, with a face verification system, the user remains looking at the screen throughout the
life of the entire transaction. The system can then enforce that the correct user remains present during
the entire transaction. Continuous authentication also may provide assistance with solving session
management issues.
Section 2.6.2 provides further details on continuous authentication.
11.5 Summary
How much security is enough? Attackers adapt their techniques to avoid the current
security measures, requiring constant updates to system security.
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Security is never foolproof. As with all countermeasures, they serve to make the attacks harder,
but must do so without sacrificing the usability of the system. The colour and monochrome face
reflection systems provide a good countermeasure to simple digital replay attacks for face verification
systems.
Even though sophisticated attacks may still be possible, these attacks will require significant im-
age processing in real-time to achieve success. The proposed systems do not weaken authentication
security in any way. They do improve the security of biometric authentication using consumer smart
devices above the current situation by making the digital replay attack much harder to perform. If
the overall authentication system can detect fraudulent attempts to masquerade as another user, then
other countermeasures, such as a time-based lockout on the account after a number of failed attempts,
are beneficial.
There will always be further work required in this area, as attacks continue to improve.
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Conclusions and Future Work
Now this is not the end.
It is not even the beginning of the end.
But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.
Sir Winston Churchill. 10 Nov 1942
Chapter Summary: Digital replay attacks are a significant barrier to the secure deploy-
ment of biometrics on consumer smart devices. Until now, no practical solutions existed
to address these attacks. The developed structured illumination system works for indoor
environments, but requires more engineering to be successful in all environments.
12.1 Thesis Summary
Replacing password authentication will most likely involve biometrics. Face verification
is a good choice for use on consumer smart devices, improving the security and usability
of authentication. Addressing digital replay attacks removes a significant threat to this
improvement.
This thesis commenced with the statement, “Users hate passwords”. There are sufficient and
ongoing studies that continually contribute to this statement. Despite the complaints, and decades of
research, passwords remain the most widely deployed authentication mechanism today. Even with
all of the usability concerns, passwords are not secure since, once compromised, intruders may reuse
them many times. Herley et al. [86] provide an excellent analysis on the difficulties of moving beyond
passwords. The lack of unified control, competing goals, usability issues, user reluctance to change,
and cost factors, all contribute to the challenge of replacing passwords.
Technical solutions, such as token-based two-factor authentication, attempt to address usability
and security problems but are costly and lead to the accumulation of multiple separate tokens. Even
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if such solutions were widely adopted, they still only authenticate possession of the relevant token.
They do not authenticate the actual person.
Due to the issues with current online authentication, the first research question posed is:
Q1: What improvements will enhance the usability of current password authentication?
Chapter 2 of this thesis explores answers to this background question. It is clear that “more of the
same” is not an option. Before researchers can develop new security solutions, they must consider
usability and cost factors. One area that shows promise is biometrics.
Biometric-based solutions aim to authenticate the actual person. If the computer system can
somehow recognise us as a person through normal activities (much like our favourite coffee shop
remembers our regular order), rather than testing our knowledge of a password, this will surely be
more usable. However, adoption of biometrics has been slow due to evolving technology and high
costs. The lack of universal biometric sensors has resulted in customised solutions for higher-risk
areas.
Fortunately, the world is in the middle of a major digital revolution. Services and information
are increasingly available via the Internet. Client access is now available wirelessly through a wide
variety of smart devices such as desktops, laptops, tablets, and phones. These devices offer the ability
the unify access to online services, becoming a significant focus for authentication research.
In particular, these smart devices possess a wide variety of peripheral interfaces. It is now possible
to leverage these interfaces as biometric sensors.
This led naturally to the second research question:
Q2: Which biometric modality is appropriate when deploying biometric systems that use consumer
smart devices?
There are many ways of measuring personal physical and behavioural characteristics, including
fingerprints, ear and hand shape, eyes, face, as well as the way we speak, walk, and type. Not all of
these methods are acceptable to the user (e.g., consider the issues in providing a DNA sample every
morning to access a building).
Manufacturers now include fingerprint readers in many of their smart devices. Whilst these read-
ers show promise as the next widely deployed authentication mechanism, they are generally only used
for low-risk authentication (such as unlocking the device), have suffered from usability problems, and
been shown to be insecure.
As well, fingerprint readers create usability problems with the implementation of continuous au-
thentication. Systems need to perform authentication throughout the lifetime of the transaction, not
just at the start. In the coffee shop analogy, after ordering and paying for the coffee, the vendor
should not then hand that coffee order to a different person. Providing a fingerprint at various times
throughout the transaction will be cumbersome and most likely rejected by users as unusable.
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Chapter 2 concluded that face verification was the most practical and usable biometric modality.
People naturally recognise each other by face, so using that authentication in the online world is a
natural extension. Smart devices are now equipped with front-facing cameras that can observe the
user easily during a transaction. The user simply has to look at the screen/camera — it is simple to
use.
Face verification systems are becoming increasingly accurate and robust. If they are not com-
pletely ready for mass deployment yet, ongoing research will continue to resolve outstanding issues.
One issue, in particular, concerns the security of such systems. The bulk of this thesis focuses on
the third research question:
Q3: Are there any obvious attacks to such a biometric system, and how could countermeasures
combat these attacks without requiring any enhancement to existing deployed hardware?
The first attack that people envisage against face verification systems is simply to use a photograph
in front of the camera. Fortunately, this simple attack is largely detectable, as are many other forms
of presentation or spoofing attack, including displayed videos and 3D masks. Researchers continue
to improve solutions to detect these attacks.
However, there is one attack that is highly effective to which no solutions are available, until now.
This is the digital replay attack. Chapter 3 is dedicated to understanding these attacks, and examines
the existing literature for potential solutions.
The extensive literature review concluded that the only postulated solutions by others to digital
replay attacks include the use of intelligent peripheral devices (increasing cost and decreasing ubiq-
uity), post-processing of biometric data (not secure), or significant user cooperation such as head
movements (decreasing usability). None of these solutions is suitable, and most do not meet the
security, usability, and cost constraints.
Digital replay attacks can be highly automated in much the same way that computer viruses,
worms, and trojan horses propagate. In contrast, the attacker must specifically customise the spoofing
attack to target an individual victim. This makes digital replay attacks a significant risk, and a barrier
to the successful deployment of enhanced authentication. It required some basic software and a few
minutes to attack an existing face verification system successfully.
Providing solutions to digital replay attacks that meet the usability and cost constraints is a chal-
lenge. The simplicity of using face verification systems must not be undermined.
Chapter 4 defined the reflection model used by the systems proposed in this thesis. Chapter 5 then
proposed the first countermeasure to digital replay attacks, by observing the reflection from the screen
in the user’s eyes. However, the small reflection region created significant problems with identifying
and classifying the appropriate reflection. The conclusion was to use a larger area for the reflection.
The system detailed in Chapter 6 used a sequence of colours displayed on the device screen to
reflect from the user’s face. This sequence, and the corresponding reflections from the face, provided
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a watermark in the face verification video used to ensure that the capture of the video occurred during
the display of the colour sequence and in close proximity to that particular device. The user is not
required to do anything more than look at the screen, thus addressing usability concerns. The system
leverages the existing hardware, thus addressing the cost concerns. Although this early system showed
promise, it required a darkened room to function correctly. The design of this system contributed to a
number of issues that required further exploration.
Chapter 7 examined the way that camera devices observe colours. The research identified that
these “closed system” devices are difficult to control, and their perception of colour creates additional
challenges. Other challenges with the colour reflection system included the time required to update
the screen with a new colour. Chapter 8 identified that this screen update time created problems due
to the screen illumination being in two different stages during the frame capture.
The system proposed in Chapter 9 addressed many of these issues by using monochrome white
illumination and an updated capture protocol. This system performed exceptionally well in all indoor
environments, but still suffered from classification problems when operating in outdoor environments.
Chapter 10 then examined why the monochrome system failed in outdoor environments, and iden-
tified the lighting constraints contributing to the poor performance. Device screens have the potential
to illuminate the user’s face sufficiently to overcome ambient indoor lighting conditions, but they
currently struggle to provide a usable signal above the intensity of illumination in outdoor environ-
ments. Analysis of the relative illumination levels provides an understanding of these illumination
constraints. Future system proposals may predict their potential performance through understanding
these constraints.
Finally, Chapter 11 examined the security of the proposed systems. Security is a constant race
between attack and defence. Understanding the security weaknesses of the proposed systems enables
further research in this field. Although these systems go a long way to addressing digital replay
attacks, the protection systems themselves may ultimately be susceptible to new attacks, some of
which this chapter explored. Security is a journey, and not a destination. These systems represent just
a small, but significant, part of that journey.
The result of this research was not only to highlight the vulnerability of systems to digital replay
attacks, but also to provide the first practical solution to combat them.
12.2 Contributions
This research work provides the first practical countermeasure against digital replay at-
tacks for face verification systems that use consumer smart devices. In addition, empirical
testing identifies and addresses several issues.
This section repeated from Section 1.2.
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The research work documented in this thesis provides a number of significant contributions. Most
importantly, although this research builds on the work of others, it is the first practical solution for
face verification systems on consumer smart devices to combat digital replay attacks. In summary,
the contributions include:
• Proposing mechanisms to improve authentication above current password systems (in Chap-
ter 2);
• Examining usable biometric modalities on consumer smart devices (in Chapter 2);
• Illustrating the difference between the two main client-side biometric system attacks (in Chap-
ter 3);
• Providing a literature baseline on digital replay attacks (in Chapter 3);
• Validating the effectiveness of digital replay attacks on consumer smart devices (in Chapter 3);
• Construction of a reflection model suitable to analyse the components in the proposed reflection
systems (in Chapter 4);
• Proposing and evaluating in-band challenge-response watermarking countermeasures that use
structured illumination reflections to combat digital replay attacks (in Chapters 5, 6, and 9);
• Further examining limitations in the proposed countermeasures, and evaluating mechanisms to
overcome those limitations (in Chapters 7, 8, and 10);
• Analysing the security of the proposed countermeasure to digital replay attacks, and proposing
additional countermeasures to combat new attacks (in Chapter 11).
A detailed review of the current literature (in Section 3.5) concludes that, although digital replay
attacks have been identified as an issue by others, no practical countermeasures to digital replay
attacks currently exist. Therefore, the proposed structured illumination reflection technique is one of
the first evaluated attempts to combat digital replay attacks for face verification systems that leverage
consumer smart devices as biometric readers.
12.3 Future Work
Security systems are constantly evolving to counter new attacks. Therefore, further work
is always required to provide continued improvement.
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The structured illumination systems proposed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 9 represent the first practi-
cal solutions to digital replay attacks. These systems are neither sufficient nor complete. Researchers
can continue to contribute to this topic in several areas.
The system performance requires improvement. Although the basic systems operate well in in-
door environments, further research is required to improve their performance and robustness in all
environments. New devices, such as the Apple iPhone 6s Plus, continue to be deployed with updated
hardware. These devices may resolve issues such as screen illumination levels and update delay times.
Cameras with higher frame rates may enable higher entropy in systems and therefore, allow in-
creased error tolerance.
Creating a total authentication package to incorporate face verification and digital replay attack
protection no doubt will identify a number of issues that require addressing.
The security of the proposed systems also requires improvement, as discussed in Chapter 11.
These systems offer the ability to enhance attack countermeasures, for example, using temporal con-
sistency checks, and frame stitching attack detection. The successful deployment of each new coun-
termeasure makes attacks more difficult. Eventually, the attack costs more than the potential gain, and
attackers then seek softer targets.
Continuous authentication, coupled with robust session management, may provide increased se-
curity against session hijacking attacks.
Finally, the face reflection technique also offers promise in supporting the detection of 2D spoofing
attempts, such as photographs and video devices. Structured illumination potentially creates a strong
and distinct specular reflection pattern from the face, regardless of ambient conditions. This may
simplify the use of specular reflection detection in anti-spoofing systems.
12.4 Concluding Remarks
The research questions in this thesis led to the conclusion that passwords will increasingly
be replaced with biometrics, a usable biometric will be face verification, and that digital
replay attacks are a major barrier to this occurring. The marketplace appears to agree,
with face verification systems starting to appear.
In 2012, at the start of this research project, the world was a different place. Fingerprint readers
were only available on a select range of laptops (not smart phones) and Google had only just released
Google Wallet. Authentication to online accounts predominantly used passwords. Authentication for
payments used either passwords or two-factor authentication when combined with a token. Mobile
phones, tablets, and laptops already possessed front-facing cameras in increasing numbers.
It is in this environment that the first research question pondered the replacement for passwords.
Existing research concluded that usability and cost issues not only drove the continued adoption of
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passwords, but also require consideration when proposing any password replacement. Usability and
security led to a conclusion that there will be a convergence between traditional authentication and
biometrics. Device manufacturers such as Apple and Samsung appeared to agree, and commenced
adopting fingerprint readers in 2013. Even more recently, providers commenced exploring the use
of face verification for financial transactions [169]. As an example, MasterCard is now trialling the
use of “selfies” (a photograph that a user takes of themselves) to replace passwords for transaction
security [139].
The second research question pondered how best to implement biometrics for authentication.
There are at least two divergent paths here. The first is the proliferation of fingerprint readers on
devices since 2013. This required manufacturers to engineer additional hardware into their devices,
adding to manufacturing costs. Although these readers are now widespread, they currently are still
vulnerable to spoofing or presentation attacks, and have suffered usability issues over several years.
The usability is improving, and fingerprint biometric systems now authorise payments as well as local
device access. However, they are not a general solution for all online accounts and do not conveniently
support continuous authentication.
The second path, proposed in this thesis, is to use face verification biometrics. Most devices
possess suitable hardware already, and face verification is usable for many online accounts as well
as conveniently enabling continuous authentication. Face verification systems are potentially more
usable than fingerprint systems since the only cooperation required from the user is to look at the
camera. It does not require a special device, or action by the user such as swiping the fingerprint.
Therefore, we continue to argue that face verification will be more usable in a wider variety of use
cases than fingerprint verification.
Most current devices possess suitable hardware (i.e., camera and screen) and are more than ca-
pable of providing the necessary video due to only modest demands on CPU and storage. As video
resolution increases, network bandwidth demands will also increase. Backend systems that process
the incoming video streams will have increasing CPU and storage requirements as service demands
increase. In particular, as attacks improve in sophistication, CPU demands will continue to increase
on backend systems to further process additional countermeasures.
Face verification is potentially more secure than fingerprints for authentication. Recently, Apple
Pay (coupled with Touch ID fingerprint authentication) suffered from fraudulent transactions due to
insufficient credit card authorisation [199]. The use of face verification would support non-repudiation
services and provide additional evidence when prosecuting such fraud, potentially acting as a deter-
rent. Many bank ATMs also support CCTV cameras to assist with security. Home internet banking
has currently removed this security feature, but face verification authentication could bring it back
again.
It is the third research question, searching for obvious attacks in biometric systems, which iden-
tified a significant weakness. Many people are already aware of spoofing or presentation attacks.
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Existing research has already uncovered the fingerprint reader’s vulnerability to spoofing attacks. For
face verification, other research efforts have made significant progress in detecting fake biometric
attempts such as photographs, videos, and 3D masks.
Further research in this thesis identified that attacking a recent face verification system from within
proved to be simple and effective. A digital replay attack simply bypassed the anti-spoofing facilities.
A detailed search of the current research literature failed to identify any significant practical and
general solutions to addressing such digital replay attacks.
Some current fingerprint systems use a closed architecture with strict use cases to limit the ex-
posure of the fingerprint information. However, not all architectures support such protections, and
opening the architecture to allow the fingerprint for use in a wider variety of applications will render
it vulnerable to attack. These systems place enormous trust in the integrity of the device and soft-
ware, which recent attacks show, cannot be trusted. As already noted, in just the last few months,
researchers identified that 600 million Samsung Android phones had pre-installed keyboard software
that contained security flaws [241]. Just in the remaining few days before completing this thesis,
Apple identified several hundred applications in the Apple Store containing malicious software [65].
In that instance, developers were convinced to use a compromised Xcode build environment, which
compromised the applications. We therefore maintain that these devices cannot be trusted, now, nor
into the future.
This thesis proposes a different direction to fingerprints, by using the camera on consumer smart
devices to replace passwords with face verification. This biometric modality addresses the usability
issues with fingerprint, thus enabling convenient continuous authentication, as well as non-repudiation
services using the face image. Yet, the consumer smart devices are not trustworthy, and such systems
are vulnerable to digital replay attacks.
To address digital replay attacks, instead of performing the authentication processing locally on
the device, the authentication system sends the watermarked video of the user to a trusted back-end
system for processing. The consumer smart device is only a collection point. The watermarking
system exploits the device screen to illuminate the user’s face with a structured illumination signal,
thus providing the first practical solution to combat digital replay attacks. This system is simple to
use, and the smart device does not require additional or modified hardware.
Since the start of this research, the available technology has changed significantly. Biometric au-
thentication is entering the mainstream usage (addressed in Research Question 1). Fingerprint readers
are now widespread, and face verification is slowly catching up (addressed in Research Question 2).
Since face verification is more usable, attention focused on obvious attacks to that system, identifying
spoofing attacks and digital replay attacks (addressed in Research Question 3). There is significant
research available to address spoofing attacks, and this thesis provides the first practical countermea-
sure to digital replay attacks. Addressing these attacks removes further barriers to the adoption of face
verification authentication using consumer smart devices. When looking back over the journey of this
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research, it is gratifying to see the significant progress in the authentication technology marketplace in
such a short time. Time will tell if the research in this thesis contributes significantly to that evolution.
This thesis identifies that no practical solutions exist to address digital replay attacks in biometric
systems. It therefore proposes a practical, cheap, and usable solution to address these attacks for
face verification systems using consumer smart devices. This helps to enable a future where, instead
of remembering a myriad of confusing passwords, secure access to online accounts is as simple as
looking at your phone.
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Appendix A
Literature Citation Mapping
Citation maps provide a useful method to examine the genesis and development of a topic
over time, as well as the reason for the existence of a particular citation giving a much
deeper meaning to that work.
It is valuable to examine how different publications relate to each other. This appendix describes
the literature citation mapping technique referred to in Section 3.5. The citation map provides insight
into how an area of knowledge develops over time, and identifies key contributors to various topics.
Citation maps examine the citation links between papers, followed by reducing the complexity of the
map to the core subset of relevant papers and examining the reason for citation links that remain.
Clearly, creating citation maps by hand for a large number of publications is a time consuming task.
The automated creation of citation maps enables the deeper analysis of how identified publications
relate to each other.
The developed citation map technique consists of four phases:
1. Collection phase, to collect papers from various sources;
2. Mapping phase, to create the initial citation map;
3. Reduction phase, to reduce the complexity of the map by removing irrelevant information;
4. Evaluation phase, which examines the remaining citation links.
A.1 Collection Phase
The review collected a number of publications for analysis using four main techniques:
1. Using scholarly search engines (primarily Google Scholar, university library, and IEEE Xplore),
publications were identified using a variety of search terms relating to eye and face reflections,
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biometric attacks, authentication weaknesses, biometric authentication, digital replay attacks,
and many other combinations. These search terms progressively narrowed to more focused
topics as the review progressed;
2. Examination of both the citation list in the more interesting publications, plus a review of pub-
lications citing this one, led to additional publications to review;
3. Examination of other publications by notable authors for usefulness;
4. Communication of the current findings and topic of interest to various colleagues led them to
highlighting potential publications of interest.
The iteration to search for more publications terminated when papers were mainly referencing
other papers with the group, and publications contained no new material or techniques. These search
techniques resulted in over 300 publications being reviewed.
Each paper was summarised and stored in EndNote [225] along with the meta-data. Each paper
has a label assigned consisting of <first-author-surname><yy>[abc] (e.g., Smith15a —
the trailing letter is only used for disambiguation if required). Included in the meta-data is a list of
papers that the current paper cites, in the same format.
Upon reviewing each publication and summarising, it became clearer that publications group well
into a number of topics that further group into two broad topics. The two broad topics of this research
proposal involve biometrics and authentication.
The subgroups in the biometrics group are:
• Biometric History;
• Eye Studies;
• Biometric Attacks;
• Biometric Encryption;
• Face Verification.
The subgroups in the authentication group are:
• Authentication Requirements;
• Mobile Devices;
• Authentication Systems;
• Cryptography.
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A.2 Mapping Phase
The next phase uses the publication citation list to create a citation map. Note that when adding each
publication to the EndNote database, it is much easier to update the citation map.
The input data format (generated using a specially defined Output Style in EndNote) is:
<label><tab><citation count><tab>...
...<year><tab><[citation(1)]...[citation(n)]>
A developed program converts the exported data into XML format suitable for loading into the
Compendium software package [222]. The mapping program creates a node for each publication and,
by analysing the citation list, creates the links from citing publication to cited publication within this
set. The mapping program calculates the location of the node in the map to prevent overlaps. The
XML contains the following entries.
The XML DTD consists of the following basic structure:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE model SYSTEM "Compendium.dtd">
<model rootview="1365747421867000">
<views>
...
</views>
<nodes>
...
</nodes>
<links>
...
</links>
<codes>
</codes>
</model>
Each node requires a unique identifier. The node has a node view specification (specifying at-
tributes, including its location), and then the actual node specification:
<view viewref="1365747421867000" noderef="1365747421867001"
XPosition="0" YPosition="0" created="1365747421867"
lastModified="1365747421867" showTags="true" showText="true"
showTrans="true" showWeight="true" smallIcon="false"
hideIcon="false" labelWrapWidth="25" fontsize="12"
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fontface="Dialog" fontstyle="0" foreground="-16777216"
background="-1">
</view>
<node id="1365747421867001" type="9" extendedtype="" originalid=""
author="Danny" created="1365747421867"
lastModified="1365747421867" label="?(0)"
state="2" lastModificationAuthor="Danny">
<details>
<page nodeid="1365747421867001" author="Danny"
created="1365747421867" lastModified="1365747421867"
pageno="1">
</page>
</details>
<source></source>
<image width="0" height="0"></image>
<background></background>
<coderefs></coderefs>
<shortcutrefs></shortcutrefs>
</node>
The specification for each link also requires a unique identifier, as follows:
<link id="1365747421867307" created="1365747421867"
lastModified="1365747421867" author="Danny" type="39"
originalid="" from="1365747421867022" to="1365747421867018"
label="" arrow="1">
<linkviews>
<linkview id="1365747421867000"/>
</linkviews>
</link>
The final step in crating the initial map is to import the XML DTD into Compendium. Figure A.1
shows the initial map.
The initial examination of the map identifies trends. It is possible to move the nodes freely and
the attached links will follow the node automatically, making them easy to identify. Grouping nodes
together into areas of common interest can help to highlight citation trends, or areas of focus.
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A.3 Reduction Phase
The ultimate goal of this literature review is to identify publications that relate to the use of biometrics
in authentication, and digital replay attacks.
Whilst the initial map in Figure A.1 does not look particularly useful, it does immediately help to
identify publications of interest that have a significant number of links, either forward or backward.
These publications tend to fall into three categories:
1. Many incoming links: this publication is highly cited, and either represents a seminal publica-
tion in the topic, or is a defining publication for a topic;
2. Many outgoing links: this publication cites many other publications, and is often a survey
publication that widely examines a topic;
3. Many incoming and outgoing links: Often, such bridging publications cite previous work, and
then build upon it in some impactful way.
The next task relocates nodes representing the publications into their designated topics (detailed
in Section A.1). Figure A.2 shows the sorted citation map. Publications on the extreme upper and
lower bounds have no citations within this map. Publications at the next layer in have citations within
the map, but only within the broad topic group (that is, the citation link is essentially horizontal).
Individually placing the final group of publications towards the centre of the map highlights their
citation links. These publications show links between the biometric field, and the authentication
field. These publications are termed crossover papers and warrant further analysis to determine works
completed in the combined topic space.
This sorted map still appears confusing. Since the literature review focuses on digital replay
attacks, a new citation map examines the combination of these crossover papers, and includes any
paper that discussed liveness testing or digital replay attacks, especially for face verification systems.
Also included in this map are a group of patents that refer to the eye reflection technique currently
proposed as a solution to digital replay attacks for face verification on consumer mobile devices (see
Chapter 5).
Therefore, the reduced citation map in Figure A.3 includes:
• All the papers that reference across the domains, plus include any other papers that discuss
digital replay attacks or liveness testing, especially for face verification;
• For each citation crossing between the major domains, an examination of the author’s reason
for that citation, with these reasons grouped together;
• Identifying the citations that relate to practical solutions for digital replay attacks, (these cita-
tions shown in the lighter colour in Figure A.3.
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The grouping of publications shows the authentication domain across the bottom, the biometrics
domain through the middle, and papers that specifically discuss digital replay attacks or liveness
testing at the top.
In order to focus more on the links between these broad topic areas, a subset map shows only the
crossover papers. All links that remain within the major topics (that is, essentially horizontal) have
been removed for clarity. As a result, Figure A.4 shows the citation links that exist between the two
major groups (biometrics and authentication). The number of interesting citation links is now small
enough to warrant individual analysis (see Section A.4).
A.4 Evaluation Phase
Note that on the right side of Figure A.3 are a group of publications. These are patents, and refer
to using eye reflections to determine liveness [83, 84, 90], using eye reflections generated from a
computer screen [138], using strobed light to find the eyes in a face image [154], and using pulsed
active light to reduce user discomfort [82]. Of particular note is that, although these patents discuss
techniques to protect against digital replay attacks by using strobed light to observe eye reflections,
these are all uncited by the mainstream literature. This is observed by the citation counts (mostly,
zero), and the lack of any citation links. The only citations for Northcott08 [154] are from other
patents.
Publications positioned across the top of Figure A.3 represent papers that relate to reflections or
biometric digital replay attacks. Note that the citations from this list are isolated to the biometrics
domain, and do not cross over into the authentication domain. Regarding digital replay attacks, any
reference to the topic within the publication generally mentions digital replay attacks as an ongoing
concern without addressing them further (e.g., [202]), they propose theoretical solutions (e.g., [111]),
or despite discussing attacks in general the topic of digital replay attacks is not addressed (e.g., [72]).
None of these publications provides practical and tested solutions to digital replay attacks.
All of the darker coloured citations links in Figure A.3 are for reasons other than digital replay
attacks. These reasons include:
• Description of biometrics;
• Biometrics on mobile devices;
• Biometric template protection;
• Password dictionary attacks.
The number of crossover citation links in Figure A.4 is now small enough to perform a more de-
tailed analysis. Examining the actual citations determines why the author cited a particular publication
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allowing the grouping of publications based upon the citation reasons. For example, all links that ref-
erence Morris79 [145] and Klein90 [115] are from publications that are pointing out the weaknesses
of passwords, especially dictionary-based attacks.
Finally, the papers on the left side of this map show references between the biometric and authen-
tication domains, and that citation contains some aspect of digital replay or spoofing attacks. These
citation links are in a lighter colour in Figure A.3. The reasons for these citation links are:
• OGorman03 [158]→ Derakhshani03 [54]: Liveness testing is required at the biometric capture
point. Forgery detection methods do exist, however . . . ;
• OGorman03 [158] → Matsumoto02 [140]: . . . these forgery detection methods are easily de-
feated. Biometrics lack secrecy;
• Meghanathan11 [141] → Xiao05 [249]: Require users to blink to detect liveness and prevent
spoofing;
• Xiao02 [248]→ Thalheim02 [221]: Static images can spoof biometric systems;
• Bonneau12 [22]→Matsumoto02 [140]: Common, off-the-shelf (COTS), devices may be easily
fooled “e.g., by lifting fingerprints from glass surfaces with gelatine-like substances”.
These papers [22, 141, 158, 248] all discuss the issues of digital replay attacks, and some propose
theoretical solutions. However, none of these papers proposes practical and tested solutions.
The citations that cross from the digital replay attack domain to the biometrics domain were also
individually examined, and summarised. These identified an additional group of papers that discussed
biometric digital replay attacks and proposed theoretical solutions.
Figure A.5 shows a clearer representation of Figure A.3, including the summary of the reason
why the author referenced the paper. It shows that few publications discuss the issue of digital re-
play attacks, and even fewer propose theoretical solutions. Of the proposed solutions, the following
techniques apply to digital replay attacks against face verification systems:
• Challenge-response to an intelligent biometric sensor (Ratha01b [180], Bolle02 [21], Spe-
icher06 [209], Roberts07 [184]);
• Encrypting the communications path between the biometric sensor and the biometric system
(Ratha01b [180], Roberts07 [184]);
• Modifying the image in a pre-defined manner (Ratha01b [180]).
None of these security solutions is suitable for a face verification system that proposes to use
the webcam on an untrusted consumer mobile device. These webcams are not “intelligent” devices,
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so cannot authenticate the captured biometric signal to a third party prior to transferring the data
through the computer first. As soon as the biometric data moves into a computer for processing
before transmission, it becomes vulnerable to compromise, especially digital replay attacks.
A.5 Summary
Figure A.5 shows a simplified version of the final citation map. This simplified diagram gives a
good high-level view of the influential papers in this topic area, as well as the reason for citing other
publications. It shows that a deeper analysis is not required for most citations. The final analysis
of these citations identifies that there are no published practical and tested solutions to digital replay
attacks. It also shows that none of the proposed theoretical solutions is suitable for the use case of
face verification using consumer mobile devices.
Reasoning that any research that aims to solve digital replay attacks in biometric systems for use in
online authentication must reference previous works from both domains, the lack of suitable citations
confirms the initial literature review in Section 3.5 that additional research is required in this area to
solve an obvious weakness in biometric systems. Digital replay attacks remain a significant threat
to the widespread adoption of biometric authentication. This literature review examined both the
authentication and biometric domains, with a specific focus on digital replay attacks, liveness testing,
and the proposed eye reflection watermarking solution.
One major outcome from this analysis technique is that when examining the citation links between
publications, it is important to focus not only on the publications involved in the citation link, but also
the purpose or reason why that citation exists. Some citations are present to build on previous work,
and others merely reference another work to refer the reader to more information on the specific topic
if required.
Possible enhancements to this technique include node location meta-data in EndNote, and inves-
tigating the use of colours to highlight items of interest. A recently released development version of
updated software titled CompendiumNG [47] may support link colours and formats, but no further
investigation has occurred.
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Figure A.1: Initial citation map
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Figure A.2: Sorted citation map
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Figure A.3: Reduced citation map
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Figure A.4: Crossover citation map
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Figure A.5: Final reduced citation map
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